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In its original proposal, this thesis aimed to examine the wartime policies 
of Winston Churchill and his influence on Britain's decision to campaign 
throughout North Africa and the Mediterranean region and to assess whether 
his motivation was to preserve what remained of the British Imperial System 
following the military reversals of the Second World War. However, the 
problem with this original idea was that there was not enough primary material 
available on Churchill in New Zealand and it would have been difficult to 
import material from the United Kingdom and elsewhere within the timeframe 
allowed for a Masters thesis and at to great a cost. Therefore, a new direction 
was required and in 2003, the focus began to shift towards the Second Front 
because the literature on British and Allied campaigns in the Mediterranean 
so often referred to it and due to the amount of primary sources that are 
available at the University of Canterbury and that allowed for detailed 
research on this subject. 
Although the Second Front opened in 1944, it has its origins following 
evacuation of the British Expeditionary Forces and units of the French military 
from the Continent in 1940. Even in defeat and faced with the prospect of 
invasion, the British began to examine the possibility of their forces re-
deploying across the English Channel and the circumstances under which an 
operation of this kind could prove successful against the Wehrmacht. The 
prospect of a re-deployment to North-West Europe became central to Britain's 
strategic planning throughout the fours years that followed yet Churchill and 
his military commanders devised alter~ative plans and sought to prevent the 
Axis forces from taking control of the Indian Ocean region and the Middle 
East. The purpose of this thesis is to ascertain the British stance towards the 
Second Front between 1940 and 1943 and to determine whether they were in 
favour of it or not and if so, what reasons did they have for not committing 
forces. It also addresses how the divisions between London and Washington 
concerning the Second Front influenced the dynamics of their alliance and 
how it came to symbolise the transforming international political and military 
2 
landscape, the decline of British power and the ascendancy of two countries 
that would shape the post-war environment known as the Cold War. 
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INTRODUCTION. 
Historiographical Review and Thesis Outline. 
The Second Front in North-West Europe, codenamed Operation 
'Overlord', opened on the morning of 6 June 1944. Following naval and aerial 
bombardment of the German defences, nine Allied infantry divisions 1 
disembarked along a 50-mile stretch of Normandy coastline between the 
Cotentin Peninsula and the Orne River. Overlord not only marked the 
beginning of the Allied ground campaign to liberate Western Europe from 
German occupation but it was also the first time that large-scale British 
infantry divisions had fought in France since the evacuation of the 
Expeditionary Force and remnants of the French Army four years earlier. In 
his book, Second Front Now - 1943,2 Dunn argues that political 
considerations rather than military ones influenced the timing of the Second 
Front and that the United States and Britain had assembled superior forces to 
the Germans by 1943. Yet they sought not only a German defeat and fewer 
casualties amongst their own troops but the operation had to commence at a 
time when they believed that the German offensives had sufficiently 
weakened the Soviet Union as not to pose a threat to them in the post-war 
era. Hence, the West delayed opening the Second Front for twelve months as 
"Politically, 1944 was the best year - the initial landing involved little loss of 
life or material on the part of the West, and yet the West was left in control of 
nearly half of Europe when Germany collapsed. On the basis of military 
capability, according to American military leaders, the second front was 
possible in 1943, if not in 1942. A German surrender in late 1943 would have 
saved Germany from the heavy bombing of 1944 and 1945 and spared 
Russia much of the devastation that resulted from the battles of those years".3 
Consequently, the delay provided the Germans with a vital twelve-month 
window of opportunity in which to rebuild their forces stationed in Western 
Europe and they "gained relatively more military capability than did the 
1 The assault force that landed in Normandy on D-Day consisted of five American, three 
British and one Canadian Division. 
2 Walter Scott Dunn. Second Front Now- 1943. (Alabama, University of Alabama Press, 
1980). 
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Western Allies during that period. The German army in France was very weak 
from April 1943 until February 1944. By June 1944, the Germans had 
increased their strength in the West considerably, while the Allies had fewer 
troops on hand, insomuch as there were fewer British divisions available. The 
Germans moved men to the West during 1944, but no new American divisions 
were formed after 1943. In effect, while the Allies sat for a year, the Germans 
rebuilt".4 
While proposing that the Western Allies sought an emaciated Russia, 
Dunn also questions their justification that shortfalls in the number of landing 
craft they possessed, the lack of training for their divisions and equipment 
shortages prevented them from deploying forces to North-West Europe in 
1943. He claims that the British High Command formulated this argument 
based on estimates of Allied military strength in 1942 and it failed to take into 
consideration the future capability of American industry. The result was that a 
lack of confidence developed among British generals as to the quality of their 
forces and this served to increase their opposition to a cross-Channel 
enterprise. By the end of 1942, the United States and Britain had overtaken 
Germany in their military production as the Reich had made little use of the 
industries within the occupied countries in the first two years of the war. 
However, under the direction of Albert Speer, "German production improved 
both in quantity and in quality, because the captured nations' industry was 
utilised and millions of non-Germans were recruited into the war effort as 
workers, service troops, and even combat soldiers. Even though Germany 
could not overcome the preponderance of the Allies, the invasion of 1944 was 
more difficult that it would have been a year earlier''.5 
The pressure on the Churchill Government to commit to the Second Front 
increased as the Soviet Union and the United States entered the war. Both 
countries favoured it as the means best suited to defeating Germany but each 
held their own reasons. For the Americans, the Second Front offered a 
strategy through which they believed the Allies could inflict a swift defeat on 
Germany before turning their attention to campaigning against Japan in the 
3 Ibid. 3-4. 
4 Ibid. 4. 
5 Ibid 6-7. 
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Pacific Ocean. Meanwhile, Moscow's agitation stemmed from the Soviet 
Government's view such an operation would draw German units away from 
the Eastern Front and relieve the pressure on the Red Army having suffered a 
series of defeats throughout 1941 and 1942 at the hands of the Wehrmacht. 
Despite the United States maintaining a policy of neutrality until Pearl 
Harbour, its military planners began convert meetings with their British 
counterparts as early as January 1941. What emerged from these sessions 
was the 'Germany First' policy under which American forces would establish a 
defensive perimeter throughout the Pacific until they could transfer the bulk of 
their forces from Europe following the surrender of the Third Reich.6 Both 
countries formulated plans for possible operations over the course of the next 
twelve months that if implemented could have seen large-scale Allied forces 
invade North-West Europe in advance of 1944. These operations, code-
named Operations 'Round-Up' and 'Sledgehammer' became issues for 
dialogue and division between the Allies and had these operations proceeded 
then the Second World War may possibly have followed a different course. 
Yet as Dunn contends, "the energy of the European forces was siphoned off 
into a campaign that could only end in the Alps and offered no serious threat 
to the German industrial vitals"7 and plans such as Round-Up, Sledgehammer 
and other proposed assaults became the forerunners to the Second Front 
rather than its manifestation. 
The Allies began to explore the possibility of operations in North Africa 
despite this planning process and as 1942 and 1943 progressed, Britain's 
attention and especially that of Brooke8, began to shift more towards the 
Middle East and Mediterranean theatres. Dunn writes, "Believing nothing 
could be done in Europe, the British searched elsewhere for a victory. To 
clean up Libya and to protect India, the British planned to send three hundred 
thousand men overseas between February and March 1942, taking them 
away from the potential European invasion force". The dispersal of British 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid, 7. 
8 Alanbrooke, Alan Francis Brooke, 1st Viscount,-1883-1963, entered the artillery in 1902 and 
saw service in the First World War. Having studied mechanised warfare during the inter-war 
period, he was appointed commander of the 2nd Army Corps in France in 1940. Following the 
fall of France, he was commander of the Home Forces and he became Chief of Imperial 
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infantry divisions throughout North Africa, the Middle East and South Asia was 
an effort on the part of the government and military hierarchy to protect what 
remained of the country's spheres of interest, but also as a ploy to force the 
Wehrmacht to disperse its forces rather than having to engage them in 
combat directly. Britain also invoked the use of blockade and aerial 
bombardment designed to degrade Germany's economic and industrial 
capacity and erode civilian morale while its action throughout North-West 
Europe was limited to a series of commando raids conducted by its Special 
Forces. 
The objective of this thesis is to analyse the development of Britain's policy 
towards the Second Front from June 1940 until January 1944 and ascertain 
the reasons why its forces did not participate in a cross-Channel invasion 
during that period. In order to this, the thesis will examine whether this was 
, , I 6' 
because Britain lacked the military capability to re-deploy to Europe given the 
losses incurred by its forces in 1940 and that it faced the subsequent threat of 
invasion. The other possibility is that the government and Chiefs-of-Staff did 
not possess the resolve fearing the consequences that a failed attack would 
have on civilian and military morale, the armed forces' combat wherewithal 
and the possible political ramifications for Churchill's administration. Wilmot's 
examination of this issue contends that even as the Expeditionary Forces 
returned from the Continent in 1940, the government and its military planners 
recognised that Germany needed to be defeated if victory was to be achieved, 
or at the very least, a situation created whereby the German Government 
sought peace terms favourable to London. For this reason, the British began 
to explore the feasibility of their forces crossing the Channel and under what 
the conditions they could prevail against the German units stationed in the 
West.9 However, if the government and Chiefs-of-Staff believed that a cross-
Channel enterprise was necessary to bring about a conclusion to the war as 
Wilmot suggests, then under what circumstances would they have permitted 
the assault to proceed and why do they not appear to have presented 
themselves before 1944? 
General Staff the following year. He served in this post until 1946 becoming Viscount 
Alanbrooke that same year. 
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Historiography. 
The issue of the Second Front in North-West Europe is a much-discussed 
topic within existing literature and study and one upon which authors offer 
different perspectives. Butler maintains that the policy of attrition and 
harassment of Germany offered the British the most effective method 
available for continuing the war without risking another possibly fatal defeat 
following Dunkirk. His reasoning is that for Churchill and Brooke, "the North 
African project was much more than a mere compromise or second-best 
solution. It was the first move in the application of a classical strategy whereby 
the superior power at sea uses its mobility to compel the enemy superior on 
the major land-front to disperse his forces in order to meet attacks favourable 
to the assailant" .10 With the Germans holding the dominant military position on 
land in 1942 they could have utilised their East-West communications system 
to deploy their forces rapidly to France in sufficient numbers that would have 
been capable of repelling any Allied assault. On the other hand, their 
communications system that ran on a southern configuration was not as 
advanced. Butler argues that if the British could force the Germans into 
dispersing their forces southward then they would not be able to redeploy 
these formations easily and this dispersion of strength would clear the way for 
a cross-Channel enterprise. This view became Allied policy in 1941 in that "an 
essential feature of the strategy agreed at Washington, based as it was on a 
memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff, was to close and tighten the ring 
round Germany and gain possession of the whole North African coast".11 The 
Western Allies believed that only the Russians could undertake any large-
scale offensive action against Germany in 1942 along their front but they 
agreed that they must be prepared "to take advantage of any opening that 
might result from the war of attrition to conduct limited land offensives" .12 
Butler goes on to record: "the British delegates on their return from 
Washington reported that the President 'set great store' on the organisation of 
9 Chester Wilmot. The Struggle for Europe. (London, Collins, 1952). For further examination 
of this point, see Chapter 3. 
10 J.R.M Butler. Grand Strategy. Volume 3, Part 2. (London, H.M.S.O. 1964). 563. 
11 Ibid. 564. ' 
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a combined Anglo-American expedition to North Africa, and for some weeks 
'Super-Gymnast', as this scheme was called, received much attention".13 
Leighton's analysis of this issue goes further than that of Butler in that he 
raises doubts as to whether the US and Britain were fixed between_two 
div~rgent and competing strategies and is critical of scholars who have in his 
opinion portrayed them as having "fundamentally opposed national 
strategies".14 He claims that that the Allied strategy "blended in to a pragmatic 
compromise. The Mediterranean sideshow, indecisive in itself, forced the 
Germans to spread and waste their waning strength, to the benefit of 
Overlord. Yet, even with the Mediterranean diversion, anything less than a 
"power play'' Overlord would have failed to break the crust of the German 
defences in the West. Happily, the Allies did not have to rely solely either on a 
"peripheral" Mediterranean strategy leading up to "mop-up" with Overlord or 
on a "power play'' Overlord without diversionary preparation in the 
Mediterranean. They combined pragmatically the strong elements of both 
strategies, discarding the weak, and victory was theirs" .15 Leighton labels the 
approach of those who conclude the Allied decision-making process was one 
of division and debate as 'fusionist revision' and he writes that, "we now know, 
for example, that responsible British leaders never advocated an Allied 
"invasion" of the Balkan Peninsula and that the "Balkans vs. Western Europe 
controversy'' referred to by many post-war writers is a myth".16 
His rationale is that the British regarded the Mediterranean campaign as a 
necessary prelude to any invasion of North-West Europe, not the primary 
Allied strategy and fully accepted that a cross-Channel enterprise was the 
only way of defeating Germany. Therefore, "this position was not inconsistent 
with their candidly expressed fears that an inadequately prepared and 
supported cross-Channel assault might end in a blood bath, nor with the hope 
persisting as late as November 1943, that when the time came a full-scale 
assault might prove unnecessary. Their commitment to cross-Channel 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Richard M. Leighton. 'Overlord Revisited: An Interpretation of American Strategy in the 
European War, 1942-1944'. The American Historical Review, Vol. LXV/11, No. 4, July 1963. 
923. 
15 Ibid. 924 - 925. 
16 Ibid. 922. 
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invasion concept is attested to by the enormous investment of shipping, 
forces, facilities and material they poured into the preparations for the 
operation. It is also reflected in their insistent demands, during the 1942-1943 
debates over the size and shape of the invasion, for a stronger assault and a 
larger allotment of landing craft that the Americans, with one eye on the 
Pacific war, were willing to provide" .17 Leighton also makes the case that the 
division between the two countries was not as severe as that proposed by 
other scholars. Instead, "it is perfectly clear from the records that even the 
military leaders, once committed to the Mediterranean by the entry into North 
Africa, yielded more or less reluctantly to the logic of momentum and events 
and supported the successive campaigns in Sicily, Italy, and, of course, 
southern France. Some of them, in midsummer of 1943, even urged an all-out 
effort in the Mediterranean, at the expense of preparations for a cross-channel 
invasion, to exploit Italy's impending collapse. Meanwhile, despite earlier 
agreement that the war in Europe had first claim on Allied resources, during 
1943 the Americans were carrying on an expanding, not a holding, war 
against Japan, at considerable cost to their effort in Europe".18 
While Leighton implies that the blame lies with the American effort in the 
Pacific Ocean, Dunn points to political concerns as being the motivation for 
the West not opening the Second Front in 1943 or earlier. Despite that, "After . 
Kursk in July 1943, there was no German strategic reserve at all. Even before 
July, the immense Russian build-up in the area would have prevented the 
Germans from transferring sizeable reserves to the West"19 he maintains that 
Churchill's desire that a weakened Soviet Union emerge following the 
conclusion of the war took precedence over the military advantage which the 
US and Britain held over the Germans. To support his case he asks, "Would 
the invasion have succeeded in 1943? The chances of any venture are 
determined by comparing the two contending forces. The possibility of a 
successful invasion was a matter of weighing the number of German forces 
and their capabilities against the number of Allied forces that could be 
delivered on the French coast. Many half-truths were told concerning the 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 922 - 923. 
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military situation, for example, the problem with landing craft was not that 
there was a shortage, but that equipment had been needlessly sent to the 
Pacific theatre. Furthermore, the British cracked the most secret codes of the 
Germans, and from 1940, the British had a complete knowledge of the 
German plans and troop movements. Certainly the West knew its own 
resources and, with full information concerning the enemy, could have struck 
a neat equation".20 Not only did Germany gain time to mobilise their own , 
industries and those in the Occupied Territories into greater production but 
also the delay did result in enormous ramifications for Europe in the post-war 
era. Had the Western Allies opened the Second Front in 1943 then they could 
have prevented Stalin from seizing the territorial spoils that he reaped in the 
following-two years and, according to Dunn, "it is possible that Germany could 
have been defeated before the Russians had completely occupied Poland, 
providing the West with the opportunity to return the Sikorski government-in-
exile. At the least, a Western hold on most of Germany would have given 
Churchill and Roosevelt a far stronger hand to play in the negotiations in 
1944".21 
According to Howard, the discourse between the US and Britain on this 
issue lay in the difference in their military doctrines. He claims that American 
military dogma held that a country, or an alliance of countries, must 
concentrate its maximum force at a single point against an enemy if it is to 
achieve victory and that, "American and British military authorities, in fact, 
approached the problem of devising a strategy for the defeat of Germany from 
different ends. The British began with mobilisation and deployment of forces, 
assuming that circumstances would determine where the decisive 
engagement would occur - if indeed any such clear 'decision', easily 
identifiable in time and space, proved necessary at all".22 In contrast, "the 
Americans, on the other hand, started by deciding where the decisive 
engagement should occur, worked back from there to their plans for 
deployment, and from there to mobilisation of resources. Only if they knew 
19 Walter Scott Dunn. Second Front Now- 1943. (Alabama, University of Alabama Press, 
1980). 266. 
20 Ibid. 4. 
21 Ibid. 1. 
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what kind of war they were going to fight, they argued with some reason, 
could they decide what kind of weapons to procure and what kind of forces to 
raise. It was this difference in approach, and not any conflict between 
'manoeuvre' and 'mass', that underlay most of the subsequent disputes 
between the Allies over strategic planning".23 Howard concludes that the 
British viewed the American strategy as being incomplete. Although this plan 
identified the objective and destination for the attack, the British contended 
that it overlooked the difficulties associated with transporting troops and the 
costs involved in confronting a much more powerful Wehrmacht that also 
enjoyed air superiority over the intended battlefields. The fact that many of the 
senior British commanders, including Brooke and Dilt24, had served with the 
B.E.F. in 1940 strengthened this case but according to Howard, the 
Americans begged to differ. They believed Britain's strategy to be "indecisive 
and peripheral, haunted by the memories of the slaughters of the First World 
War and of the early defeats in the Second. They doubted whether Britain's 
military leaders, even Churchill himself, staunch as they were in defence, 
were prepared to make the sacrifices necessary for a victorious attack; and as 
the war went on their doubts did not decrease".25 
The idea that Britain's strategy was 'peripheral' in its design is echoed by 
Kimball who writes that the British "viewed the war from a unique geographic 
perspective, that of their worldwide Empire."26 The Philippines aside, the 
United States had not faced the loss of significant portions of its overseas 
territories and its government and military establishment had no interest in 
British and European efforts to recover the empires, which they viewed as 
archaic and repressive. There was a suspicion infusing this view, for example 
22 Michael Howard. The Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War. (London, Greenhill 
Books, 1993) 22. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Sir John Dill, 1881-1944, saw action in the Boer War and First World War. In 1936, he was 
promoted to Lieutenant General by the British Government and sent to Palestine to restore 
order. In 1940, he commanded the 1 st Corps in France but was recalled to Britain in April to 
serve as Chief of Imperial General Staff. Churchill relieved him of this post due to his poor 
health and, having been replaced by Brooke, he was posted to Washington as representative 
of the British Chiefs of Staff. He died on 4 November 1944 and became the first non-US 
citizen buried at the Arlington National Cemetery. 
25 Ibid. 23. 
26 Kimball. Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence. Volume 1. 458. 
12 
on the part of King27 and Hopkins28, that the British were only concerned with 
using American forces in the Middle East to rebuild their Imperial System and 
spheres of interest and preserve them intact for when the war had concluded. 
The Western Alliance also held differences of opinion regarding the level of 
assistance that they should offer to the Soviet Union. Britain and the US 
increased their aid shipments to Russia as the war progressed, but the United 
States used the risk of a German victory in the East to advocate a possible 
cross-Channel enterprise. Throughout the duration of the first Washington 
summit that opened in December 1941, the German armies pressed on 
Stalingrad and Roosevelt feared that the Soviet Union would be defeated 
before the United States had time to mobilise its forces and industry as to 
have a bearing on the course of the war. 
In the event of this occurring or had Germany's economy, political system 
or military complex began to disintegrate from within through the effects of the 
Allied blockade and aerial bombing, the United States earmarked Operation 
Sledgehammer as a possibility in 1942. This would have involved a small-
scale landing with the objective for the Allied divisions being to divert as many 
German units into Western Europe from the east as possible then disembark. 
A second possibility, codenamed Operation Round-Up and scheduled for 
1943, would have been a larger enterprise involving the establishment of a 
permanent beachhead and the widening of the Allied assault force to thirty US 
divisions and eighteen British divisions along with six thousand aircraft and 
seven thousand landing craft. Greenfield, Butler and Dunn argue that 
Sledgehammer was not an appealing proposition to the British, as they would 
have been required to provide the bulk of the eight to ten divisions needed 
and due to time and logistical constraints, the American involvement would 
have been limited to two and a half divisions. Butler claims that Brooke was 
27 Ernest King, 1878-1956, joined the US Navy in 1901 and served on the staff of the US 
Atlantic Command. In the inter-war period, he became a submariner, Commanding Officer of 
the aircraft carrier Lexington before becoming the commander of the Navy's air division with 
the rank of Vice Admiral in 1933. In 1941, he became Commander of the Atlantic Fleet before 
being promoted to Commander in Chief of the US Navy. Following the Battle for the Atlantic, 
King's attention remained on the war in the Pacific Ocean until 1945 when he retired due to ill 
health. . 
28 Harry Lloyd Hopkins, 1890-1946, was Secretary of Commerce from 1938 to 1940 and 
Roosevelt's special envoy to Britain. He was also a member of the War Production Board and 
was Roosevelt's Special Assistant until 1945. That year he helped arrange the Potsdam 
Conference under Truman however, he retired from public life shortly after and died in. 1946. 
13 
concerned that a deployment of this scale combined with units deploying to 
other theatres would have left the Home Islands vulnerable to any belated 
German incursion and both he and Dill maintained that German fighting 
morale remained unbroken. Butler also states that the operation's success 
would have relied on the Allied assault force succeeding in opening a port 
followed by a rapid advancement into the Ruhr area. However, given the 
limited numbers of their forces taking part it was unlikely that the Allies would 
be able to have captured a port until at least two months into the operation 
and even then, there was no guarantee that this would be possible. Added to 
his equation was the question of withdrawal and Mountbatten, who in 1942 
was in command of Combined Operations, was particularly critical of any plan 
that would have involved disembarkation or a scenario where the Allied forces 
fought until the last man.29 
While Howard claims that Brooke was supportive of Round-Up following 
the abandonment of Sledgehammer, Grigg and Dunn contend that he was the 
principal supporter for the switch in emphasis from Europe to the Middle East 
and North Africa, hence the inconsistency and varying interpretation within the 
research. Grigg insists that Churchill was out-manoeuvred by his CIGS whose 
"mind was set against any Cross-Channel operation in 1943, and in favour of 
unlimited activity in the Mediterranean"30 and who dismissed the Marshall 
Plan as not being feasible. Both authors claim that Brooke held that Britain's 
shipping capacity was over-stretched, that the Allies lacked the landing craft 
with which to proceed and that the Germany military would not be weakened 
through its Russian campaign for the Second Front to be successful in 1943. 
Instead, the C.I.G.S.31 insisted that the Allies' best chance for success lay in 
the Mediterranean. This according to Dunn was an error of judgement on 
Brooke's part because by 1943 the German military was struggling to deal 
with the demands of a Russian counter-offensive and its logistical over-stretch 
throughout such a vast territory.32 Therefore, there was a distinct possibility 
that Round-Up would have achieved success. Grigg's analysis supports this 
argument and he claims that "the Germans were no longer, on balance, 
29 Butler. Grand Strategy. Volume 3, Part 2. 570. 
30 John Grigg. 1943: The Victory That Never Was. (London, Eyre Methuen, 1980). 212. 
31 Chief of Imperial General Staff. 
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weakening the Russians on the Eastern Front, but were themselves under 
such pressure there that it would be out of the question for them to transfer 
any substantial forces to the West".33 
Butler, on the other hand, deems that the circumstances of the war proved 
disadvantageous to those supporting a cross-Channel enterprise as 
Marshall's visit to London in April 1942 was "of the utmost importance in the 
development of the grand strategy of the Allies. Agreement was reached for 
the first time as to an invasion of the Continent, and on a grand scale; it was 
the beginning of integrated operational planning; it was the first meeting of 
Marshall34 and Brooke, the American organiser of victory and the Prime 
Minister's principal adviser on strategy. It was of immense value to the Allied 
cause, but in a way it was unhappily timed".35 Dunn is less diplomatic. His 
view is that "inconsistently, Brooke found twenty miles of the channel an 
insurmountable obstacle for the Allies, but feared that the Germans could join 
with the Japanese more than ten thousand miles away".36 
Churchill welcomed the news that the United States had entered the war 
but with a new ally came a new adversary and impending catastrophe for the 
British military and empire. Britain's formal declaration of war on Japan, 
issued on 8 December, coincided with the first air raid on Singapore and the 
opening of the Japanese push into northern Malaya. The offensive began with 
an air assault designed to incapacitate the R.A.F. squadrons based at a 
series of aerodromes throughout the north of the country. The British lost sixty 
out of one hundred and ten planes in the first wave of attacks with many of 
32 Dunn. Second Front Now- 1943. 11. 
33 Grigg. 1943: The Victory That Never Was. 63-64. 
34 George Catlett Marshall, 1880-1959, saw action the Western Front in the First World War 
and was an aide to General Pershing from 1918 to 1924, before serving in China until 1927. 
Following his return to the US, he was head of the Civilian Conservation, a programme 
designed to tackle unemployment among young men and in 1938, with the rank of Brigadier 
General, he became Deputy Chief of Staff. In 1939, he was appointed Chief of Staff by 
Roosevelt. Although he oversaw the expansion of the American armed forces and had a 
significant influence on the course of Allied strategy, he was disappointed not to have 
commanded the Allied forces on D-Day and he resigned from his post in November 1945. 
Following the war, he served as ambassador to China and became Secretary of State under 
Truman in 1947. It was in this role that he devised the European Recovery Programme also 
known as 'Marshall Aid' and in 1950 he became Secretary of Defence and organised US 
forces in the early stages of the Korean War. Marshall was attacked at the McCarthy hearings 
in 1951 as being soft on Communism and he retired from politics that same year. 
35 Butler. Grand Strategy. Volume 3, Part 2. 575. 
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their aircraft caught on the ground. The rapid deterioration of the Allied 
position in the Far East meant that Churchill ordered the deployment of forces 
to Southern and South-Eastern Asia in an effort to stem the Japanese 
advance. Even though Marshall and Eisenhower were particularly critical of 
such a move, 1942 was a year of military disaster for British arms and 
Britain's lowest point of the war and as Grigg states: "in the Far East, disaster 
followed disaster with bewildering swiftness."37 Within six months of the first 
Washington Conference, the Japanese had captured Hong Kong, the Malay 
Peninsula, Singapore, Burma and the Dutch East Indies in rapid succession 
and had dealt the Americans a severe defeat in the Philippines. Their forces 
spread as far west as Midway Island in the Pacific Ocean and Japanese 
planes bombed Darwin. Grigg claims that this rapid advance "enabled the 
Japanese to threaten both Australia and India. But above all it was a 
shattering psychological blow, from which the British Empire never 
recovered".38 The Japanese conquest was not only on land. With the sinking 
of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse on 8 December 1941, the 
Japanese had mastery of the Asian waters and they began to push heavily 
armed units into the Indian Ocean. 
On 5 April of the following year, Japanese naval planes attacked the port at 
Colombo in what Kimball regards as an operation by the Navy designed to 
persuade their Army counterparts to embark upon an invasion of Ceylon. The 
raid caused the British Government to fear that a Japanese breakthrough into 
India was possible and Churchill implored Roosevelt to dispatch US naval 
units to the region to reinforce the British fleet stationed there, as it was 
inferior to its enemy in number and firepower. His telegram to the President 
on 15 April stressed the threat that Japan posed to the Western Indian Ocean 
and his fear that this could force a collapse of the British forces in the Middle 
East.39 Churchill was concerned that should Japan gain control of the Western 
portion of the Indian Ocean they would sever the main southern supply route 
to Russia along with the source of oil from the Middle East. Kimball claims 
37 Grigg. 1943: The Victory That Never Was. 29. 
38 Ibid. 29. 
39 Kimball. Volume 1. 453. 
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that the British also feared that this could push Turkey into the war as an Axis 
combatant and that this would increase pressure on Russia's southern flank. 
However, even when faced with such a critical situation, Churchill 
demonstrated that he was a man who refused to be committed to one 
operation alone. In a telegram to Roosevelt on 17 April following the talks with 
Marshall and Hopkins, the Prime Minister tried to hedge between the 
American demands for a European campaign and the need to stabilise the 
British position in the East: "it is essential that we should prevent a junction of 
the Japanese and the Germans. Consequently, a proportion of our combined 
resources must for the moment, be set aside to halt the Japanese advance. 
This point was fully discussed at the meeting, and Marshall felt confident that 
we could together provide what was necessary for the Indian Ocean and other 
theatres, and yet go right ahead with your main project".4° Churchill went onto 
claim that preparations for an invasion of Europe were moving forward and 
that the Allies could bring the enterprise forward if circumstances warranted it. 
He wrote: "broadly speaking, our agreed programme is a crescendo of activity 
on the Continent, starting with an ever increasing air offensive both night and 
day, and more frequent and larger scale raids, in which United States will take 
part".41 
On 28 May 1942, Churchill sent a telegram to the President in which he 
informed him of Mountbatten's visit to Washington with a summary as to the 
difficulties of undertaking a cross-Channel assault at that point in time. Kimball 
writes that the substitute Churchill proposed was an invasion of Norway 
codenamed Operation Jupiter. In his telegram, the Prime Minister wrote: "I 
have also told the Staff's42 to study a landing in the north of Norway, the 
occupation of which seems necessary to ensure the flow of our supplies next 
year to Russia".43 Jupiter was to prove too ambitious for Churchill yet he held 
an option in reserve because in that same telegram the Prime Minister 
reminded Roosevelt ''we must never let Gymnast pass from our minds".44 
According to Howard, Roosevelt "was equally determined that an operation of 
40 Ibid. 459. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Chiefs of Staff. 
43 Ibid. 494. 
44 Ibid. 
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some kind must be launched by American forces in the European theatre in 
1942"45 and the President was favourable towards North Africa following 
reports from US diplomatic staff in Algeria that any landings there would be 
welcomed or at least unopposed by the Vichy French. 
Both Howard and Dunn record that Marshall and Eisenhower objected to 
Churchill's plan for Jupiter and Gymnast that he presented on 19 June at the 
Second Washington Conference. As a trade-off with London, Marshall 
suggested that the US send Sherman tanks and artillery to the Eighth Army 
so that Egypt could be stabilised especially after Rommel! captured Tobruk on 
21 June. However, the President's decision was final and as Leighton points 
out "as commander in chief, Roosevelt was the supreme American strategy 
maker when he chose to play the role. He was thus an essential part of the 
strategy-making process, not an influence external to it, a fact sometimes 
obscured in staff-orientated accounts of World War II strategy".46 Leighton and 
Howard share Dunn's view that political considerations now played a decisive 
hand. While his military commanders did not concur with the British view that 
the Mediterranean and southern Europe was the Continent's soft underbelly, 
North Africa presented Roosevelt with a theatre in which US forces could be 
sent into action against the Germans in the short term future. It also offered 
the President the opportunity to demonstrate to the Soviet Government that 
the US and Britain were prepared to engage in combat and that the Soviet 
Union was no longer fighting the Germans alone. If Sledgehammer and, as a 
consequence, Round-Up were not possible then North Africa offered the next 
best alternative. 
Dunn maintains that the decision to abandon the Second Front in 1942 led 
to the dispersion of Allied resources to other theatres and that there was also 
a major re-structuring of the Allies overall strategy for the war. Along with the 
build-up of forces for the Mediterranean, the Americans began concentrating 
an increased number of their military in the Pacific and offensive operations 
against the Japanese commenced. MacArthur and King had advocated this 
approach since the US had entered the war. Throughout July and August 
45 Howard. The Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War. 30. 
46 Leighton. 'Overlord Revisited: An Interpretation of American Strategy in the European War, 
1942-1944'. 928-929. , 
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1942, the US began a campaign against the Japanese on Guadalcanal and 
New Guinea hence "the British were not the only ones who turned the hoped-
for single thrust of Allied strategy into a diverse random spray of enterprises 
around the globe. Admiral King, General MacArthur and Roosevelt were not 
certain that the Americans would complete Bolero, the plan to move a million 
troops to England, and be ready to invade France in 1943".47 
Leighton offers the opinion that the increased resources sent to the 
Pacific was due to the expansion of US industrial production rather than the 
demands of King, MacArthur or even Marshall. He claims that Marshall 
supported King in his calls for more commitment to the Pacific but the General 
"gradually became more receptive to a forward strategy in the Mediterranean, 
but only within the framework of limited allotment".48 Leighton states that 
Roosevelt recognised that a Mediterranean offensive would allow for a 
decisive cross-channel crossing once Torch had commenced. Consequently, 
"American strategists found it increasingly difficult to deny the merits of further 
advances in the Mediterranean, in order to hold the strategic initiative and 
maintain momentum, to keep Spain and other neutrals in line, to clear a 
passage for shipping to Suez, to knock out Italy, to pin down, disperse, and 
bleed German forces or attract them from other fronts".49 The Allied 
intervention throughout the Mediterranean expanded throughout 1942 and 
1943, instead of contracting as Marshall and Eisenhower might have hoped 
and by May 1943, the forces under Alexander had entered Tunisia and the 
Mediterranean was coming under increased Allied control. In the exhilaration 
of victory, the Western Allies and the British especially, were eager to exploit 
a series of successes that until that year had eluded them. Howard writes that 
the British caution over the potential for action in Italy was "apparently 
forgotten"50 while Leighton claims that "for the first time, American strategists 
could envisage a continuation of Mediterranean offensives through the 
following winter and spring, along with a mounting combined bombing 
campaign against Germany. The new concept centred on a drive up the 
47 Dunn. Second Front Now-1943. 18. 
48 Leighton. 'Overlord Revisited: An Interpretation of American Strategy in the European War, 
1942-1944'. 928. 
49 Ibid. 930. 
50 Howard. The Mediterranean Strategy'in the Second World War. 37. 
19 
Italian Peninsula that would turn westward to link up with another force 
landing in southern France, followed by a push up the Rhone Valley to a 
junction in spring 1944 with the main invasion army advancing eastward from 
Normandy". 51 
The influence that the United States had on Britain's policy once it entered 
the war is a foremost issue that arises from the historiography. Kimball's work 
in particular emphasizes the impact that Washington had on determining 
Allied strategy as the war progressed along with the division that existed 
between the two countries regarding the opening of the Second Front and the 
works of Dunn, Grigg, Howard and Leighton are weighted heavily towards 
examining the dynamics of trans-Atlantic Alliance as well. However, this 
historiography also raises the question that Washington entered the wartime 
alliance beset by conflicting opinions amongst its own senior military hierarchy 
as to which course of action to advocate. Howard's claim that US military 
doctrine held that the Allies focus their resources into a single, large-scale 
formation compares with Dunn's account that Marshall and Eisenhower 
favoured such an approach yet contrasts with Wilmot's view that Roosevelt 
wanted American forces engaging the Germans in 1942 rather than waiting 
until a later date.52 This ambiguity within the US strategy and the discourse 
with the British over which region the Allies should their commit forces led to 
the situation that Leighton describes as a "pragmatic compromise"53 under 
which Allied forces went to several theatres in an effort to placate all parties. 
Dunn and Grigg also discuss this issue and both regard Brooke as the prime 
mover of the Allied decision to disperse resources outside of Europe and 
failure to cross the Channel in either 1942 or 1943. The other factor apparent 
from this historiography is the manner in which Britain's situation in 1940 
influenced the level of support for the Second Front on the part of its political 
and military leaders as opposed to deploying forces elsewhere instead. The 
literature suggests that Britain's commanders, most notably Brooke and Dill, 
believed that any cross-Channel assault would not succeed against a 
Wehrmacht that they perceived as being more powerful in relation to their own 
51 Leighton. 931. 
52 Wilmot. 101. 
53 Leighton. 923. 
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forces and an enterprise of this nature would have left the British Mainland 
vulnerable to a German attack. Hence, a reiteration that between 1940 and 
the onset of 1944, the lack of military resources, resolve on the part of the 
political and military leadership or a combination of both factors determined 
Britain's policy towards the Second Front. 
In order to do provide answers to this hypothesis, the thesis divides into 
five chapters followed by a conclusion. The first chapter provides a 
background to the paper. It offers explanations as to how Britain's failure to 
keep pace with developments in military theory and technology throughout the 
inter-war years resulted in it lacking adequate weaponry and battlefield tactics 
to confront the German offensive of 1940. The following chapter deals with 
the aftermath of the loss of France as an ally and the threat Britain faced from 
German· invasion after its forces had evacuated from the Continent. It also 
discusses the course of action Britain formulated for continuing the war and 
the challenges this decision presented through until the entry of the US into 
the war at the close of 1941. Chapter 3 begins with the first Washington 
Summit and from this point onwards, the thesis examines Britain's policy 
under the shadow of the trans-Atlantic alliance and its perspective towards 
Operations Sledgehammer and Round-Up. The fourth chapter analyses the 
importance of the Casablanca Conference on Western Allied strategy along 
' 
with the growing influence that the Soviet Union was beginning to assert on 
the US-British relationship and issue of the Second Front. The fifth and final 
chapter deals with the development to Britain's policy throughout 1943 and 
the changes that it underwent that year and the reasons why by the close of 
the Teheran Conference in November, operations such as Sledgehammer 
and Round-Up had manifested themselves into Overlord. 
A variety of sources were utilised during this study, including the public 
speeches Churchill gave throughout the war54, for example to the House of 
Commons and other public forums such as the Lord Mayor of London's 
Luncheon, the United States Congress and numerous other locations at which 
the Prime Minister spoke. The speeches cited in this study demonstrate that 
54 Robert Rhodes James. Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches, Volumes 1-8. (New 
York, Chelsea House Publishers, 1974). 
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publicly, Churchill and his government were prepared to continue the war 
despite Germany's control over Western Europe but the usefulness of this 
material is limited. First, they do not offer any detailed analysis of British 
strategy and second, one could interpret them as propaganda and merely an 
effort on the part of the Churchill Government to strengthen public morale. 
Consequently, the research concentrated on information sourced from British 
government records55, the correspondence between Churchill and 
Roosevelt56 and Brooke's diaries. 57 This data allowed for a study of detailed 
British policy that the illustrated the divergences of opinion not only with the 
United States but also the cleavages that emerged within the British 
Government and military hierarchy itself concerning the opening of the 
Second Front and their preferences as to the course of Allied strategy. 
55 PREM 3: Papers Concerning Defence and Operational Subjects, 1940-1945, Winston 
Churchill, Ministry of Defence, Secretariat-Papers, Public Records Office, London. 
56 Warren F. Kimball. Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence, Volumes 1-3. 
{New Jersey, P~inc ton University Press, 1984). 
7 Field Marsha Lord Alanbrooke. War Diaries, 1939-1946. Edited by Alex Danchev and 
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CHAPTER ONE. 
The Inter-War Years: New Tactics, Old Policies and the 
effect on British Military Capability. 
''The immediate chain of causation is to be traced through Sir Henry Wilson's pre-war 
affiliations, Lord Kitchener's summons to arms, the General Staff's haste to reach France, and 
General Joffe's haste to reach Germany, down to its ultimate destination in the swamps of 
Passchendaele Thither we guided and there we spent the strength of England, pouring it out 
with whole-hearted abandon on the soil of our allies". 
Liddell Hart's explanation as to the factors that led 
Britain to deploy its army to Europe in the First World 
War. 
1918-1940: New Ways in Warfare. 
It June 1940 was Britain's 'finest hour', then the months between 
November 1918 and June 1919 should also have been remembered as 'fine 
hours' but this was not the case. The Armistice on the Western Front meant 
that although the military balance in Europe had swung back in the Allies' 
favour, four years of conflict had exhausted their fighting spirit and their 
financial resources. Howard claims that the "victory was too ambiguous"58 
while Perret describes the First World War as a "People's War and the 
suffering inflicted was written large on memorials in even the smallest villages 
of the land".59 The conscription of civilians into the armed forces and the high 
casualty rate among the units in the front line meant the war affected people 
at all different levels and sectors of society. Throughout the 1920's the civilian 
population gradually learnt more of the horrors of the war in a way that it 
never had before. Mourning and the epitaph of 'Never Again' overlay feelings 
of celebration and conquest. 
Lloyd George may have promised a land fit for heroes but in the years 
immediately after the truce, his Administration was in no position to keep true 
58 Michael Howard. The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British Defence Policy in 
the Era of the Two World Wars. ( Middlesex, England, Penguin Books Limited, 1972), 7 4. 
23 
to this pledge. Laybourn writes that, "by the end of the war, in 1918, Britain 
had lost the industrial leadership that she had previously enjoyed. Even as 
British industries recovered in the early 1920's, it was soon evident that they 
had lost about one-fifth of their old markets".60 The demobilisation of the war 
economy coincided with the return of four million men into civilian life and the 
massive conscript army had given way to a skeleton force deployed on 
policing duties throughout the Empire and the overseas spheres of influence. 
There was a brief upturn in Britain's economic fortunes after the war as the 
"great demand for goods to replace depleted stocks and considerable 
demand for capital to restore peacetime production provided a stimulus to 
business".61 Yet by 1920, the economic forecast for Britain had changed. 
Supply had caught up with demand and the European markets began to face 
stiff competition from American and Asian producers. Britain's share of world 
trade had been diminishing since the late 1880's and the First World War 
accelerated this process. As a result, unemployment, the National Debt and 
inflation began to rise. 
In an effort to counter this depression, the Government's policy was to cut 
the budgets for all its departments and the falling fiscal axe affected defence. 
In 1920, the defence budget halved from £604 000,000 to £292 000,000 and 
within a year that figure halved again.62 This retrenchment in defence 
spending was in line with Churchill's proposal to the Cabinet in 1919 that it 
adopt the 'Ten Year Rule' under which British military expenditure and 
planning was tailored to the assumption that there would be no major conflict 
or need for a commitment of forces to the Continent within that period. On 
✓ 
face value, this view was sound. Germany's military and economic power lay 
crushed under the Treaty of Versailles and the French Army stood as the 
largest and most powerful in Europe. Britain had subscribed to the League of 
Nations as a system of collective security that would maintain the post-war 
balance of power; hence, the epitaph of 'Never Again' rang throughout 
Government policy as well as being the public's sentiment. 
59 Bryan Perret. History of Blitzkrieg. (London, Panther, 1985), 55. 
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Perret writes that the belief that Britain would not be faced with another 
Continental war and the financial retrenchment "ensured not only the 
contradiction of armies but also that military spending was constrained by a 
financial strait jacket which prohibited all but the simplest experiments with 
new weapons systems and techniques".63 Nevertheless, there was a small 
chorus of theorists, in Britain and elsewhere, who studied the mechanisation 
of warfare and looked beyond what they had witnessed of this process during 
the Great War to the wars in the future. Thinkers such as Douhet, Mitchell, 
Fuller, Guderian and Liddell Hart "realised that the primitive fighting vehicles 
and aircraft of 1918 would inevitably give place to more sophisticated 
machines with greater mechanical endurance and destructive capability. Each 
of these strands confirmed in some measure that the next major war would be 
one of mobility. Woven together they would form the fabric of a technique 
designed to save life by achieving a lightning victory - the technique of 
Blitzkrieg'. 64 
Liddell Hart and Fuller emerged as Britain's pre-eminent military theorists 
during the inter-war years and each was at the forefront of the campaign to 
mechanise the Army and re-develop its tactics on the battlefield. Fuller had 
ended the war with the rank of Major General and by 1918 was the 
Commanding Officer of the Royal Tank Corps. He continued to campaign for 
the increased mechanisation of the British Army that began tentatively with 
the creation of the Experimental Armoured Force in 1927. The purpose of this 
force was to demonstrate the effect that the combined firepower of tanks, 
armoured vehicles, motorised infantry and close support aircraft could have 
on the battlefield. In spite of his rank and position within the Army Fuller was 
passed over for command of this formation and he resigned his commission in 
1933 when he was offered the post of military commander in Bombay which 
he considered a demotion., 
Nevertheless, the military continued to develop Fuller's ideas and in 1931, 
a Tank Brigade was established and was equipped with medium size tanks 
and radios that for the first time allowed an armoured battle group to operate 
62 Howard, 78. 




with a degree of flexibility unrivalled by any other army at that time. Field 
, Commanders could make decisions depending on battlefield conditions and 
the formation could fight outside of the tactics set down in the pre-battle 
briefing. Hence, Britain was leading the way in mechanised warfare but it 
would not be long before other nations closed the gap. European thinkers, 
most notably Guderian, closely examined Fuller's work and adapted it into 
their own line of study and given Guderian's rise in the command structure of 
the German Army in the 1930's it is not surprising that Fuller's influence 
· showed in the German offensives of 1939 and 1940. Barnett writes that "in 
many ways Fuller predicted the general pattern of the German victories over 
Poland in 1939 and France in 1940, and even more closely the pattern of the 
campaign in the Western Desert in 1940-43".65 Fuller prophesised that the 
war of the future would not be anything like that he witnessed in 1914-1918. 
Smaller, better-equipped mechanised forces would advance with speed and 
depth replacing the vast immobile conscript armies. He forecast that the tank 
would be the principal weapon within these forces and that it would work in 
close collaboration with aircraft but it was not until 1938 that the British Army 
finally moved away from the view that the tank was merely an infantry support 
weapon and established its first armoured division. 
By 1925, Liddell Hart had become the leading military writer in Britain 
through his position as military affairs correspondent for London's Daily 
Telegraph newspaper. Liddell Hart had served as an infantryman during the 
First World War and suffered wounds at the Somme. Having been withdrawn 
from frontline duty, his role throughout the remainder of his service was to 
analyse the British Army's training methods. Liddell Hart was influenced by 
the tactics employed by Ludendorf's shock troops in their offensive of 1918 
where, rather than smash their forces against the heavily defended Allied line, 
the Germans switched the point of their attack to the weakest part of the 
enemy position to create a breach. The reserves would then be able to 
' infiltrate the line and span out among the rear areas of the Allied sectors. He 
labelled this tactic the 'expanding torrent'. 
65 Corelli Barnett. Britain and Her /mJ1y: 1509 - 1970. (London, Allen Lane The Penguin 
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It is possible that as an infantryman Liddell Hart was still haunted by his 
experiences during the Great War as throughout his career as a writer he 
continued to advocate a defensive strategy for the British forces while 
remaining critical of the European powers for their faith in human mass. He 
wrote that the desire to build the massive armies of the Great War stemmed 
from the perception that the Prussian victory of 1870 was due to the human 
size of their armies and that the writings of Clausewitz had reinforced this 
belief. According to Liddell Hart "the consequences, the threefold 
consequences, were to make war more difficult to avoid, more difficult to 
conduct successfully, and more difficult to terminate save by sheer 
exhaustion".66 Liddell Hart claimed that the British only began to understand 
the value of the armoured vehicle in 1917 at the Battle of Cambrai67 in which 
the British employed artillery in conjunction with armoured fighting vehicles 
and this not only reduced the exposure of soldiers to enemy fire but also 
reintroduced the element of surprise back into the attack. Technology, which 
until this point had strengthened the defence, gave the advantage to those on 
the offensive. The British had begun experimenting with tanks as early as 
1915 when Haig68 had pressed for tanks for the front in large numbers for the 
offensive of 1916 but design and technical difficulties prevented this from 
occurring. The Allied commanders dispersed the few vehicles that arrived in 
service throughout the British divisions and used them to give supporting fire 
for the ground troops. Had they been concentrated into a single attacking 
component and concentrated on a short area of the German line then the 
Allies might have achieved the breakthrough that eluded them . .. 
In his articles for The, Times in 1937 and his 1939 book, The Defence of 
Britain, Liddell Hart argued that Britain should adopt a policy of 'limited 
66 B.H. Liddell Hart. The Defence of Britain. (London, Faber and Faber Limited, 1939), 9. 
67 The Battle of Cambrai commenced on 20 November, 1917. It marked the first time that 
tanks had b~en..used en masse in an offensive and the Royal Tank Carp's entire compliment 
of 350 tanks were deployed. · 
68 Douglas Haig, 18 Earl, 1861-1928, served in the Sudan in 1898 and in South Africa 
between 1899 and 1902. He was appointed Commanding Officer of the British 1 st Army Corps 
in 1914 and was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Expeditionary Force the following 
year. In 1916, he mounted the ill-fated Somme offensive and in November 1917 with British 
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joint British and French command was not established until 1918, Haig has been severely 
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liability'. Under this strategy, Britain would fall back on its traditional strategy 
of naval blockade and economic warfare. This policy of economic 
strangulation would be assisted by "two supplementary arms: one financial, 
which embraced the subsidising and military provisioning of allies; the other 
military, which embraced the dispatch of small expeditionary forces to strike at 
the enemy's vulnerable extremities or to cement any promising collection of 
allied forces".69 Liddell Hart was adamant that Britain hold back the newly 
formed armoured divisions from the Continent and arrange them and others 
into a strategic reserve. He was concerned that once British forces deployed 
to France their numbers would increase and so too would the casualty lists. 
Liddell Hart believed that even if the Germans broke through the Maginot Line 
the mobile formations in reserve would be sufficient to plug any breach of 
France's defensive screen. 
The First World War not only heralded the arrival of the tank onto the 
battlefield but also the aircraft. Smith claims that British interest in the aircraft 
as a military device began in 1909 with Bleriot's journey across the Channel.70 
He writes that 'the military implications of Bleriot's flight were, of course, 
ominous for a country which traditionally relied on the inviolability of the 
Channel for its security. In the late nineteenth century, invasion scares were 
common in Britain whenever the French or Germans stole a march on the 
Royal Navy in technical development. Something of a similar nature followed 
Bleriot's flight".71 For the first two years of the war, the aircraft were primarily 
deployed in reconnaissance duties and photographing the enemy positions. 
However, by 1916, the role of the Royal Flying Corps and its counterparts 
within other forces had evolved to provide close support for the infantry. That 
same year, British planes bombed the industrial regions of western Germany. 
The age of heavy bombing of cities and civilian areas had begun. 
The German raids on London and the southern coastal areas of England in 
1916 and 1917 were the defining points in the development in air power 
He was made an earl in 1919 and he spent his post-war years working on behalf of the British 
Legion and disabled servicemen. 
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70 Louis Bleriot crossed the English Channel in a Bleriot XI monoplane on 25 July, 1919. He 
took off from Les Baraques, near Calais at 4.41 a.m. and landed at 5.17 a.m. in Dover. His 
flight covered 24 miles (38.6 kms). 
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during the Great War. If Bleriot's flight had been an ominous sign that the 
Channel could not protect the British people from the effects of war then the 
Zeppelin and bomber raids of 1916-17 provided conclusive proof. The 
psychological effects of the raids were perhaps more damaging to the British 
morale and their faith in their geographical isolation than the physical cost. In 
order to combat the raids, 17,000 troops had to be committed to the air 
defence of the Home lslands.72 The bombing raids over southern England and 
western Germany ushered in a facet of warfare whereby the air was now a 
part of the battleground as well as the land and sea. In 1921 Douhet warned: 
"no longer can areas exist in which life can be lived in safety and tranquillity, 
nor can the battlefield any longer be limited to actual combatants. On the 
contrary, the battlefield will be limited only by the boundaries of the nations at 
war, and all of their citizens will become combatants, since all of them will be 
exposed to the aerial offensives of the enemy. There will be no distinction any 
longer between soldiers and civilians".73 
Douhet was adamant that to prove decisive in warfare, aerial offensives 
must target "peacetime and commercial establishments; important buildings, 
private and public; transportation arteries and centres and certain designated 
areas of civilian population".74 In other words, if an air offensive was to 
achieve victory then it must be directed at a country's infrastructure and 
economy and prevent material and equipment from being supplied to the 
forces at the frontline. Given that the objective of an air force was the 
destruction of industrial areas away from the battlefield, civilian morale would 
be shattered and the industrial output would halt. However, this apocalyptic 
vision did not prove to be the case in the Second World War. The Luftwaffe 
offensive on the British cities did not shatter the population's morale and 
despite the damage these raids inflicted, British war industry was still able to 
produce the necessary materials to continue the war. Nevertheless, Douhet 
was closer to the mark with his claim that "to be defeated in the air, on the 
other hand, is finally to be defeated and to be at the mercy of the enemy, with 
71 Malcolm Smith. British Air Strategy Between the Wars. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984), 
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no chance of defending oneself, compelled to accept whatever terms he sees 
fit to diGtate".75 The Luftwaffe's inability to defeat the Royal Air Force following 
the withdrawal from Dunkirk prevented the launching of Operation Sealion, 
thus throwing Britain a lifeline in its efforts to continue in the conflict. 
The destructive potential of the aircraft and the possibility that it could play 
a decisive role in future warfare impressed Mitchell as it had Douhet and he 
was intrigued by the affect that aircraft would have on a civilian population 
' 
during wartime. Yet Mitchell's work was also concerned with the impact the 
aircraft could have on an enemy's forces on the battlefield, especially at sea. 
According to Warner, "the ability of aircraft to obliterate every sort of surface 
vessel, leaving surface vessels no military function whatever, became a 
veritable article of faith with Mitchell".76 In 1921, planes from the US Army Air 
Corps staged a mock attack against the ex-German battleship Ostfriesland,n 
"giving the first actual demonstration that gravity-propelled bombs could easily 
send a heavily armoured to the bottom".78 The demonstration was a portent of 
things to come, yet Mitchell struggled to persuade a conservative military 
establishment of the validity of his theories. His arguments and efforts to 
establish an independent air force in the United States ran into opposition 
from the navy and army and his zeal for his cause would cost him his 
commission and military career in 1926.79 
While Fuller, Douhet and Mitchell may have struggled to impress their 
ideas onto their indifferent military establishments, a logistics officer serving 
t~iid. 20. 
~Hid.23. . 
7 Edward Warner. 'Douhet, Mitchell, Seversky: Theories of Air Warfare'. Edward Mead Earle 
edited. Makers· of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler. (New York, 
Atheneum, 1966) 485. 
n The German battleship SMS Ostfriesland was launched in September 1909 and 
commissioned into the Kais-erliche Marine (Imperial German Navy) in May 1 ij11. Having 
surrendered to the Allies following the First World War, the ship was commissioned as a 
United States Navy vessel on 7 April 1920 but was decommissioned in September that same 
year. Ostfriesland, along with several other ex-German vessels were used as targets by Navy 
aircraft as part of Mitchell's demonstration of air power/ 
78 Ibid. 
79 Mitchell's military career began in 1898 when he enlisted in the infantry. Having learnt to fly 
in 1916, he was sent to Europe a year later as an observer and finished the war as 
commander of the air service operations. As a Brigadier-General, Mitchell advocated the 
establishment of an air force that was separate from the army or the navy and he accused 
both services of incompetenca.and criminal negligence on matters of aeronautics. His actions 
led to him being court-mjrst(q{!_ed in 1925 and his rank was suspended for five years. Mitchell 
resigned from the army on 1 February 1926 and devoted his time thereafter to lecturing, 
writing and petitioning the US Government for a separate and unified air force. Ibid. 485-503. 
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with Germany's post-war Reichswehr was proving to be a keen student of 
mechanised warfare. As a cavalry officer on the Western Front, Guderian had 
nurtured the idea that mobility and the transfer of large numbers of men and 
equipment through difficult terrain would bring victory in future battles. 
Although he did not serve at Cambrai, the battle had left a lasting impression 
on him. Macksey writes that, "Guderian was to rate the moment when "the 
tank force provided the real dynamic punch (stosskraft) of the Entente armies 
since they broke through the Siegfried (Hindenburg) Line, regarded as 
impenetrable at Cambrai, in one morning"'.80 The British success was short-
lived yet the battle demonstrated that when tanks where massed together in a 
single formation they had the capability to overcome heavily fortified infantry 
positions and allow an attacking force increased mobility and speed as well as 
firepower. 
The defeat in 1918 and the Treaty of Versailles had not extinguished the 
belief within the German Army nor Guderian's thinking that the Reichswehr 
must remain a forward-looking institution with a view towards future 
developments. Although restricted to 100,000 men, Seeckt81 saw the need to 
lay the foundations for future expansion and mechanisation and the Germans 
began to undertake clandestine research into airpower and mechanised 
warfare with Soviet Russia throughout the 1920's and early 1930's. 
Throughout this period, Guderian served with the Transport Inspectorate and 
for the next ten years from 1922, he set himself the task of developing his 
theories through a series of articles in military publications in which mobility 
and stosskraft remained central to his thinking. Guderian believed that the key 
to winning a battle lay in the delivery of firepower close to enemy positions at 
short range. Armour was strong enough to protect against a rifle bullet and the 
infantryman could not carry it around as _part of his kit. Large-scale infantry 
formations did not possess the mobility and speed required to overcome 
80 Macksey. 18. ' 1 • 
81 Hans von Seeckt,1866-1936, was appointed Chief of the Reichswehr following the close of 
the First World War having fought in Poland, Serbia, Romania and Turkey. Seeckt concluded 
the clause in the Treaty of Rapallo through which the German forces obtained weapons and 
training in the Soviet Union. He commanded the army until 1926 and then embarked upon a 
political career and became ~ deputy in the Reichstag with the conservative People's Party. In 
1934 he became a military advisor to Chiang Kai-Shek until his death in 1936. 
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heavily fortified and static defences and their small arms could only deliver a 
limited Stosskraft. Guderian's solution was the tank.82 
In 1928, the Reichswehr High Command appointed Guderian to command 
a new branch of the Transport Corps. This department studied the use of 
tanks in warfare and their integration with other branches of the armed forces. 
The Reichswehr had already embarked upon a covert developmental 
programme with Russia under the terms of the Treaty of Rapallo83 and a year 
later Guderian travelled to Sweden to witness exercises by Swedish armoured 
formations. From this point onwards, he realised the potential of the tank not 
just as an infantry support device, as was the view of the French and the 
British, but as part of an armoured division that had been a fundamental 
element of Fuller's teachings. These new divisions would consist of artillery, 
armoured cars and mechanised infantry that formed a fast moving, powerful 
weapon that once it breached the weakness in an enemy defence could 
rapidly move throughout the rear areas. 
Guderian had the opportunity to demonstrate his ideas before Hitler in 
1934, three years after his appointment to the Inspectorate of Motorised 
Troops. His ideas fitted neatly into Hitler's plans for re-armament and 
territorial expansion despite protests from commanders such as Beck84 who 
refused to view the tank as anything other than an infantry support weapon. 
Hitler recognised the usefulness of the tank and armoured vehicle because 
Germany could not sustain a protracted war but there was also the 
82 Guderian never experienced a battle during the First World War were the tank was 
employed. He was not at the Somme when the British first deployed tanks on 15 September, 
1916, nor was he at Cambrai when a massed formation broke through the German lines. 
According to Macksey, such actions left an indelible mark on the young officer serving at 
Army Group G's headquarters. Macksey also writes that Guderian claimed to be aware of 
such actions and the tank battles of 1918 yet he did not actively begin his study into the use 
of tanks in battle until his posting to the Inspectorate of Transport Troops in 1922 and then to 
the Inspectorate of Motorised Troops in 1931. These units became the forerunners of the 
panzerwaffe that the Gerl')1an armed forces developed in the 1930's. For further discussion on 
Guderian and his theories of armoured warfare, see Macksey, 37-79. 
83 The Treaty of Rapallo was signed on 16 April 1922 between the Weimar Government and 
the Bolshevist Russia. Under the terms of this agreement, the two countries renounced all 
territorial and financial claims against each other. They also agreed to increase economic co-
operation. A secret annex was signed on 29 July that permitted Germany to train their military 
inside the Soviet Union, thus violating the Treaty of Versailles. 
84 Ludwig Beck, 1880-1944, served on the General Staff in the First World War and 
throughout the inter-war period. He opposed Hitler's expansionist plans and he resigned in 
protest against the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1938. He became an opponent of Hitler's 
government and was a conspirator in the bomb plot to assassinate the Fuehrer on 20 July, 
1944. In the aftermath of the failed attempt, he was arrested and shot. 
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propaganda value of such a force. It increased Germany's prestige and 
inspired fear, especially among Germany's eastern neighbours and the other 
European powers. In 1935, the Panzer Command was established and three 
divisions were immediately formed that were equipped with various size tanks 
over the next four years. 
In 1936, Guderian published Achtung! Panzer in which he detailed his 
vision for armoured warfare in what was a blueprint for the panzer actions in 
the years to come. He proposed that the deployment of the tank in large 
' 
numbers against the enemy's flanks and rear and conceded that the tank 
alone was not sufficient to hold captured enemy territory and that the panzer 
divisions needed to include motorised infantry and artillery for this purpose. 
Guderian argued that the purpose of the armoured divisions was to achieve a 
quick and decisive breakthrough and that the tanks be concentrated at the 
central point in an attack. If this occurred and the tanks delivered an effective 
punch then their mobility and speed could deny the enemy the time needed to 
mobilise his defences. Although Guderian set his own ideas and Germany's 
future war plans down in writing, such a warning went unheeded in London, 
Paris and elsewhere yet these tactics proved decisive in the battle for 
Western Europe four years later. 
Prelude to 1940: Britain's Unlimited Liability. 
Despite the terms of Versailles and the sentiment of 'Never Again' of 
1918-19, it would only be a matter of time before Britain was once again 
embroiled in European affairs as Versailles delivered a peace that was born 
with a hole through its heart. Setting the terms pressed upon Germany aside, 
its wording was to prove its undoing especially Part V of the Treaty that would 
open the door to problems in the disarmament process in the years to follow. 
It was under the preamble to Part V that Germany argued that it should be 
accorded international equal rights with the other powers at the conferences 
of the 1920's and 1930's. Richardson and Kitching claim that "to make the 
relevant clauses more palatable to Germany, it was stated in the preamble to 
Part V of the treaty that the arms reductions required were also intended "to 
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render possible the initiation of a general limitation of armaments to all 
nations".85 Under this section, Germany argued that the other powers also 
had a moral and legal obligation to reduce their military capacities. 
The Allies did not share this viewpoint. The basis for their disarmament 
programmes lay in Article 8 of the treaty that stated that a country's 
disarmament programme must be consistent with its national security. The 
sense of ambiguity imbued within this argument enabled the Allies to maintain 
their military dominance over Germany. Richardson and Kitching write that, "if, 
in terms of legal obligation, it was Article 8 of the Covenant that the 
discussions for a general disarmament convention devolved, in practice the 
impulsion behind the negotiations was the potential threat of Germany to the 
security system established by the Treaty of Versailles".86 However, the threat 
of German rearmament and ambition cast a long shadow over Europe even 
after the events of 1918 and 1919. France, never able to erase this insecurity, 
entered into security arrangements with Romania, Poland and 
Czechoslovakia, and constructed a series of fortifications on its border with 
Germany that would become infamous as the Maginot Line. The refusal of the 
US Congress to ratify the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations and 
Russian support to communist movements throughout Europe meant that 
Britain remained France's main ally in the face of a potential German threat. 
The awakening to this threat came on 14 October 1933 when the German 
Government gave notice to its representative that it planned to withdraw from 
the Disarmament Conference.87 The conference was supposed to be the 
crowning achievement for those who had searched for a policy of international 
85 Dick Richardson and Carolyn Kitching. 'Britain and the World Disarmament Conference'. 
Peter Catterall with C.J. Morris. Britain and the Threat to Stability in Europe, 1918-45. 
<London, Leicester University Press, 1993), 36 
86 ibid. 37 
87 The term 'Disarmament Conference' denotes a series of discussions attended by those 
countries in the League of Nations along with the United States and Soviet Union from 1932 
until 1937. In 1925, the League established a commission tasked with establishing which 
arms would be limited and how the member states could achieve this. By 1931, the 
commission had established an agreement and it delivered these findings to the Disarmament 
Conference when it opened in 1932. From its outset, disagreement over what constituted war 
materials and France's reluctance to reduce its military capacity due to fears over German re-
armament hindered the conference. Germany claimed that if other states did not reduce their 
military strength and reach of a level of parity with its own armed forces, then it would rebuild 
its military power. The conference adjourned from June until October 1933, however when it 
re-convened, the National Socialists had taken control of Germany's government and 
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disarmament. However, it had finally halted under the strain of German 
demands for armaments parity with its European neighbours, French 
suspicions and fear of invasion and Japanese aggression throughout northern 
and western China. The German withdrawal from the Conference marked the 
first time the Government had countered the post-war treaties. It was Hitler's 
first diplomatic victory and one that led to a policy of re-armament in defiance 
of Versailles and territorial expansion. 
By 1936, the British Empire faced not only a threat from a resurgent 
Germany but also from possible adversaries within the Mediterranean Sea 
and the Far East. Japan had been a British ally during the Great War but, by 
1931, this relationship had come under increasing strain due to Japan's 
imperial aspirations. In that year, Japan refused to comply with a League of 
Nations' demand for the withdrawal of its forces stationed in Manchuria and 
by 1937, its war of conquest had extended throughout northern and western 
China. This offensive threatened the British Far Eastern Empire along with 
Australia and New Zealand whose defence fell heavily upon the Royal Navy. 
The Navy would be required to deploy forces to those waters should a threat 
arise and the Singapore base was constructed in 1921 as a central point for 
from which it could operate. Yet the question remained as to whether the 
Navy had the ships available to send. Any deployment to that region would 
come at the expense of its strength elsewhere for example, the Mediterranean 
Sea, and therefore Imperial defence hinged on there not being a threat to 
British interests in one or more regions simultaneously. 
Britain proved to be a weak ally in the face of Axis re-armament and 
Germany's re-occupation of the Rhineland. Germany Justified these actions by 
claiming it Was in response to the Franco-Russian agreement of February of 
1936 and that this released Germany from its obligations under the Locamo 
Treaty.88 Whatever Hitler's justification, the action violated Article 44 of the 
Treaty of Versailles and could have provided France with its own pretext for 
announced that Germany would be leaving the conference to pursue a re-armament 
gogramme. The conference continued to meet sporadically until 1 May 1937. 
The Locamo Treaty was signed by the Foreign Ministers of Britain, France Italy, Germany, 
Czechoslovakia and Poland. Under the terms of the agreement, Germany, France and 
Belgium accepted the boundaries of their shared borders, while Italy and Britain agreed to 
ensure that they maintained this pact. Under the terms, Germany joined the League of 
Nations yet no provision or agreement was reached concerning Germany's eastern frontiers. 
,• 
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launching a counter attack. Yet the Allies did nothing. First, there was a sense 
of feeling, especially within Britain, that Germany was simply reclaiming its 
own territory and redressing the terms of a harsh treaty with which there was 
little sympathy. Second, France was not prepared to act without British 
support that was not forthcoming. British foreign policy throughout the latter 
half of the 1930's was under the increasing influence of Halifax and 
Chamberlain and moved towards compromise and negotiation rather than 
sanctions and military action. 
Germany's violation of the 1938 Munich Agreement meant that France's 
system of alliances with the Eastern states became redundant. If war broke 
out in Central or Eastern Europe then France and the Low Countries would 
face the power of an expanded Reich alone and this situation became more 
serious due to the surrender of the Czech Army and military establishment. 
Yet Britain was unprepared for conflict in Europe. Although the RAF was 
expanding its number of squadrons, it was primarily a bomber force with 
Fighter Command tasked with protecting the home islands against Luftwaffe 
intrusion. Unlike the Germans, the British had not integrated their fighters into 
a combined role with the forces on the ground and they were not equipped 
with dive-bombing formations. For its part, the Army could only muster four 
regular infantry divisions for deployment to the Continent, although this total 
expanded to nine in 1939 with the re~introduction of conscription. The newly 
formed armoured units where beset by technical difficulties and debate within 
the military and political establishment over the size and the cost of the tanks 
for the Army. Barnett claims that this indecision was due to the lack of a clear 
strategic and tactical doctrine that lay somewhere between the ideas 
proposed by Fuller and Liddell Hart and the orthodoxy that had carried the 
day in 1917-1918. Hence, the British designed their tanks according to two 
specifications. The first was the heavy tank that was slow moving and 
designed once again as an infantry support vehicle while those vehicles 
designed to engage the panzers were lightly armed and small. The cost of 
"'' these decisions would become apparent with the outbreak of war and Barnett 
writes that it was not until 1943 that the British were able to strike the correct 
balance in their armoured design. 
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1940: The Consequence of Inaction. 
The inability of the Allies to match the German in the battle of Western 
Europe in 1940 was due in "part to indecision and dithering over 
specifications; part to technical incompetence of some British engineering 
firms; part to pre-war Treasury meanness".89 However, the outbreak of the 
Second World War, the Allies again placed their faith in large, static defensive 
formations and believed that their own economic strength could be mobilised 
to overcome that of Germany and that blockade and sanctions would cripple 
German industry and inflow of raw materials. As with his predecessors in 
1914, Gamelin90 expected the main thrust of the German attack to come from 
the north and deployed the bulk of his forces to the River Dyle believing that 
the Maginot Line would counter any direct assault across the Rhine and that 
the terrain of the Ardennes would prove impassable. The French Char-B tank 
carried as much armour and firepower as the Panzer yet the Allies dispersed 
their tank formations throughout the divisions rather than having them 
concentrated into a single formation. The error that had proved so costly in 
1916 proved to be the most decisive in the campaign of 1940. 
The British and French faced a military campaign that was innovative rather 
than revolutionary. The weaponry may have had increased lethality than ever 
before but the campaign did not produce any new armament that would alter 
the course of warfare forever. Instead, the success of 'Fall Gelb' lay in manner 
in which the Germans deployed their men and equipment along with 
exploiting the flaws in the Allied planning. The original plan designed by 
Brauchitsch91 and Halder92 proposed a push through the Low Countries in a 
89 Barnett. 421. 
90 Maurice Gustave Gamelin, 1872-1958, served on General Joffe's staff during the First 
World War, and became chief of the General Staff in 1931 and became Chief of Staff National 
Defence in 1938. At the outbreak' of war in 1939, Gamelin's strategy rested upon the 
fortifications of the Maginot Line and the Strategic Reserve. However, these proved 
ineffective against the blitzkrieg. On 19 May 1940, Gamelin was replaced by General Maxime 
Weygand and was arrested by the Vichy Government upon its seizure of power. Gamelin was 
imprisoned in Germany until his release from captivity in 1945. 
91 Heinrich Brauchitsch, 1881-1948. Having reached the rank of major at the end of the First 
World War, Brauchitsch was promoted Major-General and Inspector of Artillery in 1932 
becoming General of Artillery in 1937. He was promoted to the position of Commander in 
Chief of the German Army in February 1938 and was one of twelve men promoted to Field 
Marshal by Hitler following the invasjon of France. Hitler relieved him of his duties in 
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move that would outflank the Maginot Line. Under their original submission 
that was similar to the Schlieffen Plan of 1914, the main thrust would be to the 
north of the Ardennes towards the Dutch-Belgian border with the forces to the 
south providing a protective screen along the left flank with the objective of 
reaching the River Meuse. The plan did not find favour with other officers 
serving on the General Staff and nor with the Fuehrer himself. Macksey writes 
that Manstein93, "complained that it was unlikely to achieve complete victory 
since it could not bring about the total destruction of the enemy's northern 
wing and failed to create a favourable strategic situation from which to launch 
subsidiary thrusts: in essence lacked penetration and versatility''. 94 Manstein 
argued that if the German forces could not achieve a swift breakthrough then 
Germany would experience a long, drawn out conflict that it could not afford. 
His own plan differed from the proposal forwarded by Brauchitsch and 
Halder on one crucial point. Rather than embracing a full swing through the 
Low Countries and smashing directly into the Allied northern armies, the main 
German thrust would be concentrated in the Ardennes towards the French 
town of Sedan. The push from Army Group B into Holland and Belgium would 
serve as a diversion and by drawing the Allies north towards Brussels and 
Antwerp, the Germans would be able to expose the weaker Allied right flank. 
Once a breakthrough came, the offensive would turn northwards towards 
Amiens and the Channel in a move designed to attack the rear areas of the 
December 1941, with the failure of Operation Barbarossa to defeat the Soviet Union and he 
was arrested by the British in 1945. He died in 1948 while awaiting trial by a British military 
court as a war criminal. ' 
92 Franz Halder, 1884-972, served as a member of staff of the Crown Prince of Bavaria during 
the First World War. He became Chief of General Staff in 1938 and devised the invasion of 
Poland and he helped plan Operation's Sealion and Barbarossa. Halder replaced Brauchitsch 
as Commander in Chief of the Germany Army in 1941 but was replaced a year later after a 
disagreement with Hitler. He was arrested by the Gestapo in 1944 on suspicion of being a 
conspirator in the July bomb plot and having been sent to the Dachau concentration camp 
was freed by American units in 1945. He gave evidence for the prosecution at the Nuremburg 
Trials and died in 1972. 
93 Erich von Manstein, 1887-1973, became the Chief of Operations for the German Army in 
1936. Having served as commander of Army Group South during the attack on Poland, he 
returned to Berlin where he devised the offensive against France including the push through 
the Ardennes. This became known as the 'Manstein Plan'. Between 1941 and 1944, Manstein 
led a series of offensives throughout the Soviet Union including the capture of the Crimea and 
the failed attempt to rescue the Seventh Army from Stalingrad and the re-capture of Karkov. 
In 1944, he was dismissed from office for quarrelling with Hitler and when arrested after the 
war, he was sentenced to 18 years imprisonment for genocide. He was released in 1953 due 
to ill health and he died in Germany in 1973. . 
94 Kenneth Macksey. Guderian: Panzer General. {London, Macdonald and James, 1975), 97. 
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Allied forces positioned along the River Dyle. The result was that "Hitler's 
much-cherished surprise element would be fully gratified, for Manstein's plan 
called, not for eliminating France at a stroke, but for a swift advance to the 
Channel coast that would cut the Allies in half". 95 It was at this point that 
Guderian entered the equation with his proposal to the General Staff that the 
panzer divisions lead the attack through the Ardennes. The senior officers, 
including Brauchitsch, Halder and Rundstedt96 argued that the infantry, 
traditionally the armed forces' principal weapon on the battlefield, would be 
required to carry out the river crossings and create the bridgeheads. Yet 
Hitler, enthused with the use of tanks and armour, overruled their concerns 
and accepted the Sichelschnitt Plan along with the use of an armoured 
spearhead during a meeting with Manstein on 17 February. 
With the bulk of the Allied forces deployed along the Franco-Belgian border 
only the French Second Army, based in the Ardennes, was in a position to 
confront the massed panzers of Army Group A and the powerful 88mm anti-
aircraft guns that the Germans used in a ground role as its troops were 
heavily bombarded from the air. The extensive use of heavy and dive-bomber 
formations meant that the Germans did not have to deploy a large number of 
heavy artillery batteries through the narrow mountain passes along· with the 
voluminous supply and ammunition columns. Once the Germans had broken 
out of their Meuse bridgeheads and pushed into central France, the Allied 
armies found themselves fighting on two fronts and having to secure their 
flanks and rear in an effort not to have their armies cut in half. In a desperate 
95 Richard Collier. 1940: The Avalanche. (New York, The Dial Press/James Wade, 1979), 68-
69. 
96 Gerd von Rundstedt, 1875-1953, ended the First World War with the rank of Major and by 
1932 was promoted commander of the 3rd Infantry Division. Rundstedt resigned from the 
army in 1938 amidst his concern over growing Nazi power but was recalled in 1939 and 
served in Poland. Rundstedt supported Manstein's plan and led the German forces into 
France yet his call for a conventional assault on the British Expeditionary Force with infantry 
as the main weapon was accepted by Hitler and as a consequence, the panzers were 
ordered to halt before reaching Dunkirk. Rundstedt was promoted Field Marshal in 1941 and 
took part in the invasion of the Soviet Union. However, Hitler blamed him for the failure of 
Army Group South to hold the city of Rostov and he was relieved of his command. In 1942, 
he was sent to France to oversee the builqing of the Atlantic Wall yet his call for Hitler to 
negotiate with the Allies following the Normandy landings led again to his sacking. He was 
captured by the Americans in May 1945 but suffered a heart attack while under interrogation 
and served only 3 years in prison. Upon his release, he returned to Germany and died in 
February 1953. · ~ 
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act to save his government, Reynaud97 bestowed command of the hastily 
organised Fourth Armoured Division onto de Gaulle on 15 May with orders to 
counter attack near the town of Crecy. This effort was in vain as was the 
counterattack by the French First Army on the 22nd because as their front 
crumbled, the Allied command was unable to organise its tank units into a 
formation powerful enough to confront the Germans. Even as de Gaulle led 
the last counterattack at Abbeville on 28 May, a separate peace lobby had 
formed within the Reynaud Government with Petain98 and Weygand99 at its 
core. Using the fear of internal disintegration, rumoured communist revolution 
and the argument that Britain had abandoned France, the peace lobby 
mobilised support for seeking terms with Germany at the expense of the 
beleaguered Reynard, who despite appointing de Gaulle to his Cabinet as 
Secretary for Defence was increasingly isolated and unable to rally support for 
the continuation of hostilities. Once the Roosevelt Administration informed 
Reynard that the United States would not enter the war on the Allied side his 
position was lost and on 14 June, he stepped aside in an act that allowed 
President Lebrun 100 to ask Petain to form a Government. Three days later de 
Gaulle escaped to London to form the National Committee of the Free French 
97 Paul Reynaud, 1878-1966. Entered the Chamber of Deputies in 1914 as an Independent 
and became Prime Minister in 1940. His resignation from office paved the way for the Petain 
Government to take power and the Vichy authorities arrested him in 1942. He was imprisoned 
in Germany until 1945 and upon his release re-entered politics in 1946. He died in 1966. 
98 Henri-Philippe Petain, 1856-1951, joined the French Army in 1876 and as an infantry officer 
became convinced that the development of modern weaponry aided the defensive over the 
offensive. In the First World War, Petain commanded the garrison at Verdun, becoming 
Commander in Chief of the army in 1917. He was promoted Field Marshal 2 weeks after the 
armistice and served as Minister for War in 1934. In 1940, he agreed to head the Vichy 
Government yet fled to Switzerland following the Normandy landings. He was arrested for 
treason in April 1945 and died in prison in 1950. 
99 Maxime Weygand, 1867-1946, was a career soldier who ended the First World War with 
the rank of Lieutenant-General. In 1920 he saw service in Poland against the Soviet Arrny 
and in 1930 he was appointed Governor of Syria. Following his retirement in 1935, he 
became active in right wing politics yet was recalled to the army in May 1940, replacing 
Gamelin as Allied Commander in Chief. He recommended that France enter into peace talks 
with the Germans on 13 June and briefly held the position of Minister of Defence under Petain 
before being ousted in a power struggle with Pierre Laval. Weygand retired from politics in 
1942 yet he was arrested and tried as a collaborator in 1945. Although found guilty, he was 
~ranted leniency and he died in Paris in 1965. 
00 Albert Lebrun, 1871-1950, was elected to the French Parliament in 1900 with the Left 
Republican Party. He served as Minister of Colonies from 1911-14 and Liberated Regions 
from 1917 to 1919. He became President in 1932 and was re-elected to the position in 1939. 
On 13 July 1940, he resigned from office 'following the German offensive but was arrested by 
the Gestapo in 1943 on suspicion of being in contact with the resistance. After being deported 
to Austria, Hitler permitted him to return home in 1943. He died in France in 1950. 
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and on 21 June, the French delegation led by General Charles Huntziger101 
arrived at the forest of Compiegne to begin the Armistice negotiations with 
Adolf Hitler and his senior military commanders. This was the final act in the 
Battle of France and the Wehrmacht now stood ready to continue through the 
Balkans and the Mediterranean in a triumphant march that would lead it into 
the Soviet Union. However, in the months following the conclusion of 
Germany's western campaign, its attention immediately shifted towards 
defeating Britain which having failed to learn the lessons of warfare that had 
developed throughout the inter-war years, faced the possibility of the 
Wehrmacht landing on its own shores. 
') 
f 
' 101 Charles Leon Clement Huntziger, 1880-1941, headed the French Armistice Commission in 
1940 before assuming the posts of Under-Secretary for War that same year before holding 
the Ministries of National Defence and War under the Vichy regime. He was killed in an air 
crash in 1941. 
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CHAPTER TWO. 
June 1940 - December 1941 : The Aftermath of Defeat. 
'People sometimes wonder why we are unable to take the offensive against the enemy, and 
sometimes have to wait for some new blow which he will strike against us'. 
Winston Churchill. "A Long Road to Tread". Speech 
delivered at Mansion House, London. 9 November 
1940. 
On 8 September 1940, Brooke wrote in his diary: "all reports still point to 
the probability of an invasion starting between 8th and 10th of this month. The 
responsibility of feeling what any mistakes or even misappreciations may 
mean in the future of these isles and of the Empire is a colossal one! and one 
which rather staggers me at times. I wish I had more adequately trained 
formations under my orders. But for the present there is nothing to be done 
but to trust God and pray for his help and guidance".102 His entry six days later 
echoed these sentiments as the Commander of the Home Forces dwelt not 
only on the prospects for Britain's survival but also on his concern over the 
deficiencies in his country's defence. Brooke recorded that the "suspense of 
waiting is very trying especially when one is so·familiar with the weakness of 
our defence! Our exposed coastline is just twice the length of the front the 
French were holding in France with about 80 divisions and a Maginot Line! 
Here we have 22 divisions of which only about ½ can be looked upon as in 
any way fit for any form of mobile operationl"103 The lifting of the Expeditionary 
Forces from the Continent may have kept Britain in the war but the damage to 
the Army in terms of its fighting capability was certainly grave, almost critical 
and according to Wilmot, "twenty-five tanks came back from France; 25 out of 
704. Of the 400,000 men in the B.E.F. some 360,000 were saved, but only at 
a cost of sacrificing all their arms and equipment, except those weapons they 
,>· 
carried home on their shoulders. For many weeks after the evacuations, as 
Churchill was to tell the House in Secret Session, "an invading force of 
150,000 picked men might have created mortal havoc in our midst." During 
102 Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke. War Diaries, 1939-1946. Edited by Alex Danchev and 
Daniel Todman. (London : Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2001 ). 106. 
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those weeks, time was the most precious element in all Britain. At the end of 
June, the Order of Battle of the Home Forces showed 27 divisions and 14 
independent brigades: a substantial army- on paper. Twelve of those divisions 
were trained and had tasted battle in France, but they were now virtually 
unarmed. The rest were equipped for training, but with four or five exceptions, 
were neither schooled nor armed for action. Some were just learning to 
shoot'"'.104 
Despite the threat from Sealion, the Churchill Government was adamant 
that Britain would continue the war but survival, let alone continued 
participation in the conflict, depended upon the outcome of the air battle that 
followed the Battle of France. The Royal Navy had suffered heavily in the ill-
fated Norwegian campaign and again during its efforts to lift the Army from the 
French coast, paying the price for the Admiralty's pre-war blindness to the 
devastating impact aircraft can have on even the most heavily armed flotilla. 
The Navy was able to close the English Channel to enemy shipping and 
mustered what resources it possessed to deny the Germans superiority in the 
waters around the Continent and the sea-lanes into the Atlantic Ocean. 
However, it could not operate without the risk of serious loss while devoid of 
an effective air umbrella and as Wilmot claims: "for Britain, as for Germany, 
' 
the outcome of the air battle was of supreme importance. While the Army was 
being trained and equipped, while the home defences were being organised 
and developed, while the Royal Navy was strengthening its destroyers, the 
task of holding the Wehrmacht off would fall first and foremost upon the 
R.A.F. If Britain could keep command of the air, her defences at sea and on 
land might never be put to the test of invasion; if not. .. "105 
Despite the numerical advantage the Luftwaffe held over the R.A.F., 
Goering had made two fatal errors that prevented it from inflicting defeat on its 
British adversary. The first error was the ''failure of the Luftwaffe to appreciate 
the supreme importance of radar in the British system of interception".106 
Wilmot claims that the Germans failed to realise that the British advances in 
radar far outstripped their own research and, although Goering was Director 
104 Chester Wilmot. The Struggle for Europe. (London, Collins, 1952). 33. 
105 Ibid. 34. 
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of the Reich's Four Year Plan, he had failed to provide sufficient funds for the 
research and development in this technology. The second mistake was his 
acquiescence to Hitler's demand that the Luftwaffe concentrate on bombing 
the British cities following a British raid on Berlin. This switch in targeting 
proved to be the decisive point in the Battle of Britain as with its aerodromes 
and early warning installations no longer under sustained attack, Fighter 
Command gained time to rearm and regroup and assemble its reserves for 
battle. More important for the wider British war effort, the failure of the 
Germans in the air provided the Army with time to resurrect its fighting 
capability. Although the divisions protecting the southern coast of England 
were not at full strength, the British forces now had sufficient weaponry and 
equipment by September to pose a serious challenge to any seaborne 
invaders and the number of tanks in the Home Army's possession had risen 
to eight hundred. Although the Wehrmacht had completed its preparations for 
Sealion, it was unable to invade southern England without the Luftwaffe 
achieving air superiority over the Channel. 
The British did not abandon the aspiration that their forces would re-deploy 
to the Continent at some future point in the war even though they recognised 
Germany's land-based military superiority. This point is raised by Butler, who 
claims "the prospect of a return in due time to the Continent for the final 
assault on Germany had been in the mind of the British high command ever 
since the summer of 1940, but so long as Britain stood alone against a 
triumphant Germany the prospect could only be remote".107 Wilmot's 
examination draws a comparable conclusion and he explains that "the 
prospects at any particular time could be worked out by arithmetical 
calculation: what forces could the British land and maintain on the far shore of 
the. Channel; what forces could Germany bring against them there? It was a 
question of numbers, equipment and, above all, the means of transportation. 
No administrative improvisation, no strategic or tactical ingenuity, no 
readiness for sacrifice could alter the verdict which statistics told in advance. 
The answer was that there could be no cross-channel invasion until a large 
part of Germany's strength had been drawn off to other fronts; until Britain's 
107 J.R. M. Butler. Grand Strategy, Vol. 3. Part 2. (London. H.M.S.O. 1964). 565. 
44 
arm had been reinforced from sources outside the Commonwealth and 
Empire, and until she had established command of the Atlantic supply routes 
and of the air over Western Europe".108 Nevertheless, Churchill ordered the 
establishment of a Combined Operations Command whose purpose it was to 
plan for this objective and the carrying out of reconnaissance missions and 
low-level commando raids against the Continental coastlines. His directive to 
the Joint Planning Staff on 5 October 1940 that they undertake a feasibility 
study on possible offensive operations in Europe, "includ_ing the establishment 
of a bridgehead on the Cherbourg Peninsula"109 is another example that he 
recognised this vital military goal. 
Churchill promoted the notion of a re-deployment to Europe in the political 
arena. On 11 June, Churchill dispatched a telegram to Roosevelt in which he 
, 
expressed his belief that "having saved the B.E.F. we do not lack troops at 
home and as soon as Divisions can be equipped on a much higher scale 
needed for Continental service they will be dispatched to France. Our 
intention is to have a strong army fighting in France for the campaign of 
1941".110 He reiterated this stance in a cable on 25 July stating: "plans also 
ought to be made for coming to the aid of conquered populations by landing 
armies of liberation when the time is ripe. For this purpose it will be 
necessary, not only to have great numbers of tanks but also of vessels 
capable of carrying them and landing them direct on to beaches".111 Churchill 
also spoke of these aspirations in the House of Commons. In his address 
from the dispatch box on 5 Novell!ber, the Prime Minister claimed that Britain 
was engaging in building a strong army as despite the country's primary 
weapons being sea and air-based, a powerful land force was required to 
continue the war. He argued, "we must have a strong Army, well equipped, 
well armed, well trained and well organised, capable of intervening as the war 
108 Wilmot. 97-98. 
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proceeds in the liberation of one or other of the many countries which are 
yearning to throw off the odious Nazi yoke". 112 
Given the serious loss of equipment and weaponry in France and the 
strength of both the German land and air forces, such a view appears wildly 
optimistic, almost fantastic. Apart from the Dominion and Empire 
Governments pledging that they would also continue the war and commit 
troops to various theatres of operations, Britain was unable to secure an 
alliance with any other power following the Franco-German Armistice. The 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the American desire to remain outside of the 
European balance of power meant that both the Soviet Union and the US 
maintained their neutrality. Nevertheless, Churchill wasted little time in writing 
to Roosevelt and pleading for American assistance. On 15 May 1940, five 
days after entering Downing Street, he sent an emotional plea to the White 
House in which he stressed the rapid deterioration of the Allied position and 
Britain's need for immediate aid. Churchill asked that the US "should proclaim 
nonbelligerency, which would mean that you would help us with everything 
short of actually engaging armed forces".113 What the appeal 'everything short 
of actually engaging armed forces' amounted to in reality was the loan of forty 
to fifty old US Navy destroyers, several hundred of the latest US aircraft, anti-
aircraft equipment and ammunition and raw materials. At the same time as he 
made this request, Churchill asked that an American naval squadron to Eire to 
deter any possible German infiltration of that country and charged Roosevelt 
"to keep that Japanese dog quiet in the Pacific, using Singapore in any way 
convenient" .114 
Roosevelt's sympathy lay with the British but with the Neutrality Laws still in 
effect the President could not allow the purchase of weaponry, equipment or 
resources with credit based in the US. Instead, Roosevelt proposed an 
alternative arrangement whereby the United States converted Britain's assets 
throughout the Western Hemisphere into cash as a means of financing their 
acquisitions but the British rejected this scheme as inequitable. The solution 
112 'The War Situation, (The Autumn Balance Sheet)', Nov. 5, 1940, House of Commons, 
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was the policy of 'Lend-Lease', 115 and Kimball writes that this arrangement 
"permitted repayment of such subsidies in whatever manner the President 
authorised."116 Lend-Lease was finalised with an agreement that granted the 
US access to air and naval bases throughout Britain's territories in the 
Western Hemisphere for the next half century. This accord also enabled 
Roosevelt to circumvent the Neutrality Laws and his political opponents who 
wished to see the United States remain firmly outside of the conflict and 
refrain from offering any form of support to one side. Under the auspices of 
Lend-Lease, Roosevelt authorised the placing of orders for military 
-
equipment, and throughout 1941 Britain began to receive weaponry from US 
stocks. The bulk of this aid consisted predominantly of small arms and 
material for the infantry and, as a result, Britain's forces would remain beset 
by shortfalls in their equipment and equipment such as armour and heavy 
gunnery even after the US formally entered the war at the close of the year. 
According to Howard, the course of action favoured by the Chiefs of Staff 
given this situation was for Britain to utilise what resources it possessed to 
diminish Germany's economic strength and the capacity of its war industry. 
He writes that Britain's best option for success "lay in postponing any decisive 
encounter for as long as possible, while using her sea-power to build up her 
own strength and her air-power to erode that of the enemy. If this could be 
done successfully, estimated the Chiefs of Staff in the summer of 1940, the 
German Empire might collapse from within; the German Army, paralysed by 
lack of petrol and by patriot revolts in the satellite nations, might be unable to 
fight; and the British Army could then return to the Continent, not to force a 
decisive engagement with the Wehrmacht, but to receive its surrender and 
restore order''.117 The purpose of this campaign of aerial bombing and 
blockade could produce crippling shortages of food and oil stocks within the 
115 The Lend-Lease Act was passed by the US Congress in 1941 and permitted the transfer 
of war materials to countries whose defence was considered vital to the security of the United 
States. The arrangement was originally designed to include only the British Empire and China 
however by November 1941, Lend-Lease was extended to the Soviet Union. In 1942, the act 
was extended to allow for US troops to be stationed in countries participating in the 
arrangement, for example, Australia and New Zealand. The term for this was 'Reverse Lend-
Lease'. 
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Reich and "reckoned in September 1940, conditions might be such that a 
British striking force 30 divisions strong would be able to establish itself on the 
Continent and impose its own terms".118 
On 14 June, the Future Operational Planning Section outlined the limited 
range of options available to the British in a memorandum to the War Cabinet. 
The report, titled Future Strategy: Review119, claimed that the Germans 
needed only eight weeks to assemble the necessary force for Operation 
Sealion given its interior lines of operation while at the same time Britain faced 
a serious deficiency in its armoured capacity. Only three divisions within the 
Home Forces possessed their full compliment of tanks and the Planners 
cautioned that although the Battle of Britain had concluded in the previous 
autumn, Fighter Command had not gained superiority over the Luftwaffe and 
many installations and facilities within the United Kingdom remained 
vulnerable to parachute assault. The Planning Staff also offered a reminder to 
the politicians that the nature of warfare had undergone a transformation as 
"in the old days, sea power gave us flexibility and we were often able to 
employ inferior numbers against outlying enemy forces. With the advent of air 
power, mechanisation and improvements in land communications (all of which 
favour "interior lines") the advantage has passed to Germany".120 Therefore, 
Britain would not be able to undertake a return to the Continent in 1941 and 
the Planners argued that "nowhere on the Continent, even if it were possible 
for us to land, could we subsequently prevent the existing German Army and 
Air Force concentrating quickly in a strength we could not resist".121 They 
estimated that the German military power at that time consisted of 250 
divisions with 90 of them combat- ready and able to be deployed to meet any 
incoming threat although Britain could not avoid a confrontation if the outcome 
of the war was to be decided in its favour. The Planners pointed out 
"sometime, in order to impose our will upon the enemy, we must occupy and 
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control portions of his territory. Ultimately, therefore, land operations are 
essential" .122 
The solution that the Planners favoured was the degradation of Germany's 
military capability by diminishing the "economy which feeds it, the civilian 
morale which sustains it, the supplies which nourish it and the hopes of victory 
which give it courage. Then, and only then, can the German war machine, for 
all its army divisions and air geschwerders, be speeded by military action 
down the road to inevitable collapse".123 The report highlighted the fact that as 
the threat of Sealion had diminished, "Germany, too is confined to a war of 
attrition on the British economy and morale".124 The Planners were strident in 
their belief that the Second World War had become one of economic struggle 
and they made the case that in the First World War, "a complete military 
victory could forestall or reverse the results of economic struggle. But now we 
are faced with a situation where, except for the possibility open to Germany of 
an invasion of the United Kingdom, neither side can hope to bring to an end 
the resistance of his enemy unless that resistance has first been weakened by 
the destruction of his economy and the lowering of his morale".125 
Britain's examination of the methods in which it could engage the Axis 
other than through a direct cross-Channel assault continued throughout 1940 
and 1941 even as the threat of Operation Sealion faded and the German 
divisions began their march eastward. The Wehrmacht maintained garrisons 
throu·ghout France, the Low Countries and Norway. Although these forces 
consisted largely of reserve units, they still outnumbered the British in terms of 
troop numbers, equipment and land-based weaponry. As the Future Strategy: 
Review illustrated, the British believed that the Germans would easily counter 
any landing attempted by their forces and at this stage of the war, attrition 
offered the best method for engaging the Germans and for bringing about a 
possible victory. Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union meant that it was 
now fighting on the Eastern Front once again yet this offensive created an 
uncomfortable precedent for the British. They now had a new ally with 
different political doctrines with whom they would have to consult regarding 
122 Ibid. Section 1, Paragraph 3. 
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strategy for pursuing the war and one that would almost immediately exert 
pressure for the opening of the Second Front. Kimball writes that Moscow 
made its first request for such an operation or a similar enterprise in the 
Balkans in September of 1941 yet Churchill would only agree to it if Turkey 
entered the war on Britain's side.126 The pressure on Britain to re-deploy its 
forces to North-West Europe had begun and it would increase with the entry 
of the United States into the war six months later. 
125 Ibid. Section 1, Paragraph 7. 
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CHAPTER THREE. 
Britain's Policy on the Second Front in 1942. 
'We whole-heartedly agree with your conception of concentration against the main enemy, 
and we cordially accept your plan with one broad qualification. As you will see from my 69 of 
the 15h April, it is essential that we should prevent a junction of the Japanese and Germans". 
Telegram from Churchill to Roosevelt. 17 April 1942. 
Churchill in Washington, December 1941. 
Within two weeks of the attack on Pearl Harbour, Churchill and Roosevelt 
convened in Washington with their Chiefs of Staff127 for their second meeting 
since Placentia Bay128 but their first as wartime allies. The aim of this 
conference was to determine the course of Allied strategy and assimilate the 
command structures of both countries' armed forces. While the Americans 
scrambled to contain the Japanese advance in the Pacific, Churchill arrived in 
Washington having prepared what Gwyer describes as the "first sketch of the 
offensive strategy in Europe"129 during his voyage aboard H.M.S. Duke of 
York. However, the strategy contained within this report was not a 'first sketch' 
but rather a statement of intent that the Allies abide by the principles that had 
underpinned British planning since June of the previous year. Churchill 
maintained his support for Britain's aerial offensive, despite this policy having 
failed to bring about Germany's internal disintegration or that of its armed 
forces. He wrote that he had "great hopes of affecting German production and 
German morale by ever more severe and more accurate bombing of their 
cities and harbours, and that this, combined with their Russian defeats, may 
127 The Prime Ministerial party consisted of those who were instrumental in shaping British 
policy. Accompanying Churchill was Lord Beaverbrook, then Minister for Supply, and Admiral 
Dudley Pound and Air Marshal Charles Portal, the Chiefs of Staff of the Royal Air Force and 
Royal Navy respectively. The party also included Field Marshal Sir John Dill who had served 
as GIGS for the first eighteen months of the war and who would remain in Washington as the 
head of Britain's military mission there. 
128 Placentia Bay is located Newfoundland, Canada. Churchill and Roosevelt convened there 
from 8 to 11 August 1941. Although the United States was several months away from joining 
the war, the conference is significant as it laid the foundation for the Atlantic Charter that the 
US and Britain worded and agreed to on 12 August. The two parties also agreed that the 26 
countries in alliance against Germany would not seek a separate peace with Berlin. 
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produce important effects on the will of the German people, with 
consequential internal reactions upon the German government".130 He also 
maintained his support for re-deploying forces to Europe and declared that the 
Allies needed, "to prepare for the liberation of the captive countries of Western 
and Southern Europe by the landing at suitable points, successively or 
simultaneously, of British and American armies strong enough to enable the 
conquered populations to revolt". 131 However, Churchill did not identify 
Northwest France as the specific landing point for the Allied divisions. Instead, 
he envisaged the British and American formations landing in several countries 
throughout Europe, "namely, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, the French 
Atlantic coasts, as well as in Italy and possibly the Balkans, the German 
garrisons would prove insufficient to cope both with the strength of the 
liberating forces and the fury of the revolting peoples" .132 
Britain's designation of the Mediterranean as the primary theatre of 
operations in 1942 was apparent in this submission. Churchill was optimistic 
that any success gained from Auchinleck's 133 desert offensive 134 would allow 
the Allies to secure Europe's southern periphery, induce Turkey over to their 
side and generate pressure on the Petain Government to allow the Allies 
access to its North African territories in return for France's re-constitution as a 
great power and the restoration of its Empire. Yet he expressed his scepticism 
that Vichy would make such a gesture and Churchill claimed that Britain 
would commit 55,000 men, including two armoured divisions, to see this 
objective realised in addition to those already serving under Auchinleck's 
command.135 Churchill's summary of the situation was that "the war in the 
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West in 1942 comprises, as its main offensive effort, the occupation and 
control by Great Britain and the United States of the whole of the North and 
West African possessions of France, and the further control by Britain of the 
whole North African shore from Tunis to Egypt, thus giving, if the naval 
situation allows, free passage through the Mediterranean and the Suez 
Canal".136 
The first Washington Conference was a landmark summit as the British 
and the Americans agreed that the economic and military resources of each 
state would be centralised under a joint command structure. They also 
implemented what Wilmot calls the "fundamental basis of joint strategy''137 
with the 'Germany First' principle at its core and a policy to which the military 
staffs of the two countries had agreed during talks the previous February. 
Marshall viewed Germany as the key adversary and he decreed that once 
Germany had been defeated then Italy and Japan would collapse shortly 
thereafter. There were those in the US military, for example, MacArthur and 
King, who lobbied for the war-effort to be concentrated on Japan and 
operations throughout the Pacific Ocean and the White House was under 
strong pressure from the American public to press in that direction. However, 
Roosevelt agreed with Marshall and the 'Germany First' policy stood. This 
Presidential ruling provided the General with the mandate to begin putting 
plans for the invasion of Europe into practice. 
Marshall and Hopkins in London: April 1942. 
When Marshall and Hopkins arrived in London on 8 April for the follow-up 
discussions to the Washington Conference, the war had evolved from a 
European conflict into one with global dimensions. Singapore had been in 
Japanese hands for two months and Britain's forces in the Far East and the 
Mediterranean basin had crumbled under the weight of the Axis offensives. 
The presence of the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff and the President's 
Personal Representative demonstrated the importance that the Roosevelt 
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Administration attached to the discussions and its determination to achieve a 
decisive strategy. The talks also provided America's senior military 
commander with the opportunity to present the case for an early and direct re-
entry into Europe. However, the challenge facing the American delegation 
was overcoming the scepticism of the British High Command that the Allied 
ground forces lacked sufficient numbers and equipment for a direct 
confrontation with the Germans in Europe and the necessary protective 
screen in the air. Following a meeting of the C.O.S. on 28 March, Brooke 
noted these concerns in his diary: 'We were discussing ways and means of 
establishing new Western Front. I have propounded theory that a Western 
Front, to be of use, must force withdrawal of forces from Russia, that it was 
impossible with land forces at our disposal to force the Germans to withdraw 
land forces from Russia; but what might induce them to withdraw air forces. 
But to do this a landing must take place within our air umbrella, namely in the 
vicinity of Calais or Boulogne. Mountbatten was still hankering after a landing 
near Cherbourg where proper air support is not possible" .138 
Brooke's doubt over the viability of the Second Front would define his 
stance on the subject throughout the next two years as his mindset fixed upon 
the difficulties he believed the Western Allies faced in undertaking such an 
enterprise and his opinion that Marshall was unable to comprehend them. 
This lack of regard for Marshall's point of view or abilities as a comma~ding 
officer would characterise their relationship throughout the remainder of the 
war and Brooke's chronicJes for 30 March and 9 April illustrated both thought 
processes. In the first entry, Brooke complained that he "was kept up till 1 am 
discussing the possibilities of some kind of offensive in Northern France to 
assist Russia in the event of German attack successful, as it probably will be. 
A difficult problem - this universal cry to start a Western front is going to be 
hard to compete with, and yet what can we do with some 10 divisions against 
the German masses? Unfortunately the country fails to realise the situation 
we are in".139 The latter entry stated, "Started COS at 9 am as Marshall was 
due at 10.30. He remained with us until 12.30pm and gave us a long talk on 
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his views concerning the desirability of starting Western front next September 
and that the USA forces would take part. However, the total force which they 
could transport by then only consisted of 2 ½ divisions!! No very great 
contribution. Furthermore they had not begun to realise what all the 
implications of their proposed plan were!"140 
Nevertheless, Churchill sanctioned Marshall's plan at a War Cabinet 
Defence Committee 141 meeting on 14 April describing the American proposal 
as "momentous"142 and he professed that the "conception underlying it 
accorded with the classic principles of war - namely, concentration against 
the main enemy".143 Brooke concurred, and along with a note of caution, 
described the proceedings in his diary as "A momentous meeting at which we 
accepted their proposals for offensive action in Europe in 1942 perhaps and in 
1943 for certain. They have not begun to realise all the implications of this 
plan and all the difficulties that lie ahead of us!"144 Marshall's immediate 
response to Britain's acceptance was to express his relief that there was "a 
basic agreement on general principles"145 and that "all were in complete 
agreement as to what should be done in 1943".146 He was also of the view 
that the Allies needed to prepare for possible deployment to the Continent 
during that year, especially if it became apparent that the Russians were 
collapsing in the face of the German offensives. Marshall's rationale was that 
"the difficulties should not be insoluble by reason of the fact that we should 
have a great measure of air control. The size of our joint air programmes 
showed that this would be so, particularly as the German campaign against 
140 Ibid. 9 April 1942. 246. 
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Russia would absorb great resources and thus reduce the hazards of our 
operations" .147 
Howard regards Churchill's consent to a cross-Channel assault as Britain 
signalling "its final and formal acceptance."148 His case is that Marshall's 
scheme did not conflict with any of the strategies the British had considered at 
that time and it would not have been in their interest to reject the proposal 
when the United States Government faced strong domestic pressure to 
abandon the 'Germany First' principle and concentrate its offensive efforts in 
the Pacific. He writes: "the evidence suggests that both Mr. Churchill and his 
Chiefs of Staff were, in April 1942, entirely sincere in their acceptance of the 
Bolero-Round-up plan as expounded by General Marshall, and were 
determined to put it into effect. There was certainly not, at that time, any 
alternative and conflicting 'Mediterranean strategy"'.149 Wilmot also 
acknowledges that Britain welcomed the Marshall Plan, claiming that they "did 
not dispute Marshall's general thesis that 'the final blow against Germany 
must be delivered across the English Channel and eastward through the 
plains of Western Europe."150 
Although the British agreed to the 'principle' of a cross-Channel operation, 
they did so regarding 1943 and did not subscribe to any detail or timeframe. 
They were especially ill at ease with the prospect of the enterprise, referred to 
as Sledgehammer, commencing that year. Brooke's assessment as to the 
viability of Sledgehammer was that it was "governed by the measure of 
success achieved by the Germans in their campaign against Russia. If they 
were successful, we could clearly act less boldly. If, however, the Russians 
held the Germans, or had even greater measure of success, our object should 
be to force the Germans to detach their air forces from the Russian front". 151 
However, there was another force motivating the British. At the meeting on 14 
April. meeting, Churchill insisted the Allies provide a defensive cover for India 
and the Middle East as the loss of 600,000 men was unacceptable to the 
Allied cause and he called for protection for Australia and the remaining 
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territories throughout the Pacific. Brooke supported his Premier's view that 
efforts were needed to ensure that the Japanese were checked and the 
Middle Eastern sphere secured and later wrote in his diary that ''The fear I 
have is that they should concentrate on this offensive at the expense of all 
else! We have therefore been pressing on them the importance of providing 
American assistance in the Indian Ocean and Middle East".152 Both he and 
Churchill asked their American guests to dispatch warships to serve with the 
Home Fleet, as this would enable the Royal Navy to send units to the Indian 
Ocean and Churchill added the hope that Britain could deploy three carriers to 
that task. He conveyed to his guests his belief that "if, say, two or three more 
could be provided by the United States, we would have a force of aircraft 
carriers which would entirely change the situation in the Indian Ocean, but we 
should be able to master the Bay of Bengal and might intervene against the 
Japanese advance Northwards through Burma. Thus, the provision of these 
naval reinforcements would do more than the arrival in India of very large 
armies, and would be the surest way of keeping China in the war. At the same 
time, it would be the best possible means of ensuring that the great project on 
the Continent of Europe could go forward without interference".153 
Faced with the British lobbying, Hopkins spoke of the domestic pressure 
that the Roosevelt Administration was under to switch the weight of the 
American war effort towards Japan. He stated that although the United States 
recognised the importance of the Middle East, Russia and the Pacific, "the 
~ 
American decision had been governed by two main considerations. First, the 
United States wished to fight not only on the sea, but on land and in the air. 
Secondly, they wished to fight in the most useful place, and in the place 
where they could attain superiority, and they were desirous above all of 
joining in an enterprise with the British".154 The United States would undertake 
its obligations to protect Australia and other theatres but Hopkins claimed 
"their whole heart would be fully engaged in the great plan now proposed".155 
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He pointed to the increase in landing craft production as an indication of this 
and claimed that while the United States was eager to fight alongside Britain 
"it was true, of course, that each country would be fighting for its own 
interests".156 If Hopkins' comments were a threat to the British that the US 
could abandon the 'Germany First' policy, his hosts were prepared to promote 
their objectives regardless, both politically and militarily. Attlee responded to 
Hopkins by claiming that the British had been trying to survive in the war with 
limited resources but Britain "had great responsibilities in other parts of the 
world, and it was entirely right that we should safeguard these while 
concentrating our main striking force in the European theatre".157 
Portal's158 concern was that Britain would not be able to maintain control of 
the air should an invasion of Europe take place in 1942. His calculation was 
that the campaign would involve 850 Spitfires but the R.A.F. stood to lose 
1250 machines in the first two months of combat. There was only the 
production capacity for 900 new machines and 300 of these replacement 
aircraft would deploy to other theatres. Portal insisted that American aid was 
vital and stated that "without American assistance, by the end of two months 
the fighter forqe of this country would be virtually wiped out".159 The solution 
would be to use all the aircraft manufactured in Britain for cover of the 
beachhead and this would only be possible if the United States dispatched 
their air forces to all other theatres, therefore assuming responsibility for 
protection and preservation of the Middle East and Indian Ocean. Marshall 
had not helped his case by informing the Committee that the American 
contribution to any cross-Channel operation that year would be modest given 
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the time and shipping constraints and Mountbatten's reaction was to counter 
that once this inflow occurred then the Allies could begin examining ways to 
implement the American plan. 
Despite these initial concerns over Sledgehammer and the Axis threats to 
Britain's Middle East and Indian Ocean theatres, Churchill closed the meeting 
with the ruling that there was "complete unanimity on the framework."160 He 
announced that he would be cabling Roosevelt to request resources for the 
Indian Ocean and stated that "he could assure Mr. Hopkins and General 
Marshall that nothing would be left undone on the part of the British 
Government and people which could contribute to the success of the great 
enterprise on which they were about to embark". 161 However, precedents had 
been set as although his closing statement was effusive, the Prime Minister 
made no firm commitment to prioritise Europe ahead of any particular region. 
Nor was there any acceptance of a timetable. It also appeared that while the 
Churchill Government and its senior military commanders appeared to have 
agreed to the 'principle' of liberating Europe they were also determined that 
British interests abroad would not be sacrificed in the process of searching for 
a way back into Europe. 
Brooke's scepticism towards the Second Front and his dim view of 
Marshall's strategic ability was intensifying amidst further interaction between 
the two commanders. On 15 April, Brooke wrote that he thought Marshall, "a 
· good general at raising armies and providing the necessary links between the 
military and political worlds. But his strategical ability does not impress me at 
all!! In fact in many respects he is a very dangerous man whilst being a very 
charming one!"162 Brooke believed that Marshall's agenda in pressing for the 
cross-Channel plan was to deflect pressure from King and MacArthur for 
resources for the Pacific and a reaction to political opinion that called for 
assistance to Russia above all else. His account of such a policy was that it 
was "also popular with all military men who are fretting for an offensive policy. 
But, and this is a very large 'but', -his plan does not go beyond landing on the 
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coastll Whether we are to play baccarat or chemin de fer at Le Tourquet, or 
possibly bathe at Paris Plage is not stipulated! I asked him this afternoon - do 
we go east, south or west after the landing? He had not begun to think about 
it"!!163 
Questioning the Cross-Channel Enterprise. 
Following the April discussions, British planning for the Second Front 
moved into a practical phase with the establishment of the Bolero Combined 
Committee in Washington that had the mandate of overseeing the 
transportation of American personnel and equipment across the Atlantic 
Ocean. However, despite the establishment of this Committee, doubts began 
to surface increasingly throughout the British military hierarchy. On 22 May, 
Pound164, Portal and Nye 165 issued an aide memoire to Churchill in which they . 
discussed the feasibility for offensive operations in the European theatre 
throughout 1942 and 1943.166 They claimed that the objective of Britain's 
offensive action so far had been to relieve pressure on the Soviet Union and 
to draw German air and land units away from the Russian Front167 involving a 
series of low-level raids using Special Forces and a series of fighter sweeps 
against the European coastline. Yet the Chiefs made no commitment towards 
the launching of either Sledgehammer or Round Up in their communication. 
Instead, they promised that Britain would "increase the scale of land, sea and 
air operations against Western Europe which have as their object to force the 
enemy air strength to engage our fighters in heavy air fighting, and to contain 
large numbers of A/A defences on the whole Western Front. Concurrently 
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smaller raids will continue to worry him and make him spread his forces 
wastefully". 168 
Although Britain would be making all possible preparations to increase the 
scale of their operations against Europe throughout 1942, there would be a 
limit as to what they could achieve. The memorandum reported that "the 
nature of the coast and its defences are such that against an enemy who 
intends to fight, special landing craft are necessary. Hence, the size of the 
forces which we can employ and maintain is limited by the numbers of those 
craft we have available. Unfortunately, this number is still too small to land 
and maintain a force capable of remaining on the Continent against the 
present scale of opposition. We have every intention, however, of carrying out 
operations in the summer of the nature of a major raid".169 The Chiefs 
contended that the British and Americans could re-enter Europe in 1942 "if 
opposition to an assault were sufficiently reduced by either the removal of 
forces or by a deterioration in the fighting value of the enemy". If these 
conditions were evident then the Western Allies could deploy immediately but 
an operation scheduled for the following year was more plausible. This would 
enable Britain to assemble sufficient numbers of landing craft and they would 
have achieved control of the air space. Until then, all the US and Britain could 
do would be to build up their forces under Bolero which in the Chiefs' view 
"will cause the Germans increasing anxiety and, by so doing, help contain 
forces in Western Europe which otherwise be fighting on the Russian 
Front".170 
The British expressed these concerns to Molotov when he visited London 
in June. A Ministry of Defence aide memoire, issued in preparation, cited 
insufficient troop numbers and the consequence of failure as the reasons why 
the British were hesitant about embarking upon any immediate operation in 
North-West Europe. The report contended that the British Government was 
"making preparations for a landing on the Continent in August or September 
when Molotov passed through London, this issue would become one of much contention, 
mistrust, hostility between Moscow and the Western Allies as the war progressed. 
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1942"171 but it went on to point out that "the main limiting factor to the size of 
the landing force is the availability of special landing craft. Clearly, however, it 
would not further either the Russian cause or that of the Allies as a whole if, 
for the sake of action at any price, we embarked on some operation which 
ended in disaster and gave the enemy an opportunity for glorification at our 
discomfiture. It is impossible to say in advance whether the situation will be 
such as to make this operation feasible when the time comes. We can 
therefore give no promise in the matter, but, provided that it appears sound 
and sensible, we shall not hesitate to put our plans into effect".172 
Despite this unease within the military hierarchy, Churchill explored the 
viability of a cross-Channel enterprise, reiterating several of the themes that 
were contained in his report to Roosevelt earlier in the year. His presentation 
to the Cabinet and the Qhiefs of Staff on 15 June 173 began with the assertion 
that any invasion needed to be one that was characterised by magnitude, 
simultaneity and violence. Churchill returned to the theory that more than one 
landing needed to occur and these feints would draw the German forces away 
from the assault beaches. He wrote that "the enemy cannot be ready 
everywhere. At least six heavy disembarkations must be attempted in the 
wave. The enemy should be further mystified by at least half-a-dozen feints, 
which, if luck favours them, may be exploited" .174 Alongside the simultaneous 
landings in Denmark, Holland and Belgium Churchill envisaged that Operation 
Jupiter, the proposed landing in Norway, would have commenced as well. 
Churchill made the case that ten armoured divisions needed to be ashore in 
the first wave. Along with having to accept the high risks involved in their 
assault, these formations would have been tasked with pushing deep behind 
the German coastal defences, mobilising local resistance groups, disrupting 
enemy lines of communication and forcing the Germans to engage in combat 
over a wide area, thus spreading their forces. The second wave was to have 
landed behind this initial assault at four or five carefully chosen points on the 
European coastline. If the British could occupy three of these points then this 
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would enable them to build-up a concentration of armour and men ashore and 
from there the battle would have taken shape. This plan also called for the 
seizure of airfields within the vicinity of the immediate battlefield to which 
R.A.F. squadrons would deploy. 
The operation along with the feints would have had to achieve their 
objectives within a week of the initial landings commencing. Churchill 
estimated that 400,000 men would have been required and "the moment any 
port is gained and open, the Third wave of attack should start. This will be 
carried from our Western ports in large ships. It should comprise not less that 
300,000 infantry with their own artillery plus part of that belonging to the 
earlier-landed formations".175 This would have meant that over 700,000 Allied 
troops in total would have been involved. Churchill acknowledged that there 
would have been a high casualty rate under this proposal. When discussing 
the air component of the attack he wrote that "abnormal wastage must be 
accepted in this first phase,"176 although after the landings had taken place, 
"the phase of sudden violence irrespective of losses being over, the further 
course of the campaign may follow the normal and conventional lines of 
organisation and supply. It then becomes a matter of reinforcement and 
concerted movement. Fronts will have developed, and orderly progress will be 
possible" .1n Churchill concluded with a warning as to the possibility of failure. 
He wrote that "unless we are prepared to commit the immense forces 
comprised in the first three wav~s to a hostile shore with the certainty then 
many of our attack will miscarry, and that if we fail the whole stake will be lost, 
we ought not to attempt such an extraordinary operation of war under modern 
conditions" .178 
On the same day in which he issued this memorandum, Churchill 
convened a meeting of the War Cabinet Chief of Staff Committee at which he 
reiterated his view that the success of a cross-Channel assault depended on 






on the broadest possible front" .179 The Prime Minister had adjusted his plan in 
that he now expounded the benefits of landing a force on the northern coast 
of Spain and having it push into France from that direction. He also 
acknowledged that it would take time for the Allies to get a Continental port 
into working order given the presence of mines and that the assault troops 
would have to be maintained for a considerable period while still on the 
beaches. Brooke's response was lukewarm and despite admitting that neither 
he nor the C.O.S. had read the minute, he continued to maintain that the 
assault itself was not the only difficulty that the Allies needed to overcome. 
Brooke countered that "one of the principal difficulties would be to link up our 
various local bridgeheads to form a cohesive front and then to pour in the 
reinforcing divisions at a greater rate than the Germans could move their 
formations against us".180 The CIGS also contended that the Allies would 
have to capture two of the major ports on the French Coast not just the one. 
Mountbatten concurred although he pointed out that given the weather 
conditions in Western Europe it was essential that 'sheltered harbours'181 be 
secured rather than specificallt targeting a port or a beach. Mountbatten 
argued that the Allies "could probably dispense with the harbour facilities for 
some time provided that we could get the use of the sheltered beaches".182 
The conclusion of the meeting involved a discussion as to the effect that 
the diversion of American forces to other theatres would have on Round-Up. 
. { 
The minutes from this meeting record that there was consensus that for 
American forces to gain combat experience "it has been suggested that they 
should send land forces to the Middle East, or, possibly, should take over the 
Levant-Caspian front".183 Here it is possible to see pieces of the British case 
regarding the Second Front falling into place. Brooke pointed out that there 
was a serious shipping shortage with forces deploying to other theatres and 
that this was affecting the Bolero build-up but at the same time, Britain could 
not afford to send two more divisions to the Middle East. Mountbatten gave a 
reminder to the Committee that Roosevelt was anxious to see American 
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forces actively participating in the war provided a neat solution and it is 
perhaps no surprise that Brooke's solution was Operation Gymnast. 
By the end of June, the C.O.S. had considered Churchill's memorandum in 
detail and had come up with a set of conclusions of its own. In a War Cabinet 
Committee Paper titled, 'Operation 'Round-Up': Note by Commanders-in-
Chief,184 Paget, Douglas and Ramsey185 agreed that a cross-Channel 
operation required the concepts of magnitude, simultaneity and violence if it 
was to succeed and that it must be based upon the following principles: 
(1) Disregard of losses in the initial phase, 
(2) Deep penetration from the outset, 
(3) The early capture and use of enemy aerodromes, 
(4) The early capture of major ports, 
(5) A very high rate of landing of large numbers of armoured units and 
lightly equipped infantry.186 
The ·chief's agreed that the Allied armour would need to penetrate inland 
as quickly as possible, offering the areas of Pas de Calais, the Seine Estuary 
and the Cotentin Peninsula as the best demarcation points for an attack 
designed to capture the ports of Le Havre and Rouen. The Chiefs argued that 
it was unlikely that the French ports would be blocked or mined and therefore 
could be opened easily once in British hands and would be suitable for 
receiving American reinforcements. The report also stated that the capture of 
enemy aerodromes early in the operation would be crucial to its success and 
the Pas de Calais region as one where the R.A.F. could engage the Luftwaffe 
in conditions favourable to themselves in an effort to prevent the Germans 
from destroying the landings from the air. However, there was a note of 
caution in that the German demolition of the road and rail bridges in that area 
presented an impediment to any advance inland and the coastal defences 
would hamper the build-up of support troops and logistics. The suppression of 
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these defences would require additional Allied firepower and the Chiefs stated 
that "it would be most unwise to employ ships offshore or on the beaches until 
the defences are silenced" .187 
While the objectives were identifiable, the Chiefs warned that the Allies 
lacked the means of transporting enough troops to the Continent to see them 
realised. They wrote: "from our examination of the problem up to date, we are 
convinced that the initial scale and tempo of the operation are limited by the 
capacity of the assault craft and shipping which we are informed will be 
available in the Spring of 1943; by the capacity of the assault beaches, and 
particularly of the exit times from them; by the speed with which we can 
develop major ports and aerodromes; and by the capacity of ports in England 
from which the assaults must be launched and built up".188 They also claimed 
that "the assaults which we estimate we must undertake will use up all the 
craft capable of lifting forces furnished with the minimum of mobile equipment 
to enable them to operate efficiently ashore; and will leave unused only 
personnel carrying craft, for which there are no corresponding M.T.189 carrying 
craft, and also some assault shipping which is unsuitable for employment in 
the Channel.190 This surplus of craft and assault shipping could only be 
employed on diversions which do not require mobile supporting equipment for 
the assault or subsequent maintenance over beaches".191 
The estimation of the Allied lifting capacity was a fundamental difference 
between the commanders and the Prime Minister's plan. The C-in-C's 
believed that the total capacity for one lift, using all the shipping and landing 
craft that would be, available on 1 April 1943, would amount to 106,000 men 
and 14,700 tanks, guns and vehicles. They reduced this estimation further 
citing the limited number of vehicle exits at the chosen beaches, the limited 
number of tanks and motor landing craft and the need to hold shipping and 
craft back until the shore defences had been neutralised. This calculation 
immediately ruled out Sledgehammer, as the C-in-C's estimated that by 7 
December 1943, the Allies would have transported 270,000 men and 30,500 
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vehicles to the Continent as opposed to Churchill's calculations of 400,000 
mean and 46,030 vehicles. By 14 December, these figures would have risen 
to 430,000 men and 57,000 vehicles, which was a figure much below the 
Prime Minister's assessment of 700,000 men and 93,271 vehicles being 
ashore at this stage. This military assessment made no allowance for any 
disruptions caused by adverse weather conditions and nor did it take into 
account the lift capacity required to deliver stores for the troops as at this point 
in time this issue was still under consideration. The C-in-C's concluded this 
section by claiming "it is impossible to increase the number- of fighting men 
shown in our estimate above, since the additional motor transport required to 
lift their essential weapons and ammunition cannot be landed and cleared 
from the beaches".192 Only a reduction in the number of administrative 
vehicles used in the operation would allow the deployment of more men, 
transport vehicles or armour to Europe. 
The report was also critical of Churchill's proposal for diversionary raids in 
Denmark and the Low Countries as these would only draw resources away 
from the main effort and, unless they where conducted on a large scale, they 
amounted to what the military described as "an unsound dispersal of effort".193 
The C-in-C's argued that even if shipping was available there was no 
guarantee that the feints would deceive the Germans and it would be difficult 
to justify these tactics under such circumstances. If employed they should be 
limited to the Bay of Biscay area. Instead, the military analysis of Churchill's 
plan called for three to four large-scale assaults that coincided with each 
' 
other. Given the presence of strong shore-based defences, the assault could 
not take place alo~ng a narrow stretch of the coastline, as any attack of this 
nature would be vulnerable to fl~nking artillery and machinegun fire. Hence, 
while the senior military officers who prepared this report may have agreed 
with Churchill on simultaneity, violence and magnitude, they were 




The Consolidation of the British Strategic Plan. 
When Churchill and Roosevelt convened for the Second Washington 
Conference on 19 June, Britain's uppermost military commanders and political 
leaders had become vehement in expressing their view that Sledgehammer 
was not viable. The debate over how best to utilise the American forces in 
combat against the Germans that year was on the discussion table, but for 
Churchill and the Chiefs of Staff, there would be no deployment in North-West 
Europe in 1942. Churchill's memorandum to the President on 20 June stated 
that the British would not favour an operation that sacrificed six to eight 
divisions and that such an outcome would not only be of no assistance to the 
Soviet Union but also compromise any possible enterprise in 1943. Churchill 
wrote that "No responsible British military authority has so far been able to 
make a plan for September 1942 which had any chance of success unless the 
Germans become utterly demoralised, of which there is no likelihood. Have 
the American Staff's a plan? If so, what is it? What forces would be 
employed? At what points would they strike? What landing-craft and shipping 
are available? Who is the officer prepared to command the enterprise? What 
British forces and assistance are required? If a plan can be found which 
confers a reasonable prospect of success His Majesty's Government will 
cordially welcome it and will share to the full with their American comrades the 
risks and sacrifices. This remains our settled and agreed policy".194 The 
British proposed that if there was to be a deployment of American forces 
against the Wehrmacht that year then North Africa provided a more suitable 
theatre of operations 195 as Churchill alluded to in his conclusion. His final 
argument was that "in case no plan can be made in which any responsible 
authority has good confidence, and consequently no engagement on a 
substantial scale in France is possible in September 1942, what else are we 
going to do? Can we afford to stand idle in the Atlantic theatre during the 
whole of 1942? Ought we not be preparing within the general structure of 
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BOLERO some other operation by which we may gain positions of advantage 
and also directly or indirectly to take some weight off Russia? It is in this 
setting and on this background that the operation GYMNAST should be 
studied?"196 
When Marshall, Hopkins and King returned to London for further talks in 
July, 197 Britain's determination for operations in the Mediterranean had 
strengthened and Brooke in particular was resolved that this course would be 
pursued. The day before the American delegation arrived, he wrote in his 
diary: "Spent most of the morning preparing for visit of Harry Hopkins, 
Marshall and King, who are on their way over now, arriving early tomorrow 
morning. They have come over as they are not satisfied that we are adhering 
sufficiently definitely to the plans for invading France in 1943, and if possible 
1942. In my mind 1942 is dead off and without the slightest hope. 1943 must 
depend on what happens to Russia. If she breaks and is overrun there can be 
no invasion and we must be prepared to go into North Africa instead".198 
Churchill and the Chiefs of Staff presented this view as formal government 
policy when the War Cabinet Chiefs of Staff Committee199 met with the 
Americans on 18 July.200 Although the British were prepared to examine any 
proposal Marshall could offer along with preparations for Round-Up, the Prime 
Minister and the High Command had concluded that "there was general 
agreement in this country that SLEDGEHAMMER was not a feasible or 
sensible operation".201 The preferred operational preference was the 
Mediterranean and the Committee stated that "in respect of action in 1942, 
the only feasible proposition appeared to be GYMNAST. It would be much to 
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our advantage to get a footing in North Africa cheap, in the same way as the 
Germans got Norway cheap by getting there first".202 The British argued that 
Gymnast should be "the right wing of our "second front". An American 
occupation of Casablanca and district would not be sufficient. The operations 
would have to extend to Algiers, Oran and possibly further east. If the 
Americans could not supply the forces for all of these, we might undertake the 
more easterly operations with British troops accompanied by small American 
contingents". 203 
The American defence of any cross-Channel enterprise was strident and 
Brooke complained in his diary that he found Marshall and King, "still 
hankering after an attack across Channel this year to take pressure off 
Russia. They failed to realise that such an attack could only lead to the loss of 
some 6 divisions without achieving any result!"204 The Americans did alter 
their plan to include Sledgehammer as an operational first step towards a 
permanent deployment on the Continent but the British refused any 
compromise. Brooke recorded that "I put all the disadvantages to them. They 
did not return to the attack but stated that they would now have to put the 
matter up to the President and wished to see the PM first. I therefore fixed up 
for 3pm meeting with PM and went round to explain to him how matters stood 
and to discuss with him most profitable line of action" .205 Brooke found 
powerful allies for his stance in both Churchill and Roosevelt and this was his 
trump card. When Roosevelt cabled London to state his preference for an 
offensive in North Africa on July 23rc:t and cast his veto on Sledgehammer, he 
presented Marshall and those supporting the Second Front with their fait 
accompli. 
The momentum had now shifted decisively towards campaigning in the 
Mediterranean. On 26 July, Churchill sent Roosevelt a telegram in which he 
expressed his opposition towards Sledgehammer and provided another 
example of his inconsistent thinking towards strategy. Churchill appears to 
endorse Sledgehammer, albeit as part of an operation involving Torch and it 
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is unclear why he would do so except to suggest that he may have believed it 
would soften any American opposition towards a Mediterranean offensive or 
perhaps he believed at that moment in time such an enterprise was possible. 
Whatever his rationale, he wrote that the Allies "must establish a second front 
this year and attack at the earliest moment. As I see it this second front 
consists of a main body holding the enemy pinned opposite 
SLEDGEHAMMER and a wide flanking movement called TORCH (hitherto 
called GYMNAST).206 Churchill still pressed for Jupiter and stated that "we 
must also work up SLEDGEHAMMER with the utmost vigour''.207 
In the context of the July talks and Marshall's failure to persuade the 
British to adopt Sledgehammer, this telegram is something of an anomaly. 
Churchill was not prepared to 'work up to Sledgehammer with the utmost 
vigour' because in the same telegram he cautioned Roosevelt that, "nothing 
must interfere with TORCH", 2°8 and on the 2ih he outlined his plans for. 
Torch, contradicting Marshall's proposal that the Allies land on Morocco's 
Atlantic coast with the demand that the landings take place further to the 
east.209 With the appointment of Eisenhower as Supreme Commander for 
Torch and the acceptance by the British that it would be an American-led 
operation, the passage of time had dealt Sledgehammer its fatal blow. On 24 
October, Churchill dismissed it outright in a memorandum to the War 
Cabinet210 citing large concentrations of German ground forces in the Pas de 
Calais area along with a strong Luftwaffe concentration that stood ready to 
counter the Allied threat. There was also the criticism. that the beaches and 
tides were unfavourable to any amphibious landing and that the area's ports 
where either too shallow for shipping or landing craft or destroyed. 
This statement would appear to mirror what the Commanders-in-Chief had 
said in their June report and would indicate that Churchill himself now was 
thinking along similar lines even though he refused to dismiss the possibility of 
a cross-C_hannel assault altogether. Nevertheless his summation of 
206 Kimball, Volume 2. 26 July 1942. 543. 
207 Ibid. 
208 Ibid. 
209 Marshall feared that Spain would allow the Germans to block the Straits of Gibraltar hence 
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Sledgehammer was that "it would have little chance of success, unless the 
Germans were completely demoralised and virtually in collapse, observing 
that it would have to be either an assault on the Pas de Calais, where the 
enemy is strongest and conditions are most adverse, or alternatively, an 
opposed landing at some point outside air cover. Personally I was sure that 
the newly raised United States formations, as well as our own somewhat 
matured forces could not establish themselves on the French coast, still less 
advance far inland, in the teeth of well-organised German opposition".211 
Regarding the Second Front, he reminded the Cabinet that "both the 
President and I continued to regard it as the main and most attractive form of 
the first American impact upon the Western theatre of war,"212 but it was 
secondary to Gymnast. The Prime Minister stated that "it was agreed that 
further resolute efforts should be made to overcome the obvious dangers and 
difficulties of the enterprises, and that, if a sound and sensible plan could be 
contrived we should not hesitate to give effect to it. It was also agreed that, as 
an alternative for 1942, the Gymnast plan should be completed in all details 
as soon as possible".213 Churchill claimed that throughout the discussions with 
Marshall and King in July, he had convinced them of Gymnast's benefits and 
viability and that this operation represented the first phase in the Allied 
offensive plan to achieve victory but that all operations in 1943 depended 
upon its success. There is a sense of optimism within Churchill's words. He 
wrote: "not only shall we open a route under air protection through the 
Mediterranean, but we shall be in a position to attack the under-belly of the 
Axis at whatever may be the softest point, i.e. Sicily, Southern Italy or perhaps 
Sardinia; or again, if circumstance warrant, or as they may do, compel, the 
French Riveria or perhaps even, with Turkish aid, the Balkans. However this 
may turn out, and it is silly to try to peer too far ahead, our war from now on till 
the summer of 1943 will be waged in the Mediterranean theatre".214 Churchill 
argued that while it was important not to disregard Round-Up, the operation 







No Second Front in 1942. Doubts Over 1943. 
Agreement from British Chiefs of Staff towards this position came in a 
paper that they presented to the War Cabinet six days later.216 In this 
document, Brooke, Pound and Portal stated that it was no longer possible for 
the Allies to land large-scale forces on the Continent at that point in time. The 
British Empire was approaching its maximum capacity for military and 
industrial expansion and the Allies were "not yet out of the dangerous period 
of the war".217 Once again, the Chiefs contended that the sea routes through 
the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Oceans still needed securing and 
consequently, the Allies needed to prepare for commitments in the 
Mediterranean. The Chiefs placed the Mediterranean alongside France and 
the Low Countries and Norway as possible theatres for amphibious 
operations and ranked them in terms of importance in this order. They made 
the case that at the successful conclusion of Torch the ring around Germany 
would tighten. Thus, Sardinia and Sicily would be open to Allied invasion and 
they could extend their control throughout the western and central 
Mediterranean. If the region became a liability for the Germans, they would 
have to deploy increasing forces to hold their position in Italy and throughout 
the Balkans thus dissipating their strength in Western Europe and relieving 
the pressure on Russia. 
The report claimed that Russia was the only country capable of defeating 
the Germans in the field at that time and that "an unsuccessful invasion 
resulting in a large Allied defeat would be a disaster. It would compromise 
Allied power for further offensive action and would be devastating to the 
morale of occupied Europe".218 The Chiefs wrote of the efforts Britain had 
undertaken to undermine the industrial and military power of the Reich and 
that "our attrition of Germany has hitherto been comprised of bombing, 
blockade, raid and subversive action."219 Nevertheless, they also made their 
opposition to Jupiter apparent. The landings in Norway would not be possible 
216 Brooke, Pound, Portal. American-British Strategy Report. War Cabinet Chiefs of Staff 




owing to tactical difficulties and nor were Allies in a position to attack Spain 
should it have entered the war on the Axis side or be threatened by German 
incursion. The solution lay with a Mediterranean strategy and the paper 
stressed that "this area must therefore be regarded as a potential defensive 
commitment, rather than one in which we should deliberately assail 
Germany's military power''.220 Having identified this region as the main area 
for amphibious operations, the Chiefs claimed that "preparations for a re-entry 
to the Continent from the United Kingdom should be brought up to the highest 
pitch of readiness, provided there is no interference meanwhile with a 
relentless programme of bombing blockade and general attrition, or with 
amphibious operations in the Mediterranean. British resources for amphibious 
warfare are insufficient, however, to provide for a full-scale cross-Channel 
combined operation in 1943 at the same time as sustaining our amphibious 
campaign abroad". 221 
This is an important report regarding Britain's policy as it showed that as 
far as the High Command was concerned the viability of a cross-Channel 
enterprise, even in 1943, had clearly diminished to the point that it had 
become a secondary consideration when placed alongside a Mediterranean 
offensive. In the wake of Operation Torch,222 lsmay,223 a strong advocate of 
Mediterranean operations, issued a memorandum to the C.O.S. in which he 
cautioned "to make no more use of the success of Torch and Lightfoot in 1943 
would be most regrettable. I should be very sorry to see this report being 
accepted as the limit of our action".224 lsmay's desire was that the Allies 
should not be content with capturing just Sicily, Sardinia and raids such as 
that which took place at Dieppe. As an alternative "the effort for the campaign 
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and the Low Countries by continuous preparations to invade, and a decisive 
attack on Italy, or better still, Southern France, together with Operations not 
involving serious shipping expense, and other forms of pressure to bring in 
Turkey, and operate over land wi~h the Russians into the Balkans".225 lsmay's 
point was that if Torch was not going to be exploited and expanded upon then 
it was nothing more that a waste of the Allieitime and resources. However, 
once French North Africa was in Allied hands, they should then move against 
the 'under-belly' of the Axis, and this should be the route back into western 
and central Europe. 
Throughout his diary entries for December, Brooke wrote of Churchill's 
continued commitment towards Round-Up and of his efforts to dissuade him 
from adopting this policy and remain committed to Mediterranean operations. 
Brooke also used the C.O.S. memorandums to the Prime Minister to reaffirm 
his case. For example, on 1 December 1942,226 the C.O.S. used the 
argument that inadequate shipping, manpower and landing craft resources 
prevented the Allies operating throughout the Mediterranean while at the 
same time as preparing for Round-Up. The Chiefs claimed that if six infantry 
divisions and one Royal Marine division were diverted to Torch then there 
would be only eight divisions remaining in the United Kingdom. Nine US 
divisions could reinforce these units but this number would have been 
inadequate for a direct confrontation with the Germans. Therefore, the Chiefs 
concluded that, "it is indeed extremely doubtful whether we could stage an 
effective "Round-Up" against an unbroken German Army by July 1943, even if 
we were to curtail the build-up of "Torch", give complete priority to the 
American land forces over their air forces and abandon all operations in the 
Mediterranean itself. But it is certain that we cannot pursue both these 
objectives simultaneously''. 227 
In a paper to the Chiefs of Staff on 3 December, Churchill admitted that 
Torch had made serious demands on shipping and landing craft resources 
and there was a vacuum in the replacement of these craft and trained crews. 
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Although the Russians had been lobbying for the Second Front since entering 
the war, Churchill argued that it was not in the Allies' interest to press ahead 
with it until they could bring to bear the full weight of their military power on 
the Germans. He wrote: "I feel that Premier Stalin would have grave reasons 
to complain if our land offensive against Germany and Italy in 1943 were 
reduced to the scale of about 13 divisions instead of 50 which have been 
mentioned to him. I feel that our offensive war plans for 1943 are on 
altogether a too small a scale compared with the resources and power of 
Britain and the United States".228 Churchill applauded the defeats that the 
German military had suffered in Russia but he concluded that "no important 
transfers of German troops can be made in 1943 from the Eastern to the 
Western theatre".229 
Churchill calculated that the 31 Allied divisions stationed throughout the 
Mediterranean had forced the Germans to withdraw 11 of the 40 divisions 
stationed in France in order to defend the southern coastlines and another 4 
to 6 would be required to garrison the Italian Peninsula, Sicily and Sardinia. 
This, according to Churchill, was the return on Torch and that "none of these 
facts were present when 'Round-Up and 'Sledgehammer' were considered at 
the London Conferences of July".230 His assessment was that "it should be 
assumed that the North African shore is adequately equipped with Air Forces 
and that the Mediterranean is open for military traffic by the end of March, 
thus securing a substantial relief in shipping: that any "Brimstone" operations 
are concluded by the beginning of June: that all landing craft needed for 
Round-Up should be back in Great Britain by the end of June; that July should 
be devoted to preparation and rehearsal; and that August or, if the weather is 
adverse, September should be taken as the striking target".231 However, such 
inconsistency of Churchill's strategic preference frustrated Brooke who 
constantly tried to rein in the Prime Minister's operational schemes. With 
Churchill's gaze cast upon the Channel once again, Brooke complained in his 
journal that "COS· meeting at which we were faced with a new paper written 





having repeatedly said that North Africa must act as a 'springboard' and not 
as a 'sofa' to future action! After urging attacks on Sardinia and Sicily he is 
now swinging away from these for a possible invasion of France in 19431"232 
Brooke's second entry for the day recorded: "In the evening, 5.30pm meeting 
of COS with PM, Attlee, Eden, Leathers. Long harangue by the PM that army 
must in 1943 fight German army! However, after proving to him small forces 
that might be available, inclined to agree that we might perhaps do more in 
the Mediterranean, unless there are signs of great weakness in Germany''.233 
Churchill's supposed pledge to Stalin that a Second Front would open in 
1943 compounded the difficulty Brooke had in deterring the Prime Minister 
from this course of action. Brooke contested that such a promise had been 
made, to which he claimed Churchill replied that it had occurred on the last 
evening of his visit to Moscow earlier in the year when saying goodbye to 
Stalin and out of earshot of anyone else.234 On 9 December, Brooke 
documented that "Clark Kerr, Ambassador in Moscow, came to see me this 
evening and I had a long talk with him. He corroborates all my worst fears, 
namely that we are going to have great difficulties in getting out of Winston's 
promise to Stalin, namely the establishment of a Western front in 19431 Stalin 
seems to be banking on it, and Clark Kerr fears a possible peace between 
Hitler and Stalin if we disappoint the latter'' .235 Brooke did not put much store 
in the idea of a truce between Germany and the Soviet Union given the Red 
Army's advances, the depletion of Germany's resources that this entailed and 
Stalin's desire for the incorporation of the Baltic countries into the Soviet 
Union. He concluded: "I therefore feel that the danger of a peace between 
Russia and Germany is mainly useful propaganda from either side to secure 
their own ends".236 
Brooke's suspicion of the Soviet Union was coupled with his distaste for 
Churchill's European ambitions and his undertaking to champion the 
Mediterranean strategy. His diary entry for the 15th noted: ''We finished off our 
paper refuting PM's argument for a Western front in France and pressing for a 
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Mediterranean policy aiming at pushing Italy out of the war and Turkey into it. 
By these means we are relieving the maximum possible pressure off Russia. 
Clark Kerr, the Ambassador in Moscow, gave us an hour on his views of 
Stalin's reactions if we do not start a Western front in France. He argued that 
such a course might well lead Stalin into making a separate peace with Hitler. 
I refuse to believe such a thing is possible, and fail to see how any common 
agreement could ever be arrived at between them which would not irreparably 
lower the prestige of one or the other in the eyes of their own people".237 The 
following day he returned to these themes once again and the need to 
convince Churchill that the Mediterranean offered the best chance of 
defeating the Axis and drawing pressure away from the Soviet Union: "At 6pm 
we had a COS meeting with PM. Anthony Eden also there. All about policy for 
1943. As the paper we put in went straight against Winston, who was pressing 
for a Western front in France, whilst we pressed for amphibious operations in 
the Mediterranean, I feared the worstll However, meeting went well from the 
start and I succeeded in swinging him round. I think he is now fairly safe, but I 
still have the Americans to convince first, and then Stalin next".238 
Brooke again argued strongly against Bolero and Round-Up at a meeting 
of the War Cabinet Chiefs of Staff Committee on that same day, and claimed 
that the success of Bolero was subject to the capacity of the ports, railways 
and bases in the United Kingdom to host US formations. He contended that 
once Round-Up was underway, the intake of US forces into Britain would fall 
to one division a month as men and equipment moved out of the country as 
well as in and argued that the Germans could counter this by transferring their 
divisions from the East to West through the excellent rail systems on the 
Continent. The system running along North-South lines through Greece and 
Italy was not as advanced and was vulnerable to Allied attack. Brooke 
asserted that a simultaneous operation under which the Western Allies 
entered Europe and knocked Italy out of the war would be more appealing to 
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the Russians than if everything rested upon Round-Up. In his mind, Round-Up 
could not offer any relief to the Russians until August at the earliest.239 
If the British expressed doubt about the Second Front in their previous 
reports and communications when the War Cabinet C.O.S. Committee 
reconvened on 31 December they were openly critical. Churchill may still 
have been wavering towards Round-Up but on the eve of 1943 Brooke, 
Pound and Portal continued to petition that it was not possible for the Western 
Allies to deploy forces to North-West Europe. Although it was necessary to 
occupy Germany in order to achieve victory, "north-west Europe may be 
likened to a powerful fortress which can be assaulted only after adequate 
preparation. To make a fruitless assault before the time was ripe would be 
disastrous for ourselves, of no assistance to Russia, and devastating to the 
morale of occupied Europe. We cannot yet bring ourselves to bear sufficient 
forces to overcome the German garrison of France and the Low Countries, 
which can rapidly concentrate against us in superior strength and powerful 
coast defences".240 Any assault on Europe must take place before September 
to allow for the weather conditions but in their estimations, the strongest force 
that the Allies could have mustered consisted of 13 British and 9 US divisions. 
The C.O.S. argued that if the Allies gave a higher priority to transporting 
US forces across the Atlantic and a larger proportion of Army support aircraft 
then this would be to the detriment of the bomber offensive against the 
European Axis powers. Forces allocated to Bolero would require amphibious 
operations in the Mediterranean to be halted and this would allow Germany 
the opportunity to rest and re-equip its forces and Italy would be granted time 
to recover its faltering morale. Again, the High Command pressed for the 
attrition of Germany rather than a direct assault; a process that they claimed 
would undermine the industrial and economic base of the Reich and its 
J 
sources for replenishing its submarine and air fleets as well as the self-
confidence of the citizens. If Italy could be detached from the Axis then the 
Allies could induce Turkey into the war on their side. It was the opinion of the 
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British High Command that the Allies needed to follow up Torch with an 
invasion of Italy as that was where the momentum was and without such an 
operation, the Axis would have allowed time to recuperate. 
The year 1942 was a decisive twelve months in the course of the Second 
World War and British and Allied planning towards the Second Front. The 
debate and manoeuvring that surrounded the Marshall Plan continued 
throughout the year yet the culmination of the Western Allied discourse was 
the launching of Torch. The commitment of British and American divisions to 
this offensive drew resources away from the Bolero programme and this in 
turn, meant that if Sledgehammer had of proceeded then Britain would have 
provided the bulk of the formation that would have crossed the Channel. This 
chapter has illustrated that the British could not accept this and as a result, 
the Allies abandoned the possibility that the Second Front could have opened 
in 1942. Although the Western Allies embarked upon operations throughout 
the Mediterranean and Middle East, Round-Up's fate had not been finally 
determined. Marshall, in particular, remained committed to the Second Front 
and with the Anglo-American forces clearing the North African coast, 
Churchill, Roosevelt and their Chiefs of Staff planned to meet to determine 
strategy and plans. They chose Casablanca was as the location. 
Nevertheless, as the Allied leaders and military commanders prepared to 
meet, it appeared that Britain's attitude towards the Second Front had 
prevailed within the Allies' strategic planning on the eve of 1943. 
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CHAPTER FOUR. 
From Casablanca to Teheran: The Compromise of 
1943. 
"It seems to me that it would be a most grievous decision to abandon ROUND-Up. TORCH is 
no substitute for ROUND-UP and only engages 13 divisions as against the 48 contemplated 
for ROUND-UP. All my talks with Stalin in Averill's presence were on the basis of a postponed 
ROUND-UP. But never was it suggested that we should attempt no Second Front in Europe 
in 1943 or even 1944". 
Telegram from Churchill to Roosevelt. 24 November 1942. 
Casablanca. 
The Casablanca Conference opened amidst the changing landscape of 
the Second World War. As American and British forces fought for control of 
the North African coastline, the Axis nations suffered reversals on the 
battlefields of the Western Pacific and the Soviet Union. The purpose of the 
summit, which was an Anglo-American affair,241 was to further determine a 
joint strategy for the future of the war242 with Roosevelt and Churchill travelling 
to Morocco along with their Chiefs of Staff and close political advisors. 243 
Although they had committed forces to Torch at the expense of the Bolero 
programme, the Americans failed to share the British enthusiasm for the 
Mediterranean Strategy. Farrell's explanation of this divergence between the 
allies on the eve of the conference is that "The questions of what was decided 
at Casablanca and the impact of these decisions are approached primarily 
from the perspective of the efforts of British and US military staffs to reshape 
241 Overtures were extended to Stalin in the previous months, as Roosevelt was keen for 
Stalin to be involved lest he looked upon the conference as the western Allies forming policy 
without consultation with Moscow. However, the Soviet leader opted to remain in Moscow at a 
time of uncertainty as to the outcome of the Battle of Stalingrad. 
242 Farrell's analysis of this point is that the conference, "encompasses not only the question 
of balancing current and proposed campaigns against the Axis powers, but also a more 
fundamental point: what was to be the basic grand strategic approach in preparing and then 
executing the ultimate offensives? By January 1943, this question was a chronic point of 
contention in the Allied central direction of the war". Brian P. Farrell. 'Symbol of Paradox: the 
Casablanca Conference, 1943'. Canadian Journal of History. April 1993, Vol. 28, No. 1. 
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grand strategy".244 In his opinion, the reason for this was that "Different vested 
interests remained operative. The men who directed the war from the centre 
in the United Kingdom and the United States operated with very different 
perceptions of their respective margins of power. Despite their growing 
abundance of material, the Allies faced awkward shortages of several 
essential items. These factors virtually dictated that at each crossroad of 
events a conference of principals was necessary, in order to attempt to re-
orient Allied grand strategy to new conditions and restore consensus".245 
While King sought to have thirty percent of all Allied resources transferred 
into the Pacific and Arnold spoke of the benefit to the air forces in acquiring 
bases throughout the Mediterranean from which they could strike at Germany 
and the Romanian oil fields, Marshall remained adamant that all theatres of 
operation were subsidiary to North-West Europe.246 Yet whatever the fault 
lines running through the US command, there was agreement within the 
American delegation that the Mediterranean must not take precedence over 
Europe. Farrell explains that "The J.C.S. failed to forge a firm US consensus 
position to bring to the conference. All agreed that shipping shortages would 
limit global options. They also agreed that British proposals to expand 
operations farther into the Mediterranean would drain forces into a subsidiary 
theatre and prevent what they all desired - the concentration of allied power 
in the UK for a grand strategic offensive, with US forces predominant. Many in 
the War Department viewed the new British outline proposal as a deliberate 
attempt to conserve British power and foster British influence at the expense 
of a more rapid turn to the ultimate offensive".247 
For the British, it was important to their interests that the Mediterranean 
remained central to the Allied plan and that their forces were predominant 
there in relation to the other Allied states if they were to remain an equal 
partner in the trans-Atlantic Alliance and be assured of continued 
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representation on the highest political and military councils. Churchill referred 
to this and the differing priorities of the American commanders in a telegram 
to Attlee and the War Cabinet on 17 January. In this communication, he wrote 
that ''The Chiefs of Staff have been in session two or three times each day 
either alone or with their American Colleagues. The whole field of the war is 
being surveyed theatre by theatre. Admiral King of course considers that the 
Pacific should be a first charge on all resources and both the American Army 
and Navy are very keen on more vigorous action in Burma to help China 
culminating in a large-scale ANAKIM later in the year. General Marshall is 
also keen on this, but otherwise his emphasis seemed to lie towards building 
on ROUND-UP or SLEDGEHAMMER at the expense of the 
Mediterranean".248 He went on to make the point that "So great a 
reinforcement of British troops and our numbers would evidently justify 
increased representation for us in the High Command" .249 
In the opening sessions of the conference, Brooke presented the case that 
German operations against the Allied lines of communication and supply 
throughout the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean posed the gravest threat 
and the lack of shipping resources compounded this problem. Howard writes 
that the C.I.G.S. argued that the Germans "were no longer attacking. They 
were on the defensive both in Russia and in North Africa; their allies were 
faltering, their manpower was failing, and they were growing short of oil. As a 
result, victory in Europe in 1943 was by no means impossible".250 Even so, 
the phrase 'victory in Europe in 1943' did not correspond to an assault on the 
Continent's northwestern seaboard. Instead, Brooke's support for possible 
amphibious landings rested upon his belief that to be successful any landings 
needed to take place at points where the enemy was most vulnerable and at 
their weakest rather than the area where it was most suitable for the Allies to 
concentrate their forces. Using Germany's excellent east-west 
communications as the basis for his argument, Brooke proposed that the 
German forces would be overstretched throughout the Mediterranean, have 
248 Telegram from Winston S. Churchill to Clement Attlee and War Cabinet via HMS Bulolo 
and Admiralty. Strategem No. 56. Paragraph 1. 17 January, 1943. PREM 3/420/3. 
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more difficulties with reinforcement and supply given the terrain around the 
Italian Alps and would remain uncertain as to where the Allied forces would 
land. 
Throughout his diary entries for this period, Brooke portrayed himself as a 
man trying to make those around him understand the merits of the British 
strategic viewpoint and these recordings show that his low opinion of Marshall 
as a commanding officer had not diminished. On 16 January, he recorded that 
< 
"From 10.30 to 1 pm Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting at which I had again to 
put forward all the advantages of our proposed Mediterranean [strategy] and 
counter arguments in favour of a French front plan·.' It is a slow and tiring 
business which requires a lot of patience. They cannot be pushed and 
hurried, and must be made gradually to assimilate our proposed policy''.251 His 
account for the following day indicated that his patience was wearing thin. "A 
desperate day! We are further from obtaining agreement than we ever were! 
Started Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting to be told by Marshall that there 
was disagreement between the Joint Planners on the question of Burma. 
Then a long harangue again on the question of the Pacific from Marshall, and 
finally questions about Iceland!! Decided that it was useless going on 
conferring until the Joint Planners had made more headway. Had a meeting 
between Chiefs of Staff and our Joint Planners when we found that the main 
difficulty rested with the fact that the USA Joint Planners did not agree with 
Germany being the primary enemy and were wishing to defeat Japan first!!! 
We have therefore prepared a new paper for discussion tomorrow at which 
we must get this basic principle settled".252 
The difficulty in achieving a settlement regarding the basic strategic 
principles was due to the suspicion that each side had of the other and their 
failure to see their counterpart's point of view. While the British were 
concerned that the United States would place their emphasis on the Pacific at 
the expense of 'Germany First', the Americans regarded Britain's intentions to 
expand the Mediterranean operations as merely a device to conserve their 
power and believed that the British were not interested in deploying forces to 
251 Alanbrooke. 16 January 1942. 360. 
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the Pacific once Germany had been defeated. Marshall did not want to see 
the enlargement of operations throughout the Mediterranean from which the 
Allies could not easily extract their forces but at the same time, he did not 
wish to see large American formations sitting idle in the UK waiting for a crack 
in German morale before crossing the English Channel. In this sense, he 
supported transferring resources to the Pacific where the Allies could actively 
utilise their forces and not merely hold a defensive perimeter that enabled the 
Japanese to consolidate their positions throughout the Greater Co-Prosperity 
Sphere. 
The United States and Britain concluded an agreement on 18 January 
after arduous and sometimes acrimonious negotiations. In his diary passage 
for that day, Brooke wrote: "We met again at 3pm and I produced the paper 
which was accepted with few alterations!!! I could hardly believe our luck. 
Shortly afterwards we were informed that the President would hold a full 
meeting with the PM all Combined Chiefs of Staff to hear results we had 
reached. We met at his villa at 5.30pm. I was asked to sit next to him, and he 
asked me who had been acting as our Chairman and I told him that Marshall 
had been invited by us to perform that function. He then called on Marshall, 
who at once called on me to expound the results of our meetings. It was a 
difficult moment, we had only just succeeded in getting the American Chiefs of 
Staff to agree with us. However the statement went all right, was approved by 
the Americans and by the President and PM, receiving full blessing. So we 
have reached some results after all".253 The 'results' referred to in this extract 
was an arrangement designed to placate and satisfy the demands of all 
concerned. Dunn's assessment of this outcome is that "Roosevelt and 
Churchill opted at Casablanca for a do-little or nothing strategy in 1943. The 
Mediterranean strategy projected only the conquest of Sicily, and then the 
situation was to be reviewed again. The hope was that Germany would 
collapse under the stress of the battle in Russia and the Allied air raids".254 
The Casablanca agreement was a double-edged sword for British. On the 
one hand, the Combined Chiefs stated in a memorandum outlining the 
summit's conclusions, that "Operations in the European theatre will be 
253 Ibid. 
254 Dunn. Second Front Now- 1943. 35. 
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conducted with the object of defeating Germany in 1943 with the maximum 
forces that can be brought to bear upon her by the United Nations".255 
However, there was no direct reference to the Second Front. Instead, there 
was reference to "the main lines of offensive action"256 that included the 
invasion of Sicily, intensifying pressure on Italy and enlisting Turkey as an 
ally. 257 Offensive action based in the United Kingdom would involve the heavy 
aerial bombing of the Reich along with the launching of amphibious 
operations. In terms of a possible implementation of Round-Up, the 
memorandum stated that the strongest possible force must be ready to deploy 
to the Continent. However, with this came the qualification: "as soon as 
German resistance is weakened to the required extent".258 259 
Contained within these conclusions was the stipulation that operations 
throughout all theatres would continue but only with the forces that the Allies 
had already allocated. This meant that although Husky260 would eventually 
widen to incorporate the Italian, Mainland, there would be no further troop 
movements into the Mediterranean. Hence, there would be no further 
campaigns in the Balkans, the Iberian Peninsula or elsewhere in the region. 
Thus, the Allies had taken the first step towards ensuring that the Second 
Front become ascendant to~ the Mediterranean strategy, something that 
Marshall had campaigned since the United States' entry into the war. 
However, in January 1943, the Mediterranean remained the principal area of 
operations for US and British forces and these proposals formed the basis for 
the Conference's final report that the Combined Chiefs of Staff presented to 
Roosevelt and Churchill four days later.261 
255 Combined Chiefs of Staff. Conduct of the War in 1943: Memorandum by the Combined 
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Stalin's Reaction to the Casablanca Conference. 
The Soviet Government and its leader had monitored the proceedings 
and outcomes of the Casablanca Conference. Stalin had declined Roosevelt's 
invitation to attend the summit a month earlier citing the situation on the 
Eastern Front262 however, in keeping with his wishes to remain informed of 
developments, Roosevelt and Churchill communicated the conclusions to him 
in a joint communique on 25 January. The two leaders claimed to be 
committed to a cross-Channel enterprise: "we are in no doubt that our correct 
strategy is to concentrate on the defeat of Germany, with a view to achieving 
early and decisive victory in the European theatre".263 What they omitted was 
a commitment to a particular point of entry to the Continent for their forces as 
well as a possible timetable. Instead, they signalled their intention to expand 
the US and British commitment throughout the Mediterranean through the 
launching of large-scale amphibious operations as well as increasing the 
number of US forces based in the United Kingdom. Roosevelt and Churchill 
argued that these forces, when combined with their British counterparts ''will 
') 
prepare themselves to re-enter the Continent of Europe as soon as 
practicable. These concentrations will certainly be known to our enemies, but 
they will not know where or when, or on what scale we propose to strike. They 
will therefore be compelled to divert both land and air forces to all the shores 
of France, the Low Countries, Corsica, Sardinia, Sicily, the heel of Italy, 
Yugoslavia, Greece, Crete and the Dodecanese".264 
Churchill was aware of Stalin's reaction to the outcome of the conference 
and the communique that contributed nothing towards opening the Second 
Front nor demonstrated that the Western Allies had decided upon a decisive 
262 Roosevelt forwarded Stalin's reply to the Casablanca invitation to Churchill on December 
17, 1942. Stalin claimed that the situation at the front prevented him from leaving Moscow at 
that time and in regard to the Second Front wrote, "allow me to express my confidence that 
the time is not being lost and that the promises about the opening of a second front in Europe 
given by you Mr. President and by Mr. Churchill in regard to 1942 and in any case in regard to 
the spring of 1943 will be fulfilled, and that a second front in Europe will be actually opened by 
the joint forces of Great Britain and the United States in the spring of next year''. Prime 
Minister's Personal Telegram. Serial No. T 1726/2. 17 December 1942. PREM 3/333/11. 
263 Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary. Stratagem No. 204. Forward of President Roosevelt 
and Prime Minister Churchill to Premier Stalin. Stratagem 255, 25 January 1943. 
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strategy. On the 26th, Churchill warned Attlee, Eden and the War Cabinet 
"Nothing in the world will be accepted by Stalin as an alternative to our placing 
50 to 60 divisions in France by the Spring of this year. I think he will be 
disappointed and furious with the joint message. Therefore, I thought it wise 
that the President and I should both stand together. After all, our backs are 
broad".265 Stalin's immediate response was couched in a friendly tone; 
nevertheless he was prepared to press the issue of the Second Front and 
seek clarity amidst the ambiguity of Roosevelt and Churchill's initial report. 
Stalin expressed his gratitude for the report on the summit yet wrote: ''Taking 
your decisions with regard to Germany as setting the task to smash her in 
1943 by the way of a second front in Europe, I would be grateful to you for 
telling me what concrete operations and at what time are envisaged".266 
Grigg claims that throughout the Casablanca Conference, Churchill 
appeared on easy terms with the President yet he noted "appearances are 
deceptive. In retrospect we can see that at Casablanca Churchill's control of 
events was slipping. TORCH had been his personal triumph, It was his idea 
and he had imposed it upon the Americans and his own advisers. But now he 
was ceasing to be the architect of Allied strategy. At Casablanca the strategic 
design agreed to was Brooke's rather than his. And if he could no longer 
dominate the British C.I.G.S., still less could he dominate the President of the 
United States".267 Churchill had wanted to inform Stalin that following the 
offensive in Tunisia, the US and Britain would seek to force Italy out of the 
war, but the President refused to concur. He suggested altering the wording to 
omit any reference to a possible assault on Italy itself. He wrote that the 
Western Alliance inform Stalin that ''we intend in July, or earlier if possible, to 
seize Sicily with the object of clearing the Mediterranean, promoting Italian 
collapse with the consequent effort on Greece and Yugoslavia, and wearing 
down the German air force; this to be closely followed by an operation in the 
264 Ibid. 
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Eastern Mediterranean, probably against the Dodecanese".268 Roosevelt also 
insisted that the telegram include a pledge to build-up forces for a cross-
Channel invasion in August. He did concede that the availability of landing 
craft and shipping would be a factor in the operation proceeding, along with 
the weather. However, if these impediments arose then the operation would 
be deferred to September. Both of these stipulations were included in the final 
draft transmitted to Moscow on 9 February. 
Stalin's reaction on 16 February signalled his growing discontent with the 
outcome of the Casablanca Conference and the ensuing US and British 
strategy. In this message, he argued that in his opinion, the ongoing 
operations in Tunisia allowed the Germans to transfer forces to the Soviet 
front rather than the stated intention of the Western Allies to divert them in the 
opposite direction. He again urged London and Washington to cross the 
English Channel if they were to deny the Germans the opportunity of re-
building their forces and stressed that "It is evident from your message also 
that the establishment of the second front, in particular in France, is 
envisaged only in August-September. It seems to me that the present 
situation demands the greatest possible speeding up of the action 
contemplated, i.e. of the opening of the second front in the West at a 
considerably earlier date than indicated. In order not to give the enemy any 
respite it is extremely important to deliver the blow from the west in the spring 
or in the early summer and not to postpone it until the second half of the 
year''_2ag 
Churchill immediately cabled Washington on 4 March imploring Roosevelt 
that "We think it important here that we should keep together".270 His next step 
was to provide Stalin with a detailed account of the Western Alliance's war 
situation at that time in another attempt to demonstrate why their 
commitments throughout various theatres prevented any immediate cross-
Channel enterprise from taking place. Churchill dispatched this telegram on 
Roosevelt's behalf and argued that "The Anglo-American attempt to get Tunis 
268 President Roosevelt to the Prime Minister. Telegram. No. 256, 5 February 1943. 
PREM3/333/3. 
269 Premier Stalin to Premier Churchill. Prime Minister's Personal Telegram. Serial No. 
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and Bizerta at a run was abandoned in December because of the strength of 
the enemy, the impending rainy season, the already sodden character of the 
ground and the fact that communications stretched 500 miles from Algiers and 
160 miles from Bone through bad roads and a week of travelling over single-
track French railways".271 Churchill also claimed that the weather had caused 
delays in the Allies' logistical system and that there were over 400,000 
German troops, along with additional Italian forces, confronting their forces. 
He disclosed that the Allies had, "suffered some sharp local reverses towards 
the end of last month",272 and that it would be the 19th of that month before 
Montgomery's forces could resume their forward push. 
It was in this telegram that Churchill admitted that there would be no 
Second Front that year. His reasoning was that the British military estimated 
that there were 30 German divisions stationed throughout Western Europe at 
that point in time and fresh units had replaced those that Germany had 
deployed to Russia. Churchill expounded upon the shortage in shipping 
resources and that "In order to sustain the operations in North Africa, the 
Pacific and India, and to carry supplies to Russia, the import programme into 
the United Kingdom has been cut to the bone, and we have eaten, and are 
eating, deeply into our reserves. It would be impossible to provide the 
shipping to bring back any of the forces now in North Africa in time for 
operations across the Channel this year.273 Churchill returned to the British 
theme that a cross-Channel operation would commence should the German 
forces weaken and concluded: "In the case the enemy should weaken 
sufficiently we are preparing to strike earlier than August, and plans are kept 
alive from week to week. If he does not weaken, a premature attack with 
insufficient forces would merely lead to a bloody repulse and a great triumph 
for the enemy''. 274 
Stalin did not accept Churchill's explanations nor the ambiguity contained 
within them. He reiterated that the Western Alliance had pledged to undertake 
operations in France no later than the spring of 1943 and that any delays in 
27° Churchill to Roosevelt. Prime Minister's Personal Telegram. Serial No. T/257/3. 4 





such action meant that the Red Army faced increased German forces. Stalin 
concluded that although he recognised the difficulties the Western Alliance 
faced in mounting a cross-Channel enterprise he was unable to accept that 
they had placed the Tunisian offensive on hold. He wrote, "I deem it my duty 
to warn you in the strongest possible manner how dangerous would be from 
the viewpoint of our common cause further delay in the opening of the second 
front in France. This is the reason why the uncertainty of your statements 
concerning the Anglo-American offensive across the Channel arouses grave 
anxiety in me about which I feel I cannot be silent".275 
Maintaining the Status Quo. 
Stalin would remain true to his word and continued agitating for the 
opening of the Second Front throughout the months ahead. However, Britain's 
strategic planning demonstrated a remarkable amount of resilience to both the 
Soviet Government's criticism and pressure and the changes in the 
circumstances of the war. The Combined Chiefs' memorandum and the final 
report of the Casablanca Conference did not refer to an extension of the 
Mediterranean strategy to incorporate the Italian mainland. Nevertheless, 
Martin Gilbert claims that this is exactly what the British had in mind and that 
the Prime Minister had cast his eye towards an invasion of the Italian 
mainland, "with the object of preparing the way for a very large-scale offensive 
on the underbelly of the Axis in 1943."276 Brooke's diary entry, recorded two 
days prior to the release of the final report, hints that this is what he had in 
mind despite it not becoming formal policy: "I wanted to ensure that Germany 
should continue to be regarded as our primary enemy and that the defeat of 
Japan must come after that of Germany. Secondly that for the present 
Germany can best be . attacked through the medium of Italy in the 
Mediterranean, and thirdly that this can best be achieved with a policy directly 
against Sicily. All these points have been secured, and in addition many minor 
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ones connected with Turkey, command of operations in Tunisia and at home 
etc. It has been quite the hardest 10 days I have had from the point of view of 
difficulty of handling the work". 277 
With an eye firmly cast towards the Italian Peninsula, Churchill issued a 
personal minute to the C.O.S. Committee on 18 April in which he clearly 
stated that there was no possibility of any Sledgehammer operation278 taking 
place that year and that it would be 1944 before Round-Up would commence. 
Once again, the emphasis was on the lack of progress in the air campaign, 
the shortfall in shipping and landing craft resources and possible operations in 
Norway and on the Iberian Peninsula as potential barriers. Even in the face of 
mounting Soviet pressure, Churchill did not shift his attention away from the 
idea of diversionary raids and he reiterated his view was that ""JUPITER" 
must again be considered as a possibility for January 1944, or whatever is the 
best winter month."279 The minute included a note of caution that "Neither can 
we exclude the possibility of a German excursion into the Spanish Peninsula, 
and plans should be brought up-to-date for Anglo-American intervention there 
on the assumption, now almost certain, that the Spaniards and Portuguese 
will resist the Germans. The re-arrangement of the forces in Great Britain 
should be adapted to the above purposes rather than to a 
"SLEDGEHAMMER" or "ROUNDUP".280 
According to Churchill, Britain remained committed to the "gradual building 
up of "BOLERO" and long-term study for "ROUNDUP" in 1944",281 as well as 
the commencement of an amphibious feint for which the Allied forces 
stationed in the United Kingdom were to stand ready for. Such low-level 
operations were a useful tool for the British as they enabled them to 
demonstrate to the United States and the Soviet Union that they had not 
abandoned their support for committing forces to Continental operations. At 
the same time, London could evade having to take such an action while they 
believed that German morale had not cracked and when they did not believe 
m Alanbrooke. 22 January 1942, 366-367. 
278 This denotes an Allied landing in France that would take place for a short period of time 
and act as a'diversionary measure to draw German forces from the Russian Front. Round-
U~, as defined in the previous chapter, would have entailed a long term commitment. 
27 Prime Ministers Personal Minute. Prepared by General Ismay for C.O.S. Committee. Serial 
No. D.81/3. 18 April 1943. PREM3/333/4. 
280 Ibid. 
92 
that there were sufficient US troops based in the United Kingdom for Round-
Up to succeed. The agreement reached at Casablanca called for the use of 
such a raid designed to draw the Luftwaffe into air combat scheduled for 1 
August. However, in a report to the War Cabinet on 30 April, the Chiefs of 
Staff cast doubt on the viability of such a plan. The Chiefs argued that the 
landing craft requirement for Operation Husky had mounted beyond original 
estimations and the result was that "there is no possibility of any substantial 
cross-Channel operation in the early autumn of 1943 against organised 
opposition. Only if we were to forgo the exploitation of the Mediterranean after 
"Husky'' should we be able to increase the weight of our cross-Channel strike. 
Such action, however, would take us into the late autumn, by which time the 
weather would make operations impracticable".282 The Chiefs also believed 
that the Allies needed to maintain the spectre of an invasion in an effort to 
confuse the Germans and force them to reinforce the Atlantic Wall. Their 
advice was that the Allies make "considerable and obvious preparations at the 
embarkation ports and the assembly of large numbers of barges and invasion 
craft. All this will make a good setting for a feint to produce a substantial air 
battle, which will bring into play our Metropolitan Air Force and the United 
States 8th Air Force".283 
The C.O.S. contended that the American contribution to any Second Front 
for that year would be small with the limitations on trans-Atlantic shipping and 
the need for administrative and command systems to be established prior to 
the arrival of the larger combat formations. They estimated that 120,000 US 
troops would be landing in the United Kingdom each month for the remainder 
of the year bringing the number to 600,000 by December thus rendering any 
earlier operation impractical. They also proposed that the Supreme 
Commander for all cross-Channel operations should be British284 and that the 
armed forces stationed in the UK be re-organised for the deception scheme 
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and then streamlined ready for an actual attack. This estimation forced a 
revision of the Casablanca decisions and the Chiefs' plan included: 
(a) An elaborate camouflage and deception scheme extending over the 
whole summer with a view to pinning the enemy in the West and 
keeping alive the expectation of large-scale cross-Channel 
operations in 1943. This would include at least one amphibious ff:int 
with the object of bringing on an air battle employing the 
Metropolitan Royal Air Force and the United States 8th Air Force. 
(b) A return to the Continent in the event of German disintegration at 
any time from now onwards with whatever forces may be available 
at the time. 
(c) A full-scale assault against the Continent in 1944 as early as 
possible". 285 
However, the circumstances of the war were shifting against the British. 
The continued agitation from Moscow combined with Roosevelt's wish to deal 
with Stalin bilaterally, meant that they not only found themselves being 
pushed outside of the three-power pact but they could no longer keep pushing 
the Second Front further into the future so long as they did not feel capable of 
undertaking the venture. The desire on the part of Marshall and Eisenhower to 
invade Northwest Europe had not waned inspite of the decisions reached at 
Casablanca and the determination of Churchill and Brooke to maintain a 
commitment to the Mediterranean when the British delegation arrived in 
Washington for the Trident Conference in May. Brooke had not lost his belief 
in Mediterranean Strategy nor his distaste for the American policy. On 1 O 
May, he wrote: "I do NOT look forward to these meetings in fact I hate the 
thought of them. They will entail hours of argument, they will pretend to 
understand, will sign many agreements and ... will continue as at present to 
devote the bulk of their strength to try and defeat Japan!! In fact, Casablanca 
will be repeated. It is all so maddening as it is not difficult in this case to see 
285 War Cabinet Chiefs of Staff Committee. Future Strategy: Amphibious Operations from the 
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that unless our united effort is directed to defeat Germany and hold Japan the 
war may go on indefinitely''.286 
Britain's objective at this summit was now the elimination of Italy from the 
war. At a meeting with Roosevelt on 14 May, Churchill claimed that this move 
"would cause a chill of loneliness over the German people and might even be 
the beginning of their doom"287 288 and once again, Churchill returned to his 
oft-spoken arguments. He talked of the possibility that the Allies could bring 
Turkey into their fold, thus allowing them the use of bases on Turkish soil and 
encouraging local uprisings throughout the Balkans and he claimed that the 
Allies had yet to solve the problems associated with a Continental assault289 
and that all available landing craft had been committed to Husky. He also 
pointed to the fact that at that time there was only one American division 
based in the United Kingdom and with Round-Up now scheduled for the 
following year the most experienced Allied divisions in the Mediterranean 
would simply sit idle for the next seven to eight months. 
In response, Roosevelt expressed his concern that the injection of large 
armies onto the Italian Peninsula could result in the Allies engaging in a war of 
attrition that would only serve to aid the Germans and that there needed to be 
an understanding of what resources would be required if such an operation 
were undertaken. Roosevelt accepted that neither Sledgehammer nor Round-
Up would commence that year but with this came the decree that all surplus 
forces above those already based in the Mediterranean would be committed 
to the Bolero programme as had been decided at Casablanca. The President 
argued that the Allies had discussed plans for the Second Front throughout 
the past two years but what they required was a plan under which they 
executed the operation at a certain time without further delay. Yet the 
President played into the British hands by agreeing at this meeting that the 
US and British troops stationed in the Mediterranean could not sit idle while 
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fighting continued on the Russian front and there had to be an engagement 
with the Axis forces if for no other reason than to placate Stalin. 
Although Britain attained this Presidential concession, the Americans were 
beginning to stand firm on the issue of the Second Front and this marks the 
second American decision that would bring about the eventual close of the 
Mediterranean Strategy. It also meant that the division still loomed between 
the two sides and Brooke wrote of this chasm in his diary when reflecting on 
the C.O.S. meeting the following day. Brooke claimed that this was a period in 
which he slumped into depression, as he believed the fruits of his efforts at 
Casablanca were being undone and that the Americans failed to realise that 
the British strategy was to re-enter France but through the Mediterranean. His 
case was that by re-opening the region to Allied shipping over a million tons 
could now pass through those waters and it gave the Allies a great deal of 
strategic flexibility which had been lost in the Axis victories. He argued that by 
attacking Italy and Sicily the Allies were forcing the Germans to expand their 
defences of southern Europe and this would absorb a great deal of the 
German military's resources. Therefore, this offered the best route to the 
defeat of Germany but Marshall disagreed and once again he pressed for a 
cross-Channel attack that would finish the war in quicker time. 
In a communique to Brigadier Hollis, stationed at the Ministry of Defence in 
London, Brigadier Jacob290 wrote of theJ"cleavage of opinion of what is meant 
by ROUND-Up and what the objective of our Mediterranean proposals really 
is".291 Jacob reported that the Americans believed that the British had 
abandoned Round-Up once they had embarked upon Operation Torch and he 
reiterated Brooke's view that the Americans believed Round-Up offered the 
most effective solution of winning the war. He also stated that the United 
States did not believe that there needed to be any collapse in German morale 
or fighting capability for the Second Front to commence. This constituted a 
direct challenge to what had become a fundamental element of Britain's 
strategy. Jacob wrote that, In fact they go so far as to say that if we had not 
290 Jacob's role in the Britman team was to authorise the distribution of telegrams from 
Washington to London detailing the progress of the talks. Hollis served at the Ministry of 
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done 'TORCH' we could now be doing 'ROUND-UP' .292 Yet Brooke refused to 
appreciate this point of view. Any embarkation of the cross-Channel 
enterprise could result in a defeat for the Allies and the failure of the 
Americans to support his plan was another example of Marshall's inability to 
grasp the magnitude of operations and problems connected with a direct 
attack on the Continent. Brooke deliberated on the American strategy in his 
diary for 17 May and concluded: "Another very disappointing day. We had 
long meeting with Combined COS from 10.30 onwards, again discussing 
'Global Strategy', which led us nowhere. The trouble is that the American 
mind likes proceeding from the general to the particular, whilst the problem we 
have to solve cannot evolve any form of general doctrine until we have 
carefully examined the particular details of each problem. The background 
really arises out of King's desire to find every loophole he possibly can to 
divert troops to the Pacific!"293 
The Trident Conference was a victory for Britain's policy towards the 
Second Front but a victory that came with restrictions attached. Despite the 
lingering American suspicion regarding British motives in the Mediterranean294 
and an agreement that the Second Front would proceed during the following 
year, the invasion of Italy would commence first. The Americans, after 
insisting on no further troop allocations outside of Bolero, conceded the 
remainder of 1943 to the Mediterranean strategy. On 19 May, Brooke 
acknowledged this development: "Our conclusions are that we are to prepare 
some 29 divisions for entry into France early in 1944, and at the same time a 
continuance of pressure against Italy in the Med. The latter is a triumph as 
Americans wanted to close down all operations in Med after capture of 
Sicily'.295 296 Churchill's thinking was of a similar vein. In a telegram to London 
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on 21 May he wrote that "there was yesterday reached an almost complete 
agreement on the series of questions - HUSKY, POST HUSKY, and 
BOLERO, SLEDGEHAMMER and ROUNDUP, the essence of which is that 
we have a free hand in the Mediterranean till November and that thereafter 
we concentrate on a combination of SLEDGEHAMMER and ROUNDUP 
which will be called ROUNDHAMMER, by May first".297 However, despite the 
sentiments that their strategy had once again prevailed, time was no longer 
on Britain's side. When the Anglo-American forum shifted to Eisenhower's 
headquarters in Algiers the following month,298 the Americans took with them 
their determination that the Allies would open the Second Front without further 
deferrals. At the first meeting on 29 May,299 Eisenhower claimed that if the 
Allies gained control of the air then 50 divisions could effectively hold 75 
German divisions in check. Nevertheless, his arguments and those of 
Marshall that only five divisions would be required in an initial assault wave 
met the continued British insistence that the Western Alliance needed to divert 
the Germans from Russia and engage them at several points along Europe's 
Mediterranean fringe. Brooke continued to stress that in his opinion only the 
paper but that it still has little influence on our basic outlooks which may be classified as 
under: 
King still thinks the war can only be won by action in the Pacific at the expense of all other 
fronts. 
Marshall considers that our solution lies in a cross Channel operation with some 20 to 30 
divisions, irrespective of the situation on the Russian front, with which he proposes to clear 
Europe and win the war. 
Portal considers that success lies in accumulating the largest air force possible in England 
and that then, and only then success lies assured through the bombing of Europe. 
Dudley Pound on the other hand is obsessed with the anti-U boat warfare and considers that 
success can only be secured by the defeat of this menace. 
AFB [Alanbrooke) considers that success can only be secured by pressing operations in the 
Mediterranean to force a dispersal of German forces, help Russia, and thus eventually 
produce a situation where cross channel operations are possible. 
And Winston??? Thinks one thing at one moment and another at another moment. At times 
the war may be won by bombing and all must be sacrificed to it. At others it becomes 
essential for us to bleed ourselves dry on the Continent because Russia is doing the same. At 
others our main effort must be in the Mediterranean, directed against Italy or Balkans 
alternatively, with sporadic desires to invade Norway and 'roll up the map in the opposite 
direction to Hitler'. But more often that all he wants to carry out ALL operations simultaneously 
irrespective of shortages of shipping!" 
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Russians could break the Germans on land at that point in time and the best 
strategy open to the Western Allies was diversion rather than concentration. 
Churchill was more receptive to the American point of view than his Chief of 
Imperial General Staff and he declared that he was committed to the May 
1944 deadline. The Prime Minister estimated that by 1 May 1944 the US and 
Britain would have 29 divisions assembled in the United Kingdom and it was 
his opinion that Allied air forces would be at their most effective over northern 
France. The minutes from this meeting recorded that "The Prime Minister 
emphasised that both the British people and the British Army were anxious to 
fight across the Channel"300 yet the Algiers meetings concluded that, following 
Husky, the Allied forces in the Mediterranean basin would move onto the 
Italian mainland. This was the consequence of the Americans conceding 1943 
to the Mediterranean and even though there was a commitment to Overlord, 
that theatre would remain at the forefront of the Western Allies' strategy until 
June 1944. 
In the wake of the Washington and Algiers rounds of talks, the British 
established Overlord as their primary operation against the Axis for 1943-44. 
However, even at this stage of the conflict they still looked to force a 
disintegration of the German economic and industrial capabilities as a 
possible pre-requisite to an attack and having given his agreement to the 
Americans, Churchill expressed his doubts as to whether Overlord would 
succeed and called for Jupiter to be considered even as late as July. The 
disintegration of Germany's military and industrial base was codenamed 
'Pointblank'. It called for the "progressive destruction and dislocation of the 
German military, industrial and economic system, the disruption of vital lines 
of communication, and the material reduction of German air combat strength 
by the successful prosecution of the Combined Bomber Offensive is a 
prerequisite to OVERLORD (barring an independent and complete Russian 
victory before OVERLORD can be mounted). This operation must therefore 
continue to have highest strategic priority".301 In a report issued to Churchill on 
18 August, the Combined Chiefs of Staff acknowledged that the Allies would 
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have to allocate resources to Overlord at the expense of the Mediterranean: 
"As between operation OVERLORD and operations in the Mediterranean, 
where there is shortage of resources, available resources will be distributed 
and employed with the main object of ensuring the success of OVERLORD. 
Operations in the Mediterranean theatre will be carried out with the forces 
allotted at Trident except insofar as these may be varied by decision of the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff".302 Whatever reservations the British still held 
concerning Overlord's potential for success, this acceptance of its primary 
status was a major strategic concession on their part and it demonstrates that 
the United States' policy was ascending within the trans-Atlantic alliance. 
Marshall's two-year drive for a direct attack on the north-west beaches of 
France would finally be realised and although the Allied forces would soon be 
fighting northwards along the Italian peninsula, the forces used in this theatre 
would not encroach on the accelerated Bolero programme. Britain's strategic 
approach to the war was now deferential to the American policies and 
demands. 
The ill Wind from the East. 
Whatever firm decisions the United States and Britain had taken, their 
actions failed to find favour in Moscow. On 11 June, the Soviet Premier sent a 
telegram to Roosevelt and Churchill in which he again accused them of going 
back on the pledge they had made the previous February that a cross-
Channel assault would commence in 1943. Stalin wrote that the 
postponement "creates quite exceptional difficulties for the Soviet Union, 
which has been waging war for already two years under the greatest strain 
against the main forces of Germany and her satellites".303 Stalin made no 
secret of his belief or threat, depending upon one's interpretation, that the 
postponement of the Second Front would have a damaging effect on 
Moscow's relationship with the Western Allies throughout the remainder_of the 
war. He asked whether he should explain ''what a painful impression this new 
302 Ibid. 
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postponement of the second front will make on the people and the army of the 
Soviet Union"304 and Stalin criticised the Western Alliance on the grounds that 
Moscow was not consulted on this matter. 
Churchill again conferred with Roosevelt before formulating a response. In 
a telegram to the President the following day, the Prime Minister claimed that 
Stalin's displeasure was not unexpected and that "in my opinion the best 
answer will be to knock Italy out of the war and let him know the relief which 
will come to him thereby. I quite understand their vexation, though they cannot 
understand the facts that dominate our action".305 Churchill also detected the 
threat contained within Stalin's communication. His explanation to Roosevelt 
was that Stalin's anger centred on the lack of consultation between them and 
Moscow regarding any planning for future conferences. However, Churchill 
was afraid that the British would remain outside of any dialogue between the 
Allied powers. He implored Roosevelt to keep him informed of all 
developments and correspondence and wrote that "all this makes me anxious 
to know anything you care to tell me about your letter sent to him by Mr. Davis 
and the answer which has been received from him".306 In his efforts to remain 
firmly within the circle of the three-power arrangement, Churchill offered to 
travel anywhere for a conference.307 
The pressure that Stalin exerted upon Churchill and Roosevelt increased 
with a telegram sent by Sir Alexander Clark Kerr, the British Ambassador to 
Moscow to Churchill on 14 June. Clark Kerr was blunt in his warnings over the 
impression that the postponement would make within the Soviet Union, the 
importance of not discarding Stalin's opinion or his possible actions and 
cautioned that without an attack on Europe from the West, the Red Army 
would have to bear the burden of engaging the Germans for almost another 
year. He warned that "It is impossible to foresee what a man as unpredictable 
as Stalin might be moved to do but his last paragraph seems to me to contain 
dictum of a kind which we should be unwise to disregard. It is true that we 
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could make a case for a reply to his objection that he was not consulted (I 
mean his absence from Casablanca) but I should not recommend that we 
should attempt to do so".308 Clark Kerr stated that Stalin could not have left 
the country at the time of the conference but by remaining in Moscow, Stalin 
placed the US and Britain in an unenviable position as he wanted things both 
ways. While he could not travel, he felt that he was excluded from the US-
British alliance and decision-making councils. Clark Kerr's solution was to 
convene a summit as "nothing short of a postponement which cannot but 
confirm Stalin and his people in their deep-seated belief from which they were 
just beginning to emerge, that we and the Americans are not really playing fair 
but are deliberately allowing the Russians to bleed themselves to death".309 
In his reply to Clark Kerr, Churchill not only offered justification for the 
Mediterranean strategy but a denunciation of the hypocrisy in Stalin's 
demands and reproaches. Churchill argued that any invasion across the 
Channel would amount to a massacre of the Allied forces and he claimed that 
it was the Soviets who "destroyed the second front in 1939 and 1940 and 
stood by watching with complete indifference what looked like our total 
obliteration as a nation. We have made no reproaches, and we did our best to 
help them when they were in turn attacked".31° Churchill gave full vent to his 
anger and hostility towards the Soviet Union in this telegram. He warned that 
there was a limit to his patience and that the Soviet attitude was driven by 
what he saw as "cold-blooded self-interest and total disdain of our lives and 
fortunes".311 
Yet Churchill's response to Stalin contained nothing of the harsh rhetoric 
that characterised his telegram to Clark Kerr. Instead, his tactic was to claim 
to have understood Stalin's disappointment in his telegram but he wrote that "I 
am quite sure we are doing not only the right thing but the only thing that is 
physically possible in the circumstances. It would be no help to Russia if we 
threw away a hundred thousand men in a disastrous cross-Channel attack 
such as would, in my opinion, certainly occur if we tried to exploit any success 
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that might be gained at very heavy cost.312 Churchill argued that the German 
forces stationed in France posed too formidable an obstacle for an invasion to 
be successful and that these forward divisions could be reinforced utilising the 
French railway system as opposed to the Allies who would be using the 
beaches and destroyed Channel harbours. Churchill stressed that "I cannot 
see how a great British defeat and slaughter would aid the Soviet armies. It 
might, however, cause the utmost ill-feeling here if it were thought it had been 
incurred against the advice of our military experts and under pressure from 
you. You will remember that I have always made it clear in my telegrams to 
you that I would never authorise any cross-Channel attack which I believed 
would lead only to useless massacre. If there was to be victory then the Allies 
needed to win battles and he used the campaign in Tunisia as an example 
whereby the Allies had destroyed the Axis forces both in the air and on the 
ground. The Germans had deployed forces to Italy, the Balkans, the 
Mediterranean islands and into Vichy France and Churchill claimed that, "It is 
my earnest and sober hope that we can knock Italy out of the war this year, 
and by doing so we shall draw far more Germans off your Front than by other 
means open".313 The conclusion to this telegram contained the suggestion 
that Stalin joined himself and Roosevelt for a summit as it was Churchill's 
view that "the need and advantages of a meeting are very great. I can only 
say that I will go at any risk to any place that you and the President may agree 
upon."314 Once again, Churchill suggested Scapa Flow as a possible venue. 
However, Stalin would not be appeased so easily and as a result, the 
issue of the Second Front developed into a serious point of contention 
between Moscow and the Western Allies to the point where the Soviet leader 
accused Churchill and Roosevelt of misleading him concerning both their 
preparations and intentions to deploy forces across the English Channel. In a 
cable to London on the 24th, Stalin reminded Churchill of the memorandum 
that he presented to Molotov in June 1942 in which he informed the Foreign 
Minister that preparations where underway for a cross-Channel landing that 
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would commence in 1943 and that they had made similar claims to him in 
January and February of that year. Stalin argued that the conditions for this 
enterprise had shifted in favour of the Allies with the US and British navies 
and air forces now holding a supremacy over the Germans and that the 
Wehrmacht had suffered serious defeats both in the Mediterranean and along 
the Russian Front. Moscow would not accept Churchill's argument that the 
Allies could not afford to lose a hundred thousand men in a British defeat. 
Stalin demanded to know of the one million men that Churchill had spoken 
about in earlier communications that he pledged would participate in the 
landings and if the Western Allies had prepared for crossing the Channel then 
why was it not a reality. Stalin also mad~ no secret of his view that the 
Western Allies were not prepared to engage in combat while at the same time 
allowing the brunt of the fighting to fall on the Red Army: "I must say: here is 
not simply the question of disappointment on the part of the Soviet 
Government, here is the question of its confidence in the Allies which is 
severely tried by the above happenings. One should not forget that on all this 
depends the possibility to save millions of lives in the occupied territories of 
Western Europe and Russia and reduce the colossal sacrifices of the Soviet 
armies in comparison with which the losses of the Anglo-American troops 
could be considered modest".315 
Two days later, Churchill attempted to convince Stalin of his reasons for 
not opening the Second Front once again. This telegram included a reminder 
that prior to 22 June 1941 the Soviet Union had done nothing to aid Britain 
when confronted with superior German military power and that the British had 
commenced their aid shipments immediately following Germany's eastern 
offensives. Churchill claimed that "the views of our staffs, which I have shared 
at every stage, have been continually modified by the course of events. In the 
first place, although all the shipping had been fully occupied, it has not been 
possible to transport the American Army to Britain according to the 
programme proposed in June 1942. Whereas it was then hoped that 27 
American divisions would be in Great Britain by April 1943, in fact there is 
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now, in June, 1943, only one, and there will be by August only 5".316 Churchill 
remained insistent that the Mediterranean offered the best alternative to 
defeating the Germans: "Thus not only on the one hand have the difficulties of 
the cross-Channel attack continually seemed greater to us and the resources 
available have not been forthcoming, but a more hopeful and fruitful strategic 
policy has opened to us in another theatre, and we have the right and duty to 
act in accordance with our convictions, informing you at every stage of the 
changes in our views imposed by the vast movement of the war''.317 
In the months leading up to the Teheran Conference, Churchill became 
preoccupied with the Balkans once again. While Roosevelt sought a bi-lateral 
meeting with Stalin, Churchill sought one with the President. Kimball believes 
that the motive behind Churchill's push for an Anglo-American conference 
was to gain American acquiescence for a Balkan offensive that would thwart 
growing Soviet influence in the region.318 Yet the fate of Overlord and the 
intended launch date of May 1944 depended upon which policy the Soviet 
Union supported. If the Soviets supported British operations in the Balkans as 
a means of relieving German pressure on the Eastern Front then this could 
mean a further postponement of the Second Front. However, the British would 
have had to redefine their strategy if Stalin supported Roosevelt319 and 
Churchill was adamant that the US and Britain at least present a cohesive 
policy when he and the President met Stalin and not necessarily one that 
involved Overlord. In a telegram to Roosevelt on 23 October, Churchill wrote, 
"our present plans for 1944 seem open to very grave defects. We are to put 
15 American and 12 British Divs into Overlord and will have about 6 American 
and 16 British or British-controlled divs on the Italian front. Unless there is a 
German collapse Hitler, lying in the centre of the best communications in the 
world, can concentrate at least 40 to 50 divs against either of these forces 
while holding the centre".32° Churchill went on to state that "the date of 
Overlord itself was fixed by splitting the difference between the American and 
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British view. It is arguable that neither the forces building up in Italy nor those 
available for a May Overlord are strong enough for the tasks set them".321 
On 11 November, Stalin cabled Roosevelt to indicate that he would attend 
the Eureka Conference that would take place in Teheran and Kimball claims 
that the arrangements for the conference demonstrated the transformation in 
the relationship between Churchill and Roosevelt. He writes that "The 
President's attitude was more that of a senior than an equal partner when he 
made it clear that there would be no changes made in the schedules for Cairo 
and Teheran. Moreover, as his comment about not ganging up on Stalin 
makes clear, Roosevelt was far more concerned about Soviet-American 
relations than about the Anglo-American alliance".322 Aware that Britain was 
falling out of the great power circle, Churchill informed Roosevelt on 29 June 
that he would not seek to deter any bi-lateral meeting between the President 
and Stalin323 should it take place. He only discovered that Roosevelt had 
invited Molotov to attend the Cairo talks that were a precursor to Eureka 
through Clark Kerr's intelligence, and, in a telegram to the President the Prime 
Minister asked that the arrival of the Soviet delegation be delayed to allow the 
US and British Chiefs of Staff the opportunity to conduct talks.324 Yet 
Roosevelt would not budge. On the day of his departure from Washington, the 
President informed Churchill that he saw no problem with Molotov attending 
the Cairo talks and once again stressed his wish that Stalin did not feel that 
the Western Alliance was conspiring without. him.325 According to Roosevelt, 
both he and Churchill could be glad that the Soviet leader would be meeting 
with them and with that sentiment in the air between the leaders, the Cairo 
and Teheran Conferences opened just over two weeks later. 
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"I must add that I am more anxious the campaign for 1944 than any other with which I have 
been involved': 
Telegram from Churchill to Roosevelt. October 27, 1943. 
The Widening Schism. 
The British may have achieved their objective to continue with operations 
throughout the Mediterranean but the American decision to withhold any 
further troops and resources to theatres outside of North-West Europe and 
the establishment of a date for the commencement of Overlord widened the 
gulf between the two countries. The trans-Atlantic Alliance was no longer a 
relationship between two countries of equal standing and the decline of 
Britain's military power in relation to that of the US meant that London's ability 
to advocate their preferred strategy was ebbing away. For Churchill and his 
senior military command, this was a difficult notion to accept and immediately 
prior to the Cairo326 and Teheran327 Conferences, both they and their 
American counterparts consolidated their strategic points of view. On 18 
November, four days before the opening of Sextant, the American Chiefs of 
Staff produced a memorandum in which they clearly stated that Overlord 
would be "the primary US-British ground and air effort against Germany".328 
The American C.O.S. went on to dictate that, "As between operation 
OVERLORD and operations in the Mediterranean, where there is a shortage 
of resources, available resources will be distributed and employed with the 
main object of insuring the success of Overlord. Operations in the 
Mediterranean Theater will be carried out with the forces allotted except in so 
far as these may be varied by the decision of the Combined Chiefs of 
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Staff".329 The Americans allowed for operations in Churchill's favoured areas 
of Norway330 and the Balkans but only with forces capable of carrying out low-
level missions such as carrier-based aircraft, supply drops to the partisans or 
raids by Special Forces. 
Contained within this memorandum was the unequivocal call for US and 
British operations to be co-ordinated with the Soviet Union. The development 
of dialogue and relations with the Soviet Union was becoming a key element 
within American strategy and this interaction would inevitably become a 
central characteristic of the Eureka summit and impact on the United States' 
relations with Britain.331 The American Chiefs declared that, "we are now 
examining, and shall continue to seek out, methods and means whereby the 
defeat of Germany and her satellites can be expedited through maximum 
coordination of United States, British and U.S.S.R. operations".332 A further 
indication of this process was the stipulation that "The extended plan will 
provide for emergency entry into Europe in collaboration with the U.S.S.R. of 
United Nations forces from the United Kingdom, the North African Theater of 
Operations, the Middle East, and, if required, directly from the United 
States".333 Roosevelt was looking beyond Sextant and one particular theatre 
and towards the larger issue of the United States' role in the international 
system. The President recognised the growing Soviet power, especially within 
Europe, and the meeting with Stalin at Teheran "was indeed of crucial 
importance, for it provided the greatest challenge and the greatest opportunity 
that had yet faced the foreign policy of the United States, in its transition from 
isolationism to an active intervention in world affairs".334 Having also 
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recognised the emerging power of his own country, "the forthcoming 
conference would for the first time allow, and indeed demand, the exercise of 
this new responsibility, in concert with two great European powers whose own 
traditions and interests did not coincide. Roosevelt was therefore determined 
that the meeting with Stalin should succeed, and convinced that he must be 
the medium of its success".335 
Despite this transformation of the international political and military 
balance, Churchill directed his response, contained in a submission to the 
War Cabinet on 21 November at the Mediterranean rather than North-West 
Europe. He made it clear to his own staff at least that he did not favour a 
concerted effort in preparation for Overlord that was detached from the activity 
in the Mediterranean and he displayed his enduring fascination with the 
Balkans. The Prime Minister lamented the fact that the Allies had not 
reinforced Italy, that their forces had lost control of the Eastern Mediterranean 
and that the German resistance south of the Gustav Line coupled with poor 
weather and inadequate Allied equipment for the terrain that was encountered 
in Italy, meant that the advance northwards slowed. Churchill wrote that 
"There is not a sufficient preponderance over the enemy in the front line. 
Many of the Divisions have been continuously in action since the landing 
without any spell of relief".336 The result of this inaction, according to Churchill, 
was that that the Germans had gained a window of opportunity to withdraw 
forces from the peninsula and deploy them to the Eastern Front and he 
admitted: 'We have therefore failed to take the weight of the attack off the 
Soviets".337 In his opinion, the Allies were guilty of "complete neglect to do 
anything effective in the Balkan theatre. The Germans have weathered the 
difficulties caused by the Italian collapse and desertion and with great cruelty 
are mopping up many of the Patriot forces. We shall certainly be rightly 
accused of short-sightedness or even worse in all this affair''.338 
With this claim of an absence of German troop withdrawals from Russia 
and the lack of support for the partisan movements throughout the Balkans, 
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Britain's strategy had therefore failed to achieve two of the principal objectives 
upon which they had founded it. Yet Churchill did not accept that Britain was 
to the blame for these disappointments. He made it clear that in his opinion, 
the culpability for the stalemate in Italy and the German resurgence in the 
Balkans and the Aegean lay with the American insistence that the Allies did 
not transfer any additional forces away from the Overlord build-up. In 
Churchill's opinion, such a demand meant that, "An imaginary line has been 
drawn down the Mediterranean which relieves General Eisenhower's armies 
of all responsibility for or interest in the Dalmatian coast and the Balkans. 
These are assigned to General Wilson of the Middle East Command, but he 
does not possess the necessary forces. Once Command has the forces but 
not the responsibilities. The other the responsibilities but not the forces. This 
is certainly a very bad arrangement and reflects severely on our conduct of 
the war''.339 Having shrouded the report in the melancholy of disappointment 
with the claim that the Allies not taken control of Rome, had not held the 
enemy along the front-line and allowed the Germans to assume control of the 
Aegean, Churchill would not relent in his condemnation of the US policy. 
His final point was that the Quadrant decisions were taken prior to the 
Italian campaign and he maintained that 'We have protested ceaselessly, but 
as we could not obtain agreement we have so far carried out the QUADRANT 
decisions. It has not been possible to meet together earlier. We are now faced 
with the prospect that a fixed date for OVERLORD will continue to wreck and 
ruin the Mediterranean campaign: that our affairs will deteriorate in the 
Balkans and that the Aegean will remain firmly in German hands".340 He 
argued that of the two million American and British service personnel 
stationed in the Mediterranean only 170'000 of them had deployed to the front 
line, and he wrote: "yet here is the place where alone we are in contact with 
the enemy and where we can certainly bring superior numbers to bear upon 
him now. It is certainly an odd way of helping the Russians, to slow down the 
fight in the only theatre where anything can be done for some months".341 The 





withdrawals should cease and all efforts undertaken to capture Rome. 
Churchill again spoke of the need to try to induce Turkey into the war to 
acquire the Turkish airfields and the possibility of Allied commandos seizing 
bridgeheads on the Dalmatian coastline that would aid resistance throughout 
the Balkans and Yugoslavia and re-establish air superiority in the Adriatic and 
Aegean Seas. 342 
The contents of this minute present the image of a leader persisting in vain 
to convince his allies of his government and military leadership's point of view. 
Yet persistent the British were. Churchill and the British delegation arrived at 
the Cairo discussion table prepared to move this agenda forwards although 
with the Chinese Generalissimo present planning for the Far East assumed 
centre stage. This was not a welcome development for the British, who having 
lost their Far Eastern Empire and without sizable forces in that region could 
only have minimal input into what decisions the leaders took. In addition, they 
failed to achieve satisfaction with the deferment of a decision as to the 
command structure for the individual theatres and the cross-Channel 
enterprise. The American proposal that the Allies appoint a 'Supreme 
Commander' for the European operation did not sit well with Churchill or his 
senior military command who responded by saying that His Majesty's 
Government would not place a British officer in such a position of 
responsibility and his preference was for the status quo. The Prime Minister 
argued that "It is not seen why the present arrangement should not continue, 
subject to any minor improvements that can be suggested. Under this 
arrangement an American Commander would conduct the immense Cross-
Channel Operation and a British Commander would conduct the war in the 
Mediterranean, their action being concerted and forces assigned by the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff, working under the heads of the two 
Governments".343 
Given the sentiment expressed in this statement, it is not difficult to see 
why the Americans would have suspected British motives for maintaining an 
341 Ibid. 
342 British commandos and Royal Marine units operated in small, low-level operations 
throughout Yugoslavia and the Aegean Sea in 1943 and early 1944. However, there would be 
no injection of large-scale infantry formations into the theatre. 
343 Ehrman. Grand Strategy. Volume V. August 1943-September 1944. 172. 
111 
active presence throughout the Mediterranean. Churchill made his feelings on 
the subject clear in his opening comments to the Second Plenary Meeting 
despite Roosevelt's statement that final decisions regarding strategy would 
depend on the outcome of the forthcoming discussions with Stalin. Churchill 
applauded the successes throughout North Africa, the Mediterranean, the 
Pacific, the Russian Front and the campaign in Italy. His summary was that 
"In the whole history of warfare, there had never been such a long period of 
joint Allied success, nor with such a high degree of co-operation and 
comradeship extending from the High Command down to the troops in the 
field between two Allies".344 However, despite such words of praise, Churchill 
quickly reminded those around the table, including Roosevelt, Marshall, King 
and Hopkins, that the Italian offensive had slowed and that through bad 
weather and the withdrawal of forces destined for the United Kingdom, the 
morale of those units deployed in Italy had diminished. Churchill claimed to 
have agreed to the withdrawal of the British divisions, "with a heavy heart",345 
and the result was that those units that had remained in place had been in 
contact with the Germans for long periods without respite. 
The Prime Minister repeated the sentiments contained within his 
memorandum that the Germans had regained their footholds in the Aegean 
and he spoke of the British withdrawals from the Greek Islands that they had 
seized but then relinquished due to the Allied inability to capture the larger 
island of Rhodes. Churchill spoke of his undiminished commitment to 
Overlord and that the sixteen British divisions designated to cross the 
Channel would be ready but "this operation should not be such a tyrant as to 
rule out every other activity in the Mediterranean; for example, a little flexibility 
in the employment of landing craft ought to be conceded". Churchill asked that 
the return of the landing craft to the United Kingdom that had been scheduled 
for December be deferred to January although the minutes record that he 
''wished to remove any idea that we had weakened, cooled or were trying to 
get out of Overlord".346 Churchill claimed that Britain was committed to 
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Overlord, "to the hilt.347 However, his projected scheme was to prepare for 
Overlord but inside the framework of the Mediterranean strategy. This 
involved the Allies capturing Rome in the following January, Rhodes in 
February, arranging supplies to the partisans in Yugoslavia, establishing the 
command arrangements, clearing the Germans from the Aegean and 
continuing the overtures to Turkey to enter the war. Across the table, the 
Americans listened and in the face of such dogged argument became 
increasingly determined that their strategic demands would prevail in Iran. 
I 
Presenting the Status Quo at Teheran. 
Churchill, Brooke and the British delegation arrived at the Teheran 
Conference that opened on 28 November as the circumstances of the war 
underwent an even greater transformation in the ten months since they had 
convened with the Americans at Casablanca. Soviet forces were now driving 
the Germans out of the Ukraine and pressing towards the borders of Europe's 
eastern states and as a result, Stalin cast a much larger shadow over this 
conference than he could have done had he attended any of the leaders 
earlier consultations. Roosevelt's desire to seek closer bi-lateral relations with , 
the Soviet Union surfaced in the first meeting. With the opening pleasantries 
concluded, the President began with an account of the war situation from the 
American point of view detailing action against the Japanese throughout the 
Pacific as well as reference to an overland assault that the Allies would be 
launching throughout Burma with the aid of the Chinese. In relation to Europe, 
the area of most concern to Stalin, Roosevelt made it clear that there had 
been a definite intention on the part of the US and Britain to cross the 
Channel throughout the previous year and a half, yet such action had not 
taken place due to shipping constraints and insufficient troop numbers. The 
President explained that the US and Britain had examined a number of plans 
throughout various regions but that this conference was the place to decide 
what definite action would be undertaken. The minutes from this meeting 
recorded that Stalin's response was that while Soviet Union felt that the Italian 
347 Ibid. 
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campaign to be of value to the Allied cause, he believed that "Italy was not a 
suitable jumping-off ground for the invasion of Germany. The Alps stood 
between. Therefore, nothing was to be gained by concentrating large 
numbers of troops in Italy for the invasion of Germany. Turkey would be a 
better point of entry than Italy, but it was a long way from the heart of 
Germany. Consequently, the Soviet believed that North or North-Western 
France was the place for Anglo-American forces to attack, though it was, of 
course, true that the Germans there would resist desperately".348 
In his opening address, Churchill attempted to do a number of things. First, 
he tried to persuade the Soviet leader of Britain's commitment to Overlord. His 
account was that the US and Britain had long agreed that such an enterprise 
should be undertaken and that operations in the Mediterranean were of a 
secondary character but were the best contribution the Western Alliance could 
make to the Allied cause in 1943. However, in presenting this explanation, 
Churchill revealed a fundamental weakness in the British military structure 
,. 
and the widening power gap between Britain and the United States. Churchill 
admitted that the Allies would deploy thirty-five Allied divisions across the 
Channel, but the sixteen divisions that Britain was committing was the limit 
that a nation of 45 million could do and that the US would have to "broaden 
the front and nourish the battle",349 as it held a larger number of reserves. 
The second endeavour of Churchill's address was to draw attention to the 
situation on the Italian front and while referring to the failure to capture Rome, 
Churchill claimed that the intention of the Italian campaign was to seize the 
capital and the airfields in the north from which the bomber offensive could 
target southern Germany. Yet Churchill also used the occasion to raise the 
possibility of pushing further east in the Mediterranean arguing that he and the 
President had still to decide what action their forces should take in the time 
between the Conference and the proposed date for Overlord. The minutes 
documented that "one of the possibilities was to move into Southern France, 
and the second, suggested by the President, was to move from the head of 
the Adriatic North-East towards the Danube. Meanwhile, however, the 
348 Eureka 1 st Meeting. Minutes of the First Plenary Meeting held at the Soviet Embassy, 
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problem that had been exercising the minds of the President and himself was 
what should be done in the next six months. In the first place, there was much 
to be said for supporting Tito, who was holding a number of German divisions 
and doing much more for the Allied cause than the Chetniks under Mihailovic. 
There was clearly a great advantage in supporting him with supplies and 
guerrilla activities, but these would not absorb any considerable troops".350 
Churchill also spoke of opening the lines of communication and supply 
through the Aegean and into the Black Sea once Turkey had entered the war. 
Such a move would increase the supply convoys to the Soviet Union utilising 
vessels already based in the region whereas at the point in time, the Western 
Alliance could send only four convoys on the Northern Run due to the lack of 
escort ships that were otherwise engaged in the Overlord build-up. However, 
these matters held little interest for Stalin who was determined to gain 
answers on the scale and applicability of Overlord and expressed his opinion 
that "it would be a mistake to disperse forces by sending part to Turkey and 
elsewhere and part to Southern France. The best course would be make 
OVERLORD the basic operation for 1944 and, once Rome had been captured 
to send all available forces in Italy to Southern France. These forces could 
then join hands with the OVERLORD forces when the invasion was 
launched". 351 
Brooke addressed the issue of the Mediterranean in relation to Overlord at 
a meeting of military experts the following day and returned to the theme of 
keeping as many German divisions engaged as possible. His case throughout 
this meeting remained wed to the notion that the Allies should not allow 
operations in Italy and the Mediterranean to come to a halt. Even when faced 
with questioning from Marshal Voroshilov,352 the Soviet Union's chief 
350 Ibid. 
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delegate, as to the benefits of such actions and the determination of Marshall 
to cease all activities in that theatre, Brooke continued to argue his corner. 
The minutes recorded that in his opening statement, Brooke maintained that 
"By the "Overlord" operation a large number of German divisions would be 
engaged, but that operation could not take place until, ay least, the 1 st May. 
There was, therefore, a period of at least five to six months during which, 
before the "Overlord" operation took place, it would be necessary to keep on 
engaging the German divisions. It was important to take full advantage of the 
forces now located in the Mediterranean and of the logistic and other facilities 
established in that area".353 Brooke's account of the situation in the region and 
on the Italian Peninsula mirrored that which Churchill had given to the leaders 
the previous day. He argued that with the Allied forces holding a line south of 
Rome they had engaged around 23 German divisions yet "To speed up the 
advance, it was important to have some forces capable of carrying out a 
flanking operation by means of an amphibious landing."354 He also insisted 
that through the launching of amphibious assaults against the German 
positions in Italy, "German forces would be held in the Mediterranean while 
preparations for the launching of "Overlord" were being made" .355 
Although Marshall reminded his Soviet counterpart that the lack of 
shipping and landing craft had impeded any European operations and that, 
"no definite conclusion had been reached as to the future operations to be 
undertaken,"356 Voroshilov's focus was on the Second Front and any lingering 
reservation on the part of the British over its viability. The Marshal wanted to 
know what measures the Western Alliance was taking to remedy the 
problems associated with the shortfalls in shipping and landing craft so that 
Overlord commenced at the agreed date of May 1944 and he wanted to know 
whether Brooke considered Overlord to be the operation of first importance.357 
Brooke's reply was that the British had always attached the greatest 
importance to a cross-Channel operation but he again stressed that the Allies 
must time their landings so as to allow the greatest chance for success; in 
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other words, when German morale cracked or there was a discernable 
breakdown in the fighting ability of the German forces. Brooke stated that 
"The fortifications of Northern France were very formidable and the 
communications in the area excellent. This gives the Germans a good chance 
of getting up reserves quickly, which makes it essential to lay down certain 
conditions as being necessary for the operation to be undertaken".358 
Brooke claimed that in the British opinion, these conditions would exist in 
1944 and in preparation for that eventuality, the British Army was being re-
organised from a force with a defensive posture into an expeditionary force 
and its divisions were being trained for amphibious landings. The cost of this 
exercise was that it was drawing heavily on the operations in the 
Mediterranean and impeding the progress of the Italian campaign and he 
maintained that for the British such developments ''would be most 
undesirable." Brooke conceded that the operations in the Mediterranean were 
secondary to Overlord, "but that there were certain forces deployed in the 
Mediterranean now from which certain advantages could be derived and 
should be derived. All action contemplated in the Mediterranean, he said, was - . 
strategically interlocked with the rest of the war and played an important part, 
both as regards "Overlord" and as regards holding divisions away from the 
Russian Front".359 The British commander also pointed out that the Allies had 
made detailed studies of every aspect of a cross-Channel invasion but there 
were "certain technical difficulties, such as long shelving beaches which made 
landing operations difficult on many parts of the coast". 360 Unrelenting in his 
drive to keep the operations in the Mediterranean going, Brooke again tried to 
persuade the American commanders of this policy at the meeting of the 
Military Committee on the 30th when he argued for the capture of Rome and 
the allocation of landing craft that would be required for an advance up the 
peninsula. The Americans conceded on the point that the landing craft 
needed to advance on the Pisa-Rimini line would remain in the Mediterranean 
until 15 January as opposed to their earlier demand of December. However, 





further troop allocations to the Mediterranean and that the Chiefs would 
recommend that the President and Prime Minister inform Stalin that Overlord 
would commence no later than June 1st• 
In a conversation with Stalin that evening, Churchill was candid regarding 
his strategic preference and his feelings towards the American point of view. 
His case to Stalin was that the British had preponderance over the Americans 
in terms of forces stationed in the Mediterranean of three or four to one and 
that it was his wish that these forces engaged the Germans at all times. The 
problem lay in the American demand that the British launch an offensive 
against the Japanese in the Bay of Bengal but there was not the landing craft 
available for this to commence. If there were enough landing craft in the 
Mediterranean then this operation could have been possible but Churchill 
argued that "the Americans had pinned us down to a date for Overlord and 
operations in the Mediterranean had suffered in the last two months. Our 
army was somewhat disheartened by the removal of the 7 divisions. We had 
sent home our 3 divisions and the Americans were sending theirs, all in 
preparation for Overlord. That was the reason for not taking advantage of the 
Italian collapse. But it also proved the earnestness of our preparations for 
Overlord". 361 
The record of this conversation illustrates that Churchill was in favour of an 
American appointment to the position of Supreme Commander for Overlord, 
but that the overwhelming number of British forces stationed in the 
Mediterranean meant that a separate command for that theatre must rest with 
a British officer. The appointment of a British officer to the post of 
Mediterranean command allowed them a certain degree of independence 
from the Americans and it meant that they were in a better position to 
determine the course of the war in that region themselves. The records from 
this meeting lend support to this view as they state "the Prime Minister had his 
own ideas about the war there".362 The weakness in the British case was their 
inability to determine the allocation of landing craft as the majority of what the 
Allies were producing was coming from American production lines and this 
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meant that the United States had the final say on its allocation and use. Stalin 
warned Churchill of the importance that the Soviet Union had attached to 
Overlord and his desire to seek a firm promise from the Western Alliance that 
the operation would commence in the agreed month of May. He warned that 
any failure on the US and British side would result in disappointment in the 
Soviet Union and its armed forces and this would lead to bad feeling. He also 
warned that if Overlord did not commence then the Soviet ability to carry on 
the war would be in doubt given the battle weariness of its forces. Hence, his 
main concern was to solicit the promise and commitment that Overlord would 
open on schedule and the Soviet leader received Churchill's word that the 
British were firmly behind the May deadline. Overlord would commence along 
with a diversionary raid in the south of France and at the close of the Teheran 
Conference, Britain had finally given its commitment to opening the Second 




Britain's Commitment to the Second Front. 
"I despair of ever getting our American friends to have any sort of strategic vision. Their drag 
on us has already seriously affected our Mediterranean strategy and the whole conduct of the 
war. If they had come wholeheartedly into the Mediterranean with us we should by now have 
Rome securely, the Balkans would be ablaze, the Dardanelles would be open, and we should 
be over the high way towards getting Rumania and Bulgaria out of the war': 
General Sir Alan Brooke. Diary entry. 19 November 1943. 
The Teheran Conference concluded with the pledge from the United 
States and Britain to Stalin that Operation Overlord would commence in May 
1944. In conjunction with this assault, smaller diversionary landings would 
take place against Southern France and the Red Army would launch a major 
offensive in the East with the aim of preventing any German troop transfers to 
the newly created Western Front. The decisions reached at Teheran were 
formalised in the final report that the Combined Chiefs of Staff submitted to 
their political masters after the Sextant Conference had resumed in December 
and which outlined the course of Allied strategy from the beginning of 1944.363 
The report reaffirmed Overlord as the supreme operation for 1944. It stated 
that, "Operations in the Aegean, including in particular the capture of Rhodes, 
are desirable, provided that they can be fitted in without detriment to Overlord 
and Anvi1"364 and, in order to meet this objective, decreed that, "Every effort 
must be made by accelerated building and conversion to provide the essential 
additional landing craft for the European theatre."365 The Combined Chiefs 
allowed the .offensive aimed at reaching the Pisa-Rimini line in Northern Italy 
to contifue\h~ever, the Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean could 
only ret~lf,{ianding craft designated for Overlord until 15 January. After 
that date, all craft had to return to Europe to begin preparations for the 
opening of the Second Front in a move that for the previous three years the 
363 Report to the President and Prime Minister of the Agreed Summary of Conclusions 
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Americans had favoured for bringing about the Allied victory in the Second 
World War. 
Britain's Commitment to the Mediterranean and Challenges throughout the 
Inter-War Years. 
In June 1940, the Mediterranean region and the Middle East was not only 
a theatre of operations in which combat had commenced and one in which 
Britain could successfully engage the Axis but it was also a region into which 
it had invested military, economic and financial capital beginning in the late 
1880's.366 Howard writes: "Italy's entry into the war had turned the Middle East 
into an active theatre of operations. As a centre of gravity for British forces, it 
was second only to the United Kingdom itself. Egypt has been a place d' 
armies for nearly sixty years. The establishment of British influence in the 
successor states to the Ottoman Empire, the development of the oil resources 
in Iraq and the Persian Gulf, the uneasy responsibilities of the Palestine 
Mandate, all had increased Britain's military involvement in the area during 
the years before the war''.367 Throughout the inter-war period, Arab 
nationalism had boiled beneath the thin covering of imperial defence and 
policing. Iraq, Palestine and Egypt experienced unrest and although the 
366 Britain's influence in the Mediterranean Sea and Middle East rested upon two foundations. 
The first was the dominance of the Royal Navy throughout the Mediterranean Sea founded 
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Nelson's destruction of the French fleet at Alexandria on August 1 st 1798 heralded a maritime 
dominance that lasted until the middle of the Twentieth. Century. The second and most 
significant foundation was control over the Suez Canal. The British government did not 
assume control over the Suez Canal until the Khedive of Egypt sold his majority holding to the 
Disraeli government in 1875 for four million pounds. This commercial domination deepened a 
year later when Britain and France took over international control of Egyptian finance 
following the Khedive's bankruptcy and throughout the next six years this influence extended 
to include political rule with the two European powers establishing a system of Dual Control in 
1881. The following year a British expeditionary force landed in Egypt in retaliation to rioting 
that had broken out in Alexandria. This campaign culminated with the Battle of Tel el Kebir on 
12 September in which the forces under Major-General Sir Garnet Wolseley defeated the 
Egyptian army of Arabi Pasha. Tel el Kebir heralded the beginning of British direct rule. In an 
effort to strengthen this position, the British placed a High Commissioner and Consul-General 
in residence in Cairo along with a financial officer. They also restructured the Egyptian Army 
and its mandate was to maintain internal order especially within the Suez Canal Zone that by 
1900 served as the crucial link with India, the colonies of the Far East and the Antipodean 
Dominions. 
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British moved quickly to subdue any dissent, there was a shift ~n their part 
towards granting the territories a measure of independence while at the same 
time keeping them in the British sphere of control. Although Egypt became an 
'independent state' in February 1922, the terms of the agreement allowed the 
British to retain control over imperial communications, the protection of foreign 
interests within Egypt, the country's defence and the Sudan. The granting of 
limited home rule could not stem the nationalist tide at the centre of gravity. In 
1924, the ultra nationalist Wafd party secured a majority within the parliament 
and nationalists murdered the Governor-General of the Sudan and 
Commander of the Egyptian Army Sir Lee Stack in Cairo. 
The following twelve years where marked by serious division between 
Egypt's political factions and in their relations with the Egyptian King but 
rather than exploit this division Britain gradually withdrew its forces back into 
the Canal Zone and Egypt was granted greater autonomy. This new 
relationship was formalised with the treaty of 1936 under which the British not 
only withdrew their forces to the Canal Zone but they agreed to end their 
presence in Cairo after fou,rs years and in Alexandria after a further eight. 
Nevertheless, even under this new agreement the British could not allow 
themselves to be completely divorced from their influence over Egypt. They 
undertook to train and equip the Egyptian army and the treaty stipulated that 
Egypt was to become a British ally in times of war. The military facilities 
throughout the Canal Zone where expanded to include additional air and land 
forces and permission for British units to train in the desert outside that zone. 
Britain and Egypt ratified the treaty in London on 22 December 1936 and . 
Egypt joined the League of Nations on 26 May 1937 . 
Along with having to deal with Arab nationalism, Britain's position in the 
region came under threat from the ambitions of Italy. Until 1934, the British 
had regarded their relations with Italy as friendly, which had been an ally of 
the Triple Entente in the Great War and even after the formation of Mussolini's , 
government in 1922, relations between London and Rome remained warm. 
Mussolini was a signatory of the Locarno Treaty in 1925 and during the first 
eleven years that he was in office, he acted as the conciliator between the 
European powers. In 1934 Mussolini's anti-German stance and the close 
relations he had forged with France and Britain since taking power, undf::rwent 
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a radical change that was to prove fatal for the fascist regime, the Empire and 
the man himself. Italian forces stationed in Somaliland clashed with 
Abyssinian troops on the border and after a year of threats and military build 
up, Italy embarked upon an invasion in October 1935. The regime of Haile 
Salasee fell to the technical superiority of the Italians and along with Eritrea, 
Somaliland and Libya the Duce had started to build what he regarded as a 
new 'Roman Empire'. The Abyssinian action was in direct contraven~ion of the 
League of Nations' Covenant and on 1 O October 1935, the Assembly of the 
League of Nations resolved to take collective measures against Italy. 
The imposition of sanctions by the League only served to prevent a 
European war in the short term. The western democracies not only tried to 
avoid a war while at the same time acting to prevent fascist aggression and 
expansion. The problem was that these two policies could not be reconciled. 
While conflict did not erupt in 1935, the sanctions merely isolated Mussolini 
from the western democracies and increased his popularity at home. More 
importantly, they had demonstrated that the League was not prepared to act 
decisively to prevent aggression and if Italy could defy the League in this 
manner then there was no reason why a powerful Germany could not follow 
the same course. Hibbert claims that the failure of the League was not 
"merely a vindication of the philosophy of force, it was not only another 
demonstration of the decadence of democracy; the League's debacle marked 
the end of the so-called Stresa Front and the beginning of the ltalo-German 
alliance". 368 
If war had broken out in 1935 then Britain would have withstood the worst 
of the fighting. They could have derailed the Italian war effort by closing the 
Suez Canal to Italian shipping and by striking against the communication lines 
between Italy and her North African possessions, r:r,ost impo~ant being Libya. 
Playfair writes: "of the fifty states in the Assembly who supported the policy, 
Great Britain alone showed any signs of readiness to adopt the extreme 
measures which in the last resort might be necessary to make it effective. At 
the end of September, the British reinforced the Mediterranean Fleet deployed 
at Alexandria, Port Said, and Haifa. There were British troops and air forces in 
368 Christopher Hibbert, Benito Mussolini: A Biography, (London: The Reprint Society of 
London, 1962), 96. 
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Egypt. Signor Mussolini was therefore taking a great risk in electing to fight a 
war in an under-developed country to which his sole means of access was by 
sea - either through the Suez Canal or all the way round the Cape. 
Nevertheless, the gamble succeeded for apart from making a few promises to 
provide facilities at certain Mediterranean harbours for the British Fleet the 
other nations stood aside and awaited events. The Suez Canal, in accordance 
with the Constantinople Convention, remained open to the passage of Italian 
ships, so that warlike stores of all kinds continued to pass freely on their 
way''.3ss 310 
The problem for the British was that any move on their part would have 
precipitated a retaliatory strike against Royal Navy vessels in the theatre and 
the possibility of an air attack on the Fleet lying at anchor. Such action 
increased the vulnerability of the-Sea Lines of Communication between Egypt, 
London and India but the Royal Navy lacked reserves of anti-aircraft 
ammunition and the air defences at its ports were weak. Playfair claims that 
the British would have had to rely on striking Italian facilities at Cyrenaica 
however, the Italian bombers had a far greater reach than those of the Royal 
Air Force and if this were to be successful, then the British would have to 
establish forward landing bases near the western border of Egypt. The British 
forces in the region were already overstretched both in terms of their 
manpower and equipment levels. By reinforcing the border with Libya, the 
British were faced with long supply lines as most of the supply and 
maintenance depots where located in the Canal and Delta regions of Egypt. 
There was also the issue of British forces operating in internal policing actions 
especially as Italian propaganda aimed at stirring nationalist opinion. 
The Italian actions during this period demonstrated that in the advent of 
war, Britain would have to commit forces to three separate theatres - the 
European continent, the Far East and the Mediterranean basin. In a bid to 
avoid this scenario, Britain sought to restore friendly relations with Rome. 
Howard writes that "the long-term possibilities of the new situation were plain 
369 1.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and the Middle East, Vol. 1, {London: H.M.S.0, 1954), 
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enough, and without waiting for the outcome of the war the Chiefs of Staff 
gave their Three Power Enemy warning to the Government: the danger of the 
simultaneous hostility of Germany, Japan and Italy, they said, emphasised the 
need for Allies, and especially friendship with France. It was necessary, in 
their view, not to be estranged from any Mediterranean power that lay athwart 
our main artery of communication with the East".371 Britain's diplomatic effort 
to continue a friendship with Italy failed because of Mussolini's imperial 
ambitions, the emergence of the Axis alliance and the Duce's desire to 
supplant the British as the primary power in the Mediterranean region. 
Jackson points to the torpedoing of British shipping off Spanish waters 
presumably by Italian submarines, the hostility of Italian military and political 
figures in the media and Italian overtures to Arab populations under British 
control as examples of Mussolini trying to gain Mediterranean dominance. 
Italian support for General Franco during the Spanish Civil War placed a 
further strain on relations with Britain and Germany and Italy recognised the 
Franco regime in November 1936. The creation of the Rome-Berlin Axis and 
twelve months later cemented this unity when Europe's fascist regimes signed 
-
the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan. 
The tension between Italy and Britain temporarily eased by the signing of 
the Anglo-Italian Joint Declaration on 2 January 1937 under which both 
countries recognised the freedom of movement within the Mediterranean Sea 
and another potential opportunity to repair relations came in 1938 when 
German forces forced the Anschluss with Austria without consulting the Italian 
government. However, this window was not open for long. In the months 
following the conclusion of the Joint Declaration, Italian military commanders 
declared that they would be strengthening their forces in the Mediterranean, 
the Red Sea and Indian Oceans and establishing a High Command in North 
Africa. When the Munich Conference convened Mussolini stood firmly by 
Hitler's side and in its wake, the British Chiefs of Staff advocated an 
acceleration of Britain's own re-armament programme. In an effort to counter 
the Italian threat, an anti-aircraft brigade and a light tank battalion deployed to 
Egypt. In February 1938, the Cabinet authorised army units in the region to be 
371 Ibid, 5. 
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brought up to strength and provided further transport and the Air Force was 
strengthened, albeit by outmoded equipment and only by one squadron. 
Germany was now Britain's most serious enemy and to provide further 
resources to the Middle East was to deplete those in the United Kingdom and 
responsible for Home defence. 
Central to the British plan was the knowledge that the lifeline of the Italian 
Empire was under British control. Italian war supplies and men had to pass 
through the Suez Canal to reach Rome's East African possessions. As well as 
this, Mussolini's ambitions were proving to be a serious drain on the Italian 
economy however; the Duce's territorial ambitions overrode any fiscal 
concern. Italy might be an Axis member but its lack of financial and military 
capabilities meant that it was in no position to fight a long war on the other 
side of the Mediterranean. Germany could alleviate some of the Italian military 
deficiencies but British military planners considered Italy to be the weakest 
point in the Axis alliance. Their strategic concept rested upon a counter 
offensive against Italian assets in North Africa early in the war preceding a 
campaign against Germany. Howard writes that, "In the First World War as in 
the Second, the positions which the British had occupied ,~he Middle East, 
mainly to safeguard her route to India, in fact proved valuable primarily as a 
base from which they could attack the most vulnerable of their adversaries".372 
The reasoning behind the formulation of this strategy was sound prior to 
1939. The French were the dominant power in the western Mediterranean 
while the British assumed the leading role in the east. France maintained 
large garrisons throughout North-West Africa with smaller forces stationed 
/ 
near the Equator. French forces stationed in Syria where reinforced by 
/ 
powerful naval squadrons at Mers-el-Kebir and Bizerta. The German offensive 
in Western Europe and the division between Vichy and Free French altered 
this picture for the British as not only did they need to counter Mussolini's 
ambitions but they also offered support to the activities and plans of the Free 
French. Following his exile to London in 1940, Charles de Gaulle sought to 
rally the colonies of the French Empire to his cause and he and the British 
selected North Africa as a theatre in which they could establish a base for 
372 Howard, 60. 
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their operations. Thompson writes that "An immediate target for Britain and for 
de Gaulle was Dakar, the French naval base and port of Senegal, French 
West Africa, strategically well placed to menace and to harry British shipping 
in the South Atlantic". 373 
'No' Second Front Now. 
While the Free French and the Italians diverted Britain's resources 
towards the Mediterranean region, the research undertaken for this thesis 
lends support to Leighton's analysis that the British advocated the 
Mediterranean campaign as a prelude to any invasion of North-West Europe 
and accepted the American position that a cross-Channel enterprise was the 
only way of defeating Germany. However, having said this, the thesis has also 
demonstrated that Britain recognised that in the immediate aftermath of the 
evacuation of the Expeditionary Force and the Armistice of Compiegne of 
1940, they faced a land-based enemy superior in the number of divisions, 
equipment and weaponry. Neither was there assistance from a Continental 
power or the United States until the latter part of 1941. Churchill and his 
military commanders; for example, Brooke, were concerned with preventing 
an invasion of their own shores and Britain's lack of military capability 
compared to what it believed Germany possessed dictated its strategic choice 
during this phase of the conflict. This course of action is summarised by 
Sainsbury who writes that "faced with a more powerful enemy, operating on 
interior lines, the obvious course for a country with global commitments and 
resources thinly spread all over the world was to use its superior naval power 
to launch surprise attacks on the more vulnerable parts of the enemy 
occupied territory; harassing the enemy and keeping him constantly on the 
qui-vie, while at the same time encouraging the subjugated peoples of 
occupied Europe to rise in resistance".374 Ben-Moshe presents a similar point 
of view in that the Chiefs of Staff sought a policy of attrition because "Once 
Germany had been worn down it would be possible to go on the offensive on 
373 R.W. Thompson. Generalissimo Churchill. (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1973). 84. 
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all fronts in the spring of 1942. They emphasised that it was not their objective 
to build up a powerful army that could invade the Continent and defeat the 
German army. The Army would enter Europe only when given the opportunity 
to do so after Germany had been severely weakened by strategic bombing, 
by blockade, by internal subversion, and by the organisation of uprisings all 
over Europe. They noted the importance of eliminating Italy from the war: its 
collapse would remove the threat of the Middle East, permit Britain to 
strengthen its defences in the Far East, and tighten the blockade on 
Germany''.375 
The military balance between the United Kingdom and Germany in North-
West Europe did not alter with the American entry into the war and nor did 
Britain's approach to its strategy. The blueprint that Churchill presented to the 
Americans at the first Washington Conference showed that London believed 
that the Mediterranean ought to have been the Allies' primary theatre of 
operations, at least for 1942 despite the entry into the war of its new ally. The 
report also highlighted lingering British fears regarding Operation Sealion by 
stating, "The presence of United States troops in the British Isles would' be a 
powerful additional deterrent against an attempt at invasion by Germany. It 
would enable us to nourish the campaign in North Africa by two more 
divisions and one complete armoured division".376 Had the United States 
entered the war with its armed forces and industrial base fully mobilised for 
war then it could have presented a stronger hand for' when lobbying for the 
Second Front rather than operations in the Mediterranean. Yet, this was not 
the case and Marshall hindered his own argument at the meetings in London 
in April 1942 by not only pressing for Round-Up but also insisting that 
Sledgehammer could become a possibility should the Russian Front collapse 
during that year. 
This was a crucial mistake on Marshall's part as although Britain remained 
in the process of re-building its armed forces and consolidating what remained 
of its Empire in the wake of Axis offensives, they were preponderant in troop 
374 Keith Sainsbury. The North African Landings, 1942. (London, Davis-Poynter Limited, 
1976), 19. 
375 Tuvia Ben-Moshe. Churchill: Strategy and History. (Colorado, Lynee Rienner Publishers, 
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numbers to their allies in Europe and the Mediterranean at that time. 
Therefore, they argued to the Americans that they would have had to provide 
the bulk of the forces to Sledgehammer which would be out-numbered and 
inferior to the Wehrmacht in terms of divisions and firepower while at the 
same time, demanding that the Allies protect the Indian Ocean and Middle 
East from further Axis incursion. Marshall tried to placate the British by 
offering American reinforcements for their units in the Middle East yet the 
inequality between British and US forces proved too much of a weakness for 
him to overcome in trying to convince Churchill and his military commanders 
of the viability of a Second Front. Both Churchill and the C.O.S. conducted 
feasibility studies on the matter throughout 1942 but there was disagreement 
amongst the Prime Minister and his military hierarchy as to the venture's 
chances for success. The reports cited the formidability of the German 
defences, the unsuitability of the designated landing areas, the lack of air 
cover, the continuing U-Boat threat in the Atlantic Ocean as reasons for not 
proceeding.377 The plans were also limited in their scope and called for an 
almost immediate debarkation of British forces once they had landed378 and 
their subsequent dismissal suggests that Britain was not prepared to accept 
the risk of failure as well as the loss of men and equipment._ 
The British stated their objective to defend the Indian Ocean and sub-
Continent and the Middle East at the meetings with Hopkins and Marshall in 
April 1942 yet Churchill's 'acceptance' of the principles contained within 
Marshall's proposal was necessary as Britain needed to ensure that the 
United States did not abandon the 'Germany First' policy. The irony to this 
376 J.R.M Gwyer. The Official History of the Second World War. Vol. 3, Part 1. (London, 
H.M.S.O, 1956-76), 327. 
377 See Chapter 4 for examination of these discussions. 
378 An example of such a plan was Operation lmperator that the British C.O.S devised in 
1942. Under these plans, a British division and armoured units would land on the Continent 
for 2 to 3 days then re-embark for England and would commence if the Russians appeared to 
be cracking under the German pressure. Churchill was against the plan, fearing that it would 
be costly in terms of lives and equipment and that it would be disastrous for Britain's image 
around the world if the operation met in failure. Churchill's objections centred on British forces 
landing on a small beachhead and the superior firepower from the German defences. 
Churchill did concede that if several landings took place then the operation may have stood a 
greater chance for success but a single landing scheduled only for a few days would not allow 
the British formations to advance any great distance into enemy territory. Churchill asked the 
Chiefs of Staff to consider a cross-Channel assault only if they intended Allied forces to 
remain ashore and if the Germans became demoralised by failure in Russia. 
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acceptance is that it could be interpreted as a ruse on the part of the British 
for as long as Europe remained the destination for the bulk of the US forces 
they could deploy units for service outside of Europe which otherwise would 
have been required for the defence of the Home Islands. Britain needed 
American assistance, as their own forces were over-stretched and unable to 
match those of the Axis in ensuring that it retained what was left of its colonial 
possessions and spheres of influence, for example, the Suez Canal. Churchill 
himself made this position clear yet despite his acquiescence, the British 
refused to offer any commitment to a timetable or specific points for possible 
landinD Normandy and they continued to insist that any venture depended 
upon Germany's internal disintegration and collapse of its military capability. 
While the reasons mentioned offered above are possible explanations for 
Churchill's opposition to Sledgehammer, Grigg contends that it stemmed from 
his private doubts over the fighting quality of the British forces especially after 
the loss of Singapore. He argues: 'Wherever political salvation was to be 
sought, it must not be across the Channel. Since the vast American Army that 
General Marshall was raising would not be ready for such an operation in 
1942, the bulk of the forces involved would have to be British; and on all 
grounds Churchill was unwilling to expose them to the venture. He feared 
terrible carnage and above all, perhaps, a setback even more devastating 
than Singapore - and far closer to home".379 380 The British maintained this 
line of argument throughout 1942 and 1943 despite the fact that the aerial 
bombing offensive and naval blockade had not proved successful in 
undermining Germany's economic base or civilian and military morale and 
combat effectiveness. 
The inability of the Americans to launch Sledgehammer and Roosevelt's 
agreement on Torch proved to be the death knell for Round-Up, which was 
also a result of the President's eagerness for US forces to go into battle 
against the Germans at the earliest possible opportunity. Had the President 
Churchill. Prime Ministers Personal Minute. D.116/2. C.O.S. (42) 157 (0) (Final). 8 July, 1942. 
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resisted the pressure from the American public and King and MacArthur for 
retaliatory action against Japan, then the forces could have been in place to 
launch Round-Up and those committed to operations in the Mediterranean 
would likely have been limited to units already stationed there, for example, 
the British Eighth Army and the Commonwealth units. Instead, Roosevelt's 
desire for immediate action dispersed American assets throughout three 
theatres of war instead of two and Britain, retaining the larger share of Allied 
forces stationed in the European theatre by the beginning of 1943, continued 
to deflect US and Soviet pressure for the opening of the Second Front. 
Roosevelt's decision in favour of Torch was a major turning point in the 
war and for the issue of the Second Front but as Dunn and Grigg attest; 
Brooke's obduracy for campaigns in the Mediterranean cannot be over-stated. 
An ardent believer in the principles of a Mediterranean commitment, Brooke 
was also a sceptic regarding the chances of success for a Second Front in 
1944 and even after the Teheran Conference had concluded, he still argued 
in his diaries for the reinforcement of the Mediterranean and the expansion of 
the Italian offensive to include the Balkans and Central Europe. His 
experiences with the Expeditionary Force in 1940 left an indelible impression 
on him as to the power of the German military and this only diminished very 
slowly with time. His diary entries throughout the war and the reports he 
submitted to Churchill and the Cabinet demonstrate that he refused to believe 
that the Allies stood any chance of success confronting the overwhelming 
German power head-on and that Sledgehammer and Round-Up would only 
have served to sacrifice British divisions invaluable to the country's defence. 
His diary entries also show the gulf between himself ano Marshall on this 
issue and his repeated claim that his American lacked the strategic vision 
. ' 
necessary in a competent commander and a man wedded to a Second Front 
' 
plan that in his opinion was doomed to failure. 
' Churchill was not as dismissive of North-West Europe as Brooke was and 
his paper to the Cabinet in June 1942381 provides an example of his belief that 
the cross-Channel enterprise was a possibility. This could have aided 
have faced a serious, if not mortal challenge had a British cross-Channel assault ended in 
failure. 
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Marshall's efforts for a Second Front had the Prime Minister insisted that the 
Allies implement it and had he not been a man so often diverted to the 
prospect of campaigning throughout a variety of countries and theatres. 
Churchill offset his acceptance of the Marshall plan not only with his 
enthusiasm for the Mediterranean strategy but also his belief in the possibility 
that the Allies would campaign throughout the Balkans, drive northwards 
along the Italian mainland and commence landings in Norway. One question 
that arises is whether the Prime Minister fully understood the magnitude of 
what would have been involved in launching a cross-Channel assault or 
whether his military commanders intentionally obstructed him as they were 
less enthusiastic about the scheme. A case in point that would support such a 
claim was the report Churchill produced on the Second Front in June 1942 in 
which he stated that the venture must involve a heavy concentration of 
firepower, mobile formations and coincide with diversionary landings in the 
Low Countries, Southern France and the Iberian Peninsula. Churchill's 
assessment was that at least ten armoured divisions would be required to 
invade Normandy in 1943 and that the initial landings must possess 
overwhelming firepower to subdue the coastal defences.382 In response, 
Britain's military chiefs questioned whether this plan stood any chance of 
success and cast doubt as to whether the levels of forces that Churchill 
proposed deploying would have been sufficient to ensure the operation was 
successful. Therefore, no action was agreed upon or taken. Churchill himself 
was aware of the possibility of failure but had the German formations 
stationed there not been as powerful in number or capability, it is possible that 
he would have accepted the theory of Marshall's plan, most likely for 1943. As 
was the case with Brooke, this thesis did not uncover any evidence that 
Churchill's support for operations such as Gymnast, Jupiter, Husky or 
Crusader were . motivated by political concerns. It is most likely that he 
pressed in this direction to avoid another Dunkirk-like defeat and to maintain 
Britain's military independence from the United States. Another possibility was 
381 Churchill. 'Operation Round-Up'. Selection of Papers on Future Operations. C.O.S. (42) 
169 (0). PREM3/333/9. June 15, 1942. 
382 Ibid. 
132 
that he had cast his eye towards the growing Soviet threat to Europe that he / 
believed Nazism obscured. 1 
There was no sudden abrupt end to Britain's wartime policy regarding the 
invasion of Europe, its predisposition to campaigning along the Continental 
fringes or abrupt flexing of American power or Soviet pressure that dealt it a 
fatal blow. Instead, from 1940 through into late 1943, Britain was able to 
determine its own policy, and that of the Allies, towards a cross-Channel 
assault. Nevertheless, the circumstances of the war and the dynamics of 
Britain's relationship with the US and the Soviet Union were changing and this 
was illustrated throughout Chapter's 4 and 5. It was only a matter of time 
before the United States fully mobilised its vast resources and exercised this 
supremacy to demand the opening of the Second Front and the Soviet Union 
became the strongest land-based power in Europe with its offensives in the 
East. The Casablanca Conference demonstrates this ascendancy and the 
changing landscape of the war because it proved to be the final time in which 
the leaders of the US and Britain met as equal partners and the last in which 
British strategic preference prevailed. Britain gained the concession that 
Husky would succeed Torch and that the North African offensive would 
proceed to its conclusion, yet the consent on the part of the Americans carried 
the stipulation that there would be no more resources allocated to the 
Mediterranean and as a concession to Marshall, the forces allocated to the 
Bolero programme would increase. This stipulation is a major turning point in 
terms of the US-British alliance, operations throughout the Mediterranean and 
the opening of the Second Front. From this point onwards, the campaign in 
Italy would claw its way forward bereft of reinforcements which where 
allocated to Bolero and this extinguished any prospect of a Western Allied 
campaign in the Balkans and push into Central Europe. Dunn refers to the 
outcome of this summit as producing a "do-little or nothing strategy"383 and 
while it was a compromise to all those concerned, this conclusion illustrated 
Britain's military weakness and its increasing inability to determine the course 
of Allied strategy as it had done for the previous three years. The denial of 




reinforcements and the removal of landing craft, equipment and troops to 
Bolero meant that once the Allies controlled Italy, operations in the 
Mediterranean would cease and Britain's strategic preference was becoming 
subservient to that of its Atlantic ally. 
A second important decision on the issue of the Second Front came at the 
Second Washington Conference when the Allies, under mounting US 
pressure, declared that May 1944 would be the definite date for the Second 
Front. By this stage of the war, the Soviet armies were driving the Germans 
back . westwards and Stalin's shadow was looming ever larger over the 
negotiations. Roosevelt began to seek consultation with Stalin rather than 
Churchill and when the Teheran Conference got underway in the New Year, 
the relationship between the United States and Soviet Union had eclipsed the 
Trans-Atlantic Alliance. Britain had become a junior partner in relation to two 
countries whose rivalry would dominate the international system for over four 
decades after the surrender of the Third Reich. _However, even at Teheran, 
Churchill and Brooke continued to advocate campaigning throughout the 
Mediterranean yet by 1944, their efforts were in vain. As much as they 
protested in their government documents and reports and for all of Brooke's 
arguments in his diaries that the Allies should continue on their course 
throughout Italy and the Mediterranean, North-West Europe became the 
Allies' primary operation due to the emergence of American power within the 
United Nations and the rise of the Soviet Union. With this ascendancy, the 
Second Front came to the forefront of the Allies' strategic planning and it 
marked the conclusion of the peripher~~sed strategy that Britain had -.....___..,--
embarked upon in 1940, its ability to defer the Second Front, determine its 
own course of action in the Second World War and ultimately, its position 
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